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Abstract 
Six East Asian countries (EA6) --Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand-- together with Hong Kong (which is not included in 
this study because of its "China connection") have led the economic growth of the 
developing countries since the 1'960s. Their domestic economic policies supported 
macroeconomic stability and rapidly growing trade which led to their integration in 
the world economy. Political objectives were paramount in the formation of the 
European Economic Community (1958) which consisted initially of Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It was also 
hoped that European integration would result in economic benefits from specialisation 
according to comparative advantage, from the exploitation of economies of scale and 
increased competition. West European countries enjoyed buoyant economic growth in 
the 1950s and 1960s but their economies slowed in the 1970s. Meanwhile, 
membership of the European Community expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to twelve 
countries. Integration efforts intensified with the Single European Market and plans 
for an Economic and Monetary Union. These steps were still primarily politically 
motivated but supported by arguments that they would promote faster economic 
growth. 
Trade links between the European Community/European Union (EU) and the 
EA6 countries are weak compared to trade links between the EA6 and the United 
States or the EA6 and Japan. This thesis argues that a major reason for the low 
intensity ofEU-EA6 trade in manufactures lies in the trade regime of the EU. While 
the EA6 have non-discriminatory trade policies, the EU's trade policies form a 
pyramid of preferences that disadvantages the EA6 countries. In addition, the EA6 
have become frequent targets for contingent protection and other discriminatory non-
tariff barriers in the EU. 
A computable general equilibrium model is used to investigate the extent to 
which a continuation of the EU' s discriminatory trade policies could maintain, or even 
increase, the bias against trade with the EA6; the model also examines the effects 
these policies have on GDP in both regions. The Europe Agreements between the EU 
and Central and East European countries are modelled as a key example of the 
v 
preferential nature of the EU' s trade policy. This approach is contrasted with 
hypothetical, non-discriminatory trade reforms in the EU. The effects of further EA6 
unilateral, non-discriminatory trade liberalisation on their trade with the EU and on 
the GDP in both regions are also evaluated. Model results show how the Europe 
Agreements disadvantage the EA6 in the EU market. 
Uruguay Round tariff cuts are shown to lessen the impact of the Europe 
Agreements to some extent. Unilateral tariff cuts by the EA6 are much more effective 
in counteracting the negative impact of the Europe Agreements on their market shares 
in the EU. Even greater benefits could be generated if the EU switches to unilateral, 
non-discriminatory liberalisation. 
This study underlines the key role of the newly established World Trade 
Organisation in the promotion of multilateral trade liberalisation and increased 
economic growth in the OECD and EA6 countries. 
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1 Introduction 
This study examines why growth in trade between the EA6 and the EU has lagged 
behind their trade growth with other developed regions. The EA6 --Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea (Korea), Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan-- were chosen 
for this study because of their exceptional economic dynamism. 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan were agrarian societies in 
1960. Singapore was an entrepot exporting raw materials and importing manufactures 
for its neighbours. By the early 1990s, these economies had greatly increased their per 
capita incomes and standards of living, markedly reduced poverty and become strongly 
integrated into global trade, investment and technology flows. Only a handful of other 
developing countries-- Botswana, Lesotho, Malta, and Mauritius-- have performed as 
well in per capita income growth terms. Chile accelerated its growth in the second half 
of the 1980s. Like the EA6, these countries adopted prudent macroeconomic policies 
and emphasised trade. The growth of the Philippines has lagged behind the EA6. The 
evolution of the Philippine economy has been similar to that of most Latin American 
developing countries, with poor macroeconomic management and a stress upon import 
substitution. This has resulted in low employment growth, inadequate infrastructure and 
high external debt. It is yet to be seen if recent reforms in the Philippines will lead to 
sustained growth. Because these reforms are recent, the Philippines has been excluded 
from this study. China has grown more rapidly since it returned to private production in 
agriculture and "opened its doors" to international trade; Chinese entrepreneurs from 
Hong Kong and other Asian countries have invested in unskilled labour-intensive 
production for export in China's coastal provinces (Jones et al 1993). China, however, 
is still in a state of transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. It 
is very different in economic terms from the EA6. Hong Kong has become increasingly 
integrated with China. Thus both have been excluded from the study. 
Following the devastation of two world wars, peaceful co-existence became an 
urgent objective of West European countries in the 1950s (Nedergaard 1991 ). Thus, 
with political motives at the fore, the European Coal and Steel Community was formed 
in 1952 by the Treaty of Paris. Political aims were furthered when the Treaty of Rome 
was signed in 1957 and came into force on 1January1958, establishing the European 
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Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. The 
founding members of these three Communities were Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Germany), France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA) was founded in 1959 by Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom with Finland as an associate 
member. The group focused on the economic issue of free trade but it also concerned 
itself with political issues. 
The term "European Community" (EC) was widely used to designate the three 
Communities. The EC expanded with the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom in 1973. In 1981, Greece joined the EC and in 1986 Portugal and Spain 
followed. The Treaty on European Union came into force on 1November1993. As a 
result, what used to be known as the European Community has become commonly 
known as the "European Union". The EEC was renamed the "European Community" 
under the Treaty on European Union. 
Although the "most-favoured-nation principle" is the cornerstone of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article XXIV of GATT permitted customs 
unions under certain conditions. These conditions aimed to prevent preferential trade 
liberalisation under the guise of a customs union. The customs union was obliged to 
have a non-discriminatory trade policy towards non-members. It had to be established 
within a reasonable length of time and the arrangement had to cover substantially all 
imports. The EEC was one of the many regional arrangements that did not fulfil the 
conditions of GATT Article XXIV. The GATT Council, however, condoned its 
formation for political reasons. The six original members of the EEC had considerable 
political weight in the GATT Council and they were supported by the United States, 
which saw the EEC as a bulwark against communism (Pomfret 1996). 
The reduction of trade barriers achieved by the Dillon, Kennedy and Tokyo 
Rounds of the GA TT, together with the opening of West European trade as a result of 
EFTA, contributed to rapid economic growth in the EC (and other industrial countries) 
in the 1950s, 1960s and the early part of the 1970s. But commodity price increases, 
particularly in petroleum in 1973-7 4, led to inflationary pressures and monetary 
uncertainty, which slowed economic growth and led to rising unemployment. The 
history of modern economies has revealed that economic uncertainty usually results in 
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calls for protectionism. The 1970s were no exception. Non-tariff barriers, particularly 
against developing countries, were introduced to limit imports. The momentum of 
European integration slowed and was even reversed. Use was made of Articles 36, 100, 
108, 109 and 115 of the Treaty of Rome which allowed temporary border barriers 
between member countries on the grounds of economic difficulties, and differing 
national standards and tax structures. Subsidies became available both to ailing 
traditional industries, such as textiles, and 'sunrise' industries, such as the electronics 
industry (Sharp and Pavitt 1993). Support for the electronics industry came from a 
concern in the 1970s and 1980s that the EC was falling behind Japan in the production 
and export of information technology, particularly electronics. Predictably, protectionist 
measures did not correct stagflation but contributed to the further slowing of growth in 
the EC economies. Inflexible labour market policies, inefficient public ownership of 
enterprises, and regulatory impediments to market entry slowed economic growth. 
In the 1980s, it was argued that deepening economic integration in the EC could 
increase the competitiveness of EC firms, accelerate the expansion of export capacity 
and ultimately reduce unemployment (Waelbrock 1983, Ergas 1984). This view inspired 
the plan for a Single European Market (SEM) by 31 December 1992. Completion of the 
SEM would facilitate the introduction of a single currency and integration of monetary 
and fiscal policies in an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
Not long after the Single European Act was enforced on 1July1987, the 
remaining EFTA members began applying for membership of the EU. These countries 
were concerned that they would be left out of policy decisions that would positively 
affect their economies. In 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. In this 
study, however, the concern is with the initial twelve members of the EU. 
This study focuses on the EA6 countries' trade in manufactures with the EU. 
The share of manufactures in trade rose in world trade as incomes rose. The share of 
services also rose and is now growing faster than the share of manufactures. Until 
recently, however, trade in services between the EU and the EA6 was largely limited to 
tourism and transport. The EU' s trade with non-members in agriculture has been limited 
by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This policy uses several instruments to 
support inefficient production of agricultural products and to severely restrict imports. 
The protection of agriculture was allegedly based on a desire for food security-- a legacy 
3 
of war-time and post-war food shortages. In addition, an aesthetically attractive rural 
landscape and high standards of living for rural workers were accepted political goals in 
the EU. The most powerful pressure groups in favour of the CAP, however, were the 
traditional farmers and landowners who were willing to ignore the costs to the EU 
consumers and the world economy (Winters 1989). 
In 1994, trade in manufactures between the EA6 and the EU was weaker than 
trade with their other principal trading partners. Imports per capita from the EA6 were 
much lower for the EU than for the US or Japan (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 EU, Japan, and United States manufactured and merchandise imports on a per capita 
basis from the EA6, 1994 (dollars) 
EU 
Japan 
United States 
manufactured imports 
142 
266 
345 
merchandise imports 
161 
465 
370 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The EU has not invested substantially in the EA6 and, until recently, the EA6 
have not invested in the EU. The United States and Japan, in contrast, have invested 
heavily in the EA6. 
While the tyranny of distance, and weak cultural and political links may have 
played a part in slowing trade growth between the EA6 and EU this study examines the 
role of the EU' s discriminatory trade policies in creating this trend. The EU created a 
pyramid of trade preferences in which the EA6 were near the base. In contrast, trade 
with peripheral European countries was enhanced as a result of EU trade policies. The 
EA6 have experienced more trade discrimination from the EU than have most other 
developing countries. In addition, the ad hoc nature of the EU' s trade policy has led to 
greater uncertainty for EA6 exporters in EU markets. The implementation of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations will reduce the impact of EU 
preferences and may curtail the use of contingency protection and other non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) commonly used by the EU. 
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In this study, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to evaluate 
the impact on EU-EA6 trade relations if the EU continues its discriminatory approach to 
trade policy. The model will be used to contrast EU trade strategies with the EA6's 
multilateral approach to trade liberalisation. The model comprises the economies of the 
EA6 and EU and their main trading partners. It captures the essential sectoral 
interdependencies, the decision-making processes of producers and consumers in each 
economy, and trade policy effects. The model highlights the mechanism by which trade 
policies can influence trade flows between countries. 
The costs of foregoing mutual trade and investment opportunities has been 
recognised by policymakers in both regions. This is shown in recent the acceleration of 
the offical interactions between them at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. 
Since 1978 there has been a forum for enhancing economic and other links 
between the EU and EA6 countries that are members of ASEAN in the EU-ASEAN 
meetings. The Ministerial meetings among ASEAN and its major developed country 
partners were considered useful enough to spawn Post-Ministerial Conferences from 
1979 onwards which have become a key instrument of ASEAN' s dialogue with its 
developed country partners (Naya 1989). However, the dialogue between the ASEAN 
and the EU has not been as strong as that between ASEAN and its other developed 
country partners (Curry 1994). 
In 1987 a cooperation agreement was concluded between ASEAN and the EC 
and after the 7th Ministerial meeting in 1988 it was announced that "there was still a 
need for more intensified efforts to improve market access and eliminate trade barriers" 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 1988:94-95). In 1995 the Senior Officials stated 
that "ASEAN-EU economic links should be strengthened" and reaffirmed a 
commitment to the efficient working of the World Trade Organisation (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Singapore 1995:86). 
In recent years the EU' s interest in Asia, including the EA6 has increased. In 
1994 the EU published a political statement called "Toward a New Asia Strategy" 
(Commission of the European Commission 1994a). This heralded the EU' s intention on 
to accord a higher priority to Asia . It stated that it was "a matter of urgency to 
strengthen [the European Union's] economic presence in Asia" and that "the [European] 
Union's role is to pursue market-opening for both goods and services and to overcome 
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obstacles to European trade and investment by encouraging a favourable regulatory 
environment for business in Asia" (Commission of the European Commission 
1994a:228). The report called for increasing the focus on European trade in Asia within 
economic cooperation agreements with Asian countries and also raising the EU' s profile 
in Asia. The report was seen as a sign of the attempt to strengthen the weak EU-Asia 
link (Pape 1996; Abe and Plummer 1996). 
Individual EU countries have accelerated their support for the "infrastructure 
neccessary to expand economic interaction [with Asia], with support coming from the 
highest levels" (Abe and Plummer 1997:8). Events regarding members of the EA6 
included the opening of a business information centre to collect data on the activities of 
European firms in Thailand and Indonesia, the UK Chamber of Commerce initiative to 
open a series of studies devoted to benefitting from Japanese Official Development 
Assistance in the region, and tapping into Japanese capital in Asia, and the opening of 
Germany's industrial trade centre in 1995 in Singapore. 
In recent years, the most publicised element of offical dialogue between the EU 
and EA6 countries has been the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). ASEM includes all the 
EA6 except Taiwan. In 1994 the Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong approached 
France, the then chair of the EU, to suggest that a there be a "bridge between Europe 
and Asia in the same way that APEC has created a firm bridge between Asia and North 
America" (Abe and Plummer 1997:14-15). ASEM took place in Bangkok on 1-2 March 
1996. ASEM meetings are to be held biennially alternating between Europe and Asia. 
In the lead-up to ASEM the European Commission issued a background report 
called "Shaping Factors in East Asia by the Year 2000 and Beyond" which involved the 
collaboration of experts in Europe and Asia (Pape 1996). The report aimed to analyse 
the political and socio-economic factors that would be important in Asia including the 
EA6 (except Taiwan). The publication of this in-depth study involving experts from 
Asia showed the acknowledgement on the part of the EU to give Asia the attention it 
merits. Indeed in the Preface to the Report, Jacques Santer, the then President of the 
European Commission states "[this report] is the anti-thesis of an in-house analysis 
which provides only a distant view of Asia from a Eurocentric standpoint" (Pape 
1996:2). 
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The Meeting brought together the heads of states of the fifteen EU member 
countries and ten Asian nations including the EA6 countries (except Taiwan), Japan, 
China, the Philippines and Brunei. Out of the 25 countries invited 21 sent heads of 
states and high level representatives with only the smaller EU countries abstaining 
Denmark, Sweden and Greece). The high level of official involvement showed how 
important the EU-Asia link had become in the eyes of both regions (Nakagawachi 1996; 
Takashi 1997). 
The main aim of the Meeting was to construct dialogue between the two regions 
that spanned not only economic issues, but also politics, security and cultural issues. 
That the Meeting was generally considered a success was reflected in the Chairman's 
Statement it was stated that "the Meeting forged a new comprehensive Asia-Europe 
Partnership for Greater Growth" (ASEM: 129). In addition, it was perceived a succes by 
the many countries that have expressed an interest in joining future rounds of ASEM. 
These include Australia, Central and Eastern European countries, India, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Russia and Taiwan. The issue of membership has become a point of debate 
between the EU and Asia (Far Eastern Economic Review 25/9/97:29). 
The success of the Meeting was also underlined by the various follow-up 
dialogues engendered by it. These include meetings for foreign and economic ministers, 
a senoir officials' meeting, a working group to draw up an "Asia-Europe Investment 
Promotion Plan", an "Asia-Europe Business Forum", objective studies on the economic 
synergies between Asia and Europe, and a variety of cultural exchanges. 
The present state of economic relations between the two regions was part of the 
ASEM discussion. Asian leaders stressed open trade and investment and open 
regionalism issues while the Europeans emphasised trade rules (global investment rules 
and intellectual property rules). The leaders expressed a resolve to generate greater two-
way trade and investment flows between Asia and Europe. They expressed a resolve "to 
generate greater two-way trade and investment flows between Asia and Europe ... based 
on open multilateral trading system, non-discriminatory liberalisation, and open 
regionalism" (ASEM 1996: 131 ). Support by ASEM participants for the WTO was 
stressed. A resolve was made to improve market access by simplifying and improving 
customs procedures and conformance to standards. The trade and investment issues 
were, however, placed tenth on a list of 19 points. In addition, no resolution was made 
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on most trade barrier issues between the two regions. This may suggest that the ASEM 
leaders are putting controversial issues on the backbumer relative to issues which are 
not so sensitive in an effort to build a common foundation for future negotiations (Abe 
and Plummer 1997). Therefore the first Meeting was very prepatory in nature and 
substantial progress much work needs to be done 
Mutual trade opportunities is a key issue for the EU and the EA6. It is expected 
to play a major role in future dialogue between the EU and the EA6 countries incuding 
in the WTO, ASEAN-EU Meetings and the ASEM. This study ofEU-EA6 
manufactured trade policies and links can be viewed as part of a response to the new 
priority being given in the EU and the EA6 to mutual economic relations. 
Thesis Plan 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide backgrounds to the trends in trade between the EU and 
the EA6. In chapter 2, the economic policies and the growth experience of the 
EA6 countries are surveyed. EA6 trade policies are given special attention. 
Chapter 3 documents and analyses the progress of EU integration. In chapter 4, 
recent trends in the trade patterns of the two regions are examined. This chapter 
will examine the commodities in which the EA6 and the EU countries specialise 
and the strength of their bilateral trade links relative to their links with other 
regions. In chapter 5, the trade policy of the EU is discussed. This chapter will 
look at how the EU trade regime appears to the EA6 and what effects the 
Uruguay Round will have on EU trade policy. Chapter 6 introduces the CGE 
model, which is named the "Computed Analysis of Trade Options" or "CATO". 
This model was built especially for this study. In chapter 7, CATO is used as a 
vehicle for analysing the effects of some key aspects of EU trade policy and 
EA6 trade policies on trade patterns between the EU and the EA6. Chapter 8 
offers conclusions to this study. 
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2 Growth trends and policies in the East Asian-
six 
The EA6 are a diverse group of countries (Table 2.1). At one extreme, Singapore is a 
city state with less than three million people and a GNP per capita which exceeds 
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy (World Bank 1996). At the other 
extreme, Indonesia is a vast archipelago, with the third largest population in the 
developing world and a GNP per capita below $1,000. Indonesia and Malaysia have 
considerable natural resources, Thailand is rich in agricultural land, whereas Korea and 
Taiwan have limited natural resources. 
Table 2.1 Basic indicators for the EA6 in 1994 
Land mass Population GNP per capita 
'000 sq. km millions dollars 
Indonesia 1,905 190.4 880 
Korea 99 44.5 8,260 
Malaysia 330 19.7 3,480 
Singapore l 2.9 22,500 
Thailand 513 58.0 2,410 
Taiwan 36 21.1 11,597 
Sources: World Bank, 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York; 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1996. Taiwan Statistical Databook 1996, Republic 
of China. 
The EA6 countries did not start at the same level of development after World War 
II. Taiwan was a highly developed agricultural colony of Japan. By the end of the 1930s, 
it had considerable infrastructure, including rail transport, rural roads and electricity 
supply. In the 1950s its productive capacity was boosted by experienced entrepreneurs 
and skilled labour from mainland China. Malaysia's colonisation had also left it with a 
relatively well-developed infrastructure, a well-organised fiscal system and a competent 
public service. Singapore had entrepot trade facilities and expertise in primary product 
processing, but it lacked experienced entrepreneurs in other manufacturing activities. 
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Korea's infrastructure and productive capacity were almost entirely destroyed during the 
civil war of the early 1950s. The infrastructure in Thailand and Indonesia was poor and 
administrative foundations were weak. 
Political stability in the EA6 countries was undoubtedly a necessary condition for 
rapid growth (Ahn 1990; Alesina et al. 1992; Gamaut 1990). Its contribution, however, 
should not be exaggerated. Malaysia had a communist-led insurgency and severe inter-
racial problems in the 1960s. Thailand was constantly riven by political coups. 
Indonesia fought a war of colonial independence which was followed by a major 
political upheaval in the 1960s. Political stability is relative and on its own not sufficient 
to achieve rapid economic development. 
Several historical conditions have been variously claimed as the sine qua non of 
exceptional performances of some of the EA6 countries. These include hard work and 
respect for authority embedded in Confucianism and Buddhism; large volumes of 
military and civilian aid given directly to Taiwan and Korea and indirectly to Thailand; 
and the efficacy of authoritarian regimes in all of the EA6 countries. But Confucianism 
and Buddhism were present in Taiwan and Korea, together with high inflows of aid, in 
the 1950s, when economic performance was very poor. The authoritarian regimes in the 
EA6 attained broad support through their economic success and became less autocratic 
over time. Other East Asian countries, notably China through most of its history, have 
enjoyed the same cultural and political "advantages" but performed poorly in economic 
terms. Economic analyses of the EA6 countries have thus focussed largely on the policy 
framework adopted by these countries. These policy frameworks enabled economic 
success to be achieved despite their varied cultural and political backgrounds and 
different levels of development. 
Technocrats with liberal economic views, which at the time contrasted sharply 
with prevailing "development economics", contributed greatly to the establishment of 
the EA6 policy frameworks (Leipziger and Thomas 1993). Singapore's Economic 
Development Board played an exemplary role in its development. The Park government 
of Korea recruited outstandingly capable technocrats for the "Blue House" (the 
President's residence and centre of government), ministries and government agencies. In 
Indonesia, the economically orthodox "Berkeley Mafia" moved the economy from 
stagnation to growth after the Soeharto government came into power in 1966. In 
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Thailand, the changes of political leadership often went almost unnoticed in the 
economy, because policy continuity was maintained by technocrats dedicated to 
macroeconomic stability and growth (Adams and Davis 1994). 
The key to rapid growth did not lie in particular policies, but in the policy 
frameworks adopted. They provided internal and external security and the rule of law. 
They steadily improved macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary), financial, trade, education 
and other infrastructure policies in response to changing domestic and external 
circumstances (Hughes 1995; Ranis 1995; Stiglitz 1996). Policies were more effectively 
implemented over time. The overall strength of their policy frameworks enabled the 
EA6 economies to live with such policy shortcomings as financial repression, the slow 
reform of protection offset by export incentives, domestic market monopolies, excessive 
state ownership and other forms of over-regulation. Development was a long step-by-
step process that enabled the EA6 to garner considerable efficiency benefits from 
unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation in the 1980s and to continue to do so in 
the 1990s. 
After World War II, Korea and Taiwan pursued land reforms and together with 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, ensured that the internal terms of trade were not 
biased against agriculture, services or infrastructure development. Thus growth in the 
EA6 countries was economy-wide. The focus of this study, however, is manufactures 
and hence policies in the manufacturing sector. 
Macroeconomic policy 
Macroeconomic stability has been essential to the EA6's performances (Hughes 1989, 
1995; Adams 1990; Treadgold 1990). The technocrats in the region were convinced that 
neither entrepreneurs nor governments could function in inflationary and hence unstable 
economic environments. Prudent monetary and fiscal policies, with balanced or limited 
deficit budgets, were given high priority. In Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, public and 
private borrowing abroad was high. It was particularly high in Korea and Thailand 
where it was used for efficient production, notably for exports, which enabled external 
debts to be serviced. The EA6 countries achieved relatively low inflation rates (Table 
2.2), brought down inflation quickly when prices surged and were able to pursue stable 
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real interest and exchange rates, which were vital to strong export performances 
(Montemayor and Solis 1986; Riedel 1988; Hughes 1989). 
Table 2.2 Average annual rate of inflation (per cent) 
1960-70 1970-80 1980-93 
Indonesia 21.5 8.5 
Korea 17.5 19.5 6.3 
Malaysia -0.3 7.3 2.2 
Singapore 1.1 5.9 2.5 
Thailand 1.8 9.2 4.3 
Taiwan 10.4 4.4 
Lower income countries 3.5 7.3 14.1 
Middle income countries 3 22.1 90.1 
Notes: 1For 1960-80 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $410 per 
capita in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 per capita or 
more. For 1980-93, "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $695 per 
capita in 1993, "middle income economies" denotes economies with $696 to $8,625 per capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. World 
Bank World Tables, International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
South Asian countries also had a good macroeconomic record but failed to adopt 
the trade and other components of the policy framework that was essential for rapid 
growth. Recently some South Asian countries, notably India, have begun to reform their 
policy frameworks. Latin American countries had poor fiscal policies and allowed their 
money supplies to blow out and crowd out private investment. High inflation became 
endemic. Latin American countries borrowed heavily in the 1970s when international 
liquidity increased sharply with the availability of petro-dollars in international financial 
markets. Borrowed funds were used for public consumption and unproductive 
investment in heavily protected industries. Ensuing balance of payments difficulties led 
to "stop-go" macroeconomic policies and accentuated instability. In contrast, prudent 
fiscal and monetary policies provided the EA6 countries with funds for infrastructure, 
including education (Fishlow 1989; Adams and Davis 1994). 
The EA6 did not start with the same macroeconomic "initial conditions". In the 
1950s, Taiwan and South Korea had high inflation and balance of payments problems as 
part of their slow growth. The United States, despite its political interest in the two 
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countries, decided to reduce civilian aid to them because it believed that aid encouraged 
budget profligacy and was being used for personal enrichment. Taiwan responded with a 
tough macroeconomic stabilisation program; a balanced budget has been achieved in 
almost every year since 1957. Tax revenues were able to support the growth of 
infrastructure. The fiscal effort was increased with retrenchment in state enterprises and 
their eventual privatisation. The money supply has been strictly controlled. By the 
1980s, Taiwan had budget surpluses and was accumulating high external reserves. 
Taiwan achieved one of the lowest inflation rates in the world, even during the volatile 
1970s (Li 1976; Galenson 1979; Kuo 1983). 
Macroeconomic stabilisation was equally important in Korea, although more 
difficult. A fiscal base reined in budget deficits while enabling physical and social 
infrastructure to be constructed. Roads, ports and public transport began to be built on a 
considerable scale in the devastated countryside. Loss-making state enterprises proved 
difficult to control in the 1960s and again in the late 1970s, when the drive to expand 
"heavy" manufacturing enterprises led to budget deficits and bouts of inflation. But 
inflation was rapidly brought under control in both cases and the real exchange rate 
remained stable (Mason 1980). Korea's generally prudent, stable macroeconomic 
policies and strong growth gave the government credibility which made rapid 
turnarounds from high inflation possible (Collins 1990). 
The smallness and financial openness of Singapore's economy made prudent 
macroeconomic policy essential. The Central Provident Fund provided ample savings 
for public investment, including huge outlays on public transport, housing and 
education. Singapore also had very effective direct and indirect tax collection and 
efficient public expenditure management. By the 1980s, Singapore had budget surpluses 
and large foreign reserves (Swee 1977; Hughes and You 1969; Lim 1984). Steady 
currency appreciation reflected rapid per capita income growth. 
Thailand was known for its prudent monetary management from the 1950s. 
Although revenue-gathering left much to be desired, expenditures were clamped down 
to limit budget deficits. Thus Thailand had one of the lowest rates of inflation in East 
Asia (and hence the world) and a very stable exchange rate (Warr 1993). 
Malaysia used its colonial fiscal and expenditure structure and a restrained 
monetary policy to keep inflation at bay, despite a booming petroleum sector in the 
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1970s. Its currency also steadily appreciated as was to be expected with a rising per 
capita income (Lim 1973; Fong 1989). In the 1980s, petroleum rents led to investment 
in public enterprises (Bowie 1991; 1994). But predictably, state-owned enterprises were 
poor performers. Faced with mounting deficits, the government began a major program 
of privatisation (Salleh and Meyanathan 1993). State expenditures in the 1990s again 
concentrated on infrastructure provision (Lim 1992; Hill 1993). 
In 1965, Indonesia had more than 1000 per cent inflation, its fiscal expenditures 
were out of control, it had no central bank traditions or expertise and its publicly-owned 
banking system worked according to political directives rather than according to 
commercial considerations. Indirect taxes were the main source of revenue, but 
collection was poor. Public administrative skills were negligible. The Soeharto 
administration started to introduce fiscal and monetary frameworks. Steady 
administrative improvement enabled Indonesia, like Malaysia, to control the inflationary 
effects of large oil revenues, in contrast to the experience of other petroleum exporters 
such as Nigeria (Booth and Mccawley 1981). 
Financial policy 
The development of the financial sector is essential to the accumulation of savings and 
investment; it increases the efficiency of investment (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973; 
Harris et al. 1994; Cho 1988; Chou 1991; Fry 1995). Hence, financial development has 
been found to be strongly correlated with per capita GDP growth (King and Levine 
1993; Fry 1994). 
Financial regulations in Singapore, Malaysia and even Thailand were open 
relative to the other EA6 (Petri 1993). Foreign banks were allowed early entry and over 
time, non-banking institutions, such as merchant banks and insurance funds, followed. 
Capital and equity markets developed. Currently, Singapore has the most sophisticated 
financial system of the EA6 and is a major global financial centre (Hill 1993). 
Financial repression in Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia was severe. Technocratic 
reformers did not win sufficient support to be able to introduce competitive financial 
systems. Credit rationing was a component of financial repression. 
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In Korea, the state-run banks failed to assess investment opportunities. Their loans 
supported a handful of large firms (chaebol), while small and medium enterprises were 
starved of funds. A decade of policies to stimulate small and medium firms has failed to 
offset the distortions created by financial repression. The chaebol were also encouraged 
to borrow abroad. Suppliers' credits were widely used, leading to imports of capital 
goods instead of encouraging local industry (Westphal et al. 1988). Subsidised funds 
supported "heavy" and chemical industries during the "Big Push" of 1975-77. Amsden 
(1989) considers this policy to have led to "technological upgrading", but this is not 
where rapid technological adaptation occurred. Artificial fibre for wigs, electronic 
components, shipbuilding and later, motor vehicle production, all privately controlled, 
led technological progress in Korea. It is widely agreed that the direction of credit to 
"heavy" industry, through public investment, led to serious economic imbalances. 
Inflationary episodes, with over-evaluation of the exchange rate followed. The effects 
on exports were disastrous and the "Big Push" policies were quickly reversed (Nam 
1991; Yoo 1990; Leipziger and Petri 1993). 
In Taiwan, the formal financial sector was severely repressed. Legislation that led 
to criminal prosecutions for loans officers who made bad loans ignored the inherent 
risks in lending. This resulted in loans being dominated by safety considerations and the 
reduction of commercial lending to negligible proportions (Biggs 1988; Chou 1991; 
Shea 1994; Fry 1995). An informal financial sector was, however, allowed to develop. 
Small and medium enterprises were able to obtain credit, albeit at high interest rates, 
which not only reflected the high risks and considerable administrative costs of small 
loans but also the absence of deposits and prudential governance as in the formal 
financial sector (Biggs 1991; Dahlman and Sananikone 1993). 
Indonesia had a severely repressed financial system in the 1960s and 1970s. Credit 
was allocated to low-risk loans to state enterprises which were sixty per cent of the 
economy in 1975 (Hill 1993). In a similar fashion to Korea, Indonesia tried to create a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries in the early 1980s using, among 
other policies, subsidised credit. Predictably, there is little evidence that this advanced 
growth (Macintyre 1993; Hill 1995). 
The inefficiencies that resulted from highly regulated financial sectors increased 
as the EA6 economies became more complex. These inefficiencies were highlighted by 
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the contrast with the efficiency of rapidly developing financial sectors in Singapore and 
Malaysia. Taiwan led the reforms in the financial sector in the 1980s, Indonesia 
followed, Korea was the laggard. Private firms now dominate banking in Taiwan and 
Indonesia, though Indonesia still has a major problem with accumulated non-performing 
debts (Fry 1995). 
Prudential measures are necessary to prevent snowballing insolvency in the wake 
of external shocks. They were legislated in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1950s. In the 
1980s they were extended to the rest of the EA6. Difficulties in this aspect of reform, in 
Indonesia in particular, has led to questions of the sequencing of liberalisation in the 
financial sector. 
Trade policy 
The distinguishing characteristic of the EA6s' policy frameworks was the early and 
sustained emphasis on exports (Little et al. 1970; Balassa 1971a and Balassa et al 
1971b; Krueger 1978; Bhagwati 1978; Chow 1987; Hughes 1989; Dollar 1992). 
Following Hong Kong, they were the first developing countries to adopt outward-
looking trade regimes. The opening of industrial country markets, as a result of 
multilateral negotiations within GATT, provided trade opportunities seized by the EA6 
(and Hong Kong). Until the late 1970s, these opportunities were ignored by most other 
developing countries. Exports, particularly of manufactures, boomed in the EA6 well 
before they did in other developing countries (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Real average annual growth of merchandise exports for the EA6 1960-93 
1960-70 1970-80 1980-93 
Indonesia 3.4 6.5 6.7 
Korea 33.4 22.7 12.3 
Malaysia 5.8 3.3 6.6 
Singapore 4.2 4.2 12.7 
Thailand 5.2 8.9 15.5 
Taiwan na 14.4 9.6 
Lower income countries1 4.9 2.7 6.4 
Middle income 5.4 
countries1 
Notes: 1For 1960-80 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $410 
per capita in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 per capita 
or more. For 1980-93, "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $695 
per capita in 1993, "middle income economies" denotes economies with $696 to $8,625 per capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1994. World Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, New York. World 
Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. 
The shares of EA6 exports in world trade in merchandise goods has grown 
fivefold since 1965 (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Share of trade1 in world merchandise imports and merchandise exports in 1965 and 
1994 (per cent) 
Imports Exports 
1965 1994 1965 1994 
EU 23 15 19 16 
United States 12 16 16 12 
EA6 3 10 2 10 
Japan 5 6 5 10 
China 1 3 1 4 
India 2 I 1 1 
Notes: 1For the EU, trade with non-members only. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University 
The trade regimes of the EA6 lie on a spectrum, in terms of openness, with 
Singapore's trade regime being essentially one of free trade since the colonial period, 
while at the other extreme Indonesia has been the most highly protectionist. With the 
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exception of Singapore, the EA6 began to introduce import substitution in the 1950s. 
This approach was adopted despite the fact that mainstream economics had been 
"demonstrating the merits of liberal trade policies on theoretical, empirical and 
historical grounds" for some 200 years (Baldwin 1979:36). 
The weakness of import substitution soon became apparent. In Taiwan and Korea, 
traditional agricultural producers and processors provided a core of support for outward-
oriented policies. Outward orientation became essential to reduce balance of payments 
problems, which arose after US aid was reduced, and to stimulate employment and 
growth. Political support for import substitution by manufacturing and political lobby 
groups was so strong, however, that it proved impossible to dismantle trade barriers. 
Taiwan and Korea, hence, had to introduce protection offsets to make production for the 
world market feasible. In the early years, any producer who could export was 
encouraged to do so (Yoo 1989). Offsets, thus, did not so much seek to "pick winners" 
(Johnson 1986; Amsden 1985, 1989; Wade 1990; Chang 1993) as to make exporting 
feasible (Hughes 1993b, 1995). 
Exporters of processed food and labour-intensive manufactures had emerged in 
Taiwan in the 1950s, because the domestic market was negligible. Taiwan started 
offsetting import substitution in the late 1950s; clothing, footwear, textiles, toys, 
artificial flowers and other labour-intensive products were exported by manufacturers 
who came from mainland China, where they had manufactured for export in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Electronics assembly firms from the United States were attracted to Taiwan. 
Korean exports of wigs followed silk and other rural exports in the late 1950s. 
Following Taiwan, Korea began to offset its import protection, with Korean exporters 
taking up the challenge in clothing, footwear, leather products, textiles and electronic 
assembly. 
In the period 1962-65, Singapore took part in a customs union with Malaysia but 
the arrangement did not last long enough to lead to substantial tariff rises in Singapore. 
In 1965, the smallness of Singapore's domestic market made it imperative to turn 
outwards, following in the footsteps of Hong Kong. The import substitution phase was 
too short in Singapore to allow substantial protectionist interest groups to develop 
which facilitated a rapid transition to free trade. As Singapore exported raw materials 
and imported manufactures it did not have a manufacturing base with established 
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external markets, unlike Hong Kong. It therefore sought investments by transnational 
corporations (TNCs) which were then looking for "export platforms". 
In Malaysia, tariff protection began in 1955 following the recommendation of the 
World Bank to set up a customs union (Ariff 1980; Teh 1977). High protection was 
mainly confined to consumer durables (Lee 1983). The government did not wish to 
create a bias against primary exports from the strong plantation and mining sectors, or to 
damage the rural small producer Malay economy. Belief that the primary benefits of 
protection would go to Chinese-owned businesses may have contributed to the low 
degree of protection (Hoffmann and Tan 1980). An export processing zone for 
electronics in Penang followed Singapore's lead. Strong export growth from Singapore 
spilt over into Jahore Baru in several products. High petroleum prices put a brake on 
manufactured exports in the late 1970s, but when petroleum prices fell in the 1980s, 
exports of labour-intensive manufactures were again stimulated. 
Thailand began as an agricultural exporter but gradually introduced an import 
substitution regime for manufactures in the 1960s. Protection rose in the 1970s but local 
entrepreneurs nevertheless began to export labour-intensive goods (Supchalasai 1989). 
This was partly because import barriers were still relatively low compared with other 
developing countries and because tariffs were often not enforced. Some Japanese firms 
turned from producing for Thai markets to global markets. As real wages rose in the 
more advanced EA6 countries, Thailand became attractive to American, Japanese and 
new Asian TNCs. 
Petroleum dominated exports in Indonesia, particularly after the rise in petroleum 
prices in the 1970s, which put upward pressure on the exchange rate. Only when 
petroleum prices fell in the early 1980s did agricultural exports recover and labour-
intensive exports become feasible. Clothing exporters took the initiative (Saad 1993). 
They were followed by other labour-intensive local and foreign producers. Offsets 
against import substitution measures included tariff and quota exemptions and 
drawbacks on imported inputs into exports. As with Thailand, Indonesia had loose 
customs administration which mitigated the effects of tariff and quota barriers. 
Export processing zones were set up in Taiwan and Malaysia mainly to attract 
private direct foreign investment. These zones provided a nurturing environment with 
efficient infrastructure facilities. Korea, which otherwise eschewed private foreign 
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direct investment, had one export processing zone in Massan for Japanese TNCs. 
Preferential credit, tax holidays, wastage allowances and other forms of privileged 
access to domestic markets were given in Korea and Taiwan. 
Import quota and tariff exemptions and duty drawbacks were the principal 
measures that were effective in stimulating exports (Hederschee 1990). The other export 
incentives frequently exacerbated administrative distortions, encouraged rent seeking 
and had high budgetary costs (Industry Commission 1990; Hughes 1995; Warr 1995; 
Smith 1995). Together with price stability, realistic exchange rates, adequate 
infrastructure (ports, transport, communications with the outside world) and an 
increasingly educated labour force, the few effective export incentives allowed exports 
to boom. 
The high costs of mixed trade regimes were recognised in the time of increased 
competitiveness that followed the global economic downturn in the early 1980s. Taiwan 
led the way in trade liberalisation (Smith 1995). Thailand recovered from a setback in 
the mid- l 980s, and Indonesia and Malaysia only started substantial import liberalisation 
after 1986. Despite the United States' threat of countervailing duties to offset Korea's 
export incentives, Korea has lagged in simplifying its trade regime. 
Production for world markets has led to considerable efficiency gains for the EA6 
(Kravis 1970; Kreuger 1978). Improved resource allocation and the use of appropriate 
technology meant that as skills and capital accumulated, there was a progression within 
and between the EA6 countries from low labour-intensive products to increasingly skill 
and capital-intensive ones. Resource utilisation also improved. The EA6 exporters chose 
low capital intensity techniques but achieved a high utilisation rate of capital, in marked 
contrast to other developing countries which used capital-intensive techniques but had 
low utilisation rates of capital (Bautista et al. 1979). Competing in the world markets 
resulted in greater "X- efficiency" in the firm, that is, more efficient management, more 
training for workers and more rapid product improvements. Many firms were able to 
reduce unit costs by exploiting economies of scale (Bhagwati and Krueger 1973). 
Outward orientation had economy-wide effects. Rapid export growth led to rapid 
job creation, precisely because it used appropriate technologies. The army of under-
employed in rural hinterlands was absorbed. The rapid growth of exports eased balance 
of payments problems. Competitiveness in export production had spillover effects on 
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production for the domestic market. Infrastructure and auxiliary service industries had to 
be competitive to support the international competitiveness of goods. Exporters became 
a lobby for continuing improvements in trade and other policies. Trade liberalisation has 
become a continuing process. Current trends in trade liberalisation are discussed later in 
this chapter. 
Human resource development 
Rapid development in the EA6 enabled swift demographic transitions to take place. 
Improved health, especially through the provision of drinking water supplies and 
housing, education and employment, particularly of women and urbanisation all led to 
longer life, a higher age of marriage for women and reduced fertility. Declining 
population growth rates augmented the capital available per worker. 
In the 1960s, education levels were relatively high in the EA6. Colonial 
administrations had introduced primary education in Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Widespread religious training in Thailand went some way towards 
eradicating male illiteracy. Indonesia was the main exception but it used petroleum 
revenues to catch up in primary education. Overall expenditures on education as a share 
of GDP increased with rising per capita GDP (Mason 1980). 
As the complexity of production increased, governments focussed on the 
provision of secondary education. Vocational and technical education were introduced. 
Tertiary education was developed with an emphasis on engineering and science. On-the-
job training became widespread. Workers who entered the labour force as electronics 
assemblers were able to become supervisors responsible for increasing quality and 
productivity. 
Tertiary education abroad led to the training of numbers of scientists and 
engineers with "hard" technological skills and "soft" business and economic training. 
This facilitated the transfer and adaptation of technology (Hughes 1995). Singapore, 
Korea and Taiwan have intervened at the university level with entry quotas and 
incentives for new departments specialising in engineering and other courses 
appropriate to industrialisation. Singapore plans that by the year 2000, 60 per cent of 
school leavers will go to a university or polytechnic. Steps have been taken to improve 
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secondary level education to make this possible. Taiwan's government offers Taiwanese 
post-graduates in America incentives to return (Ranis 1995). 
Labour market policies 
All the EA6 countries started with high under-employment and some open 
unemployment in cities. Economic growth led to rapid job growth, enabling excess rural 
populations to move to urban areas and work in the formal and informal sectors. In 
Thailand and Indonesia the employment transition has not yet been achieved; both still 
have large numbers of underemployed in their rural hinterlands. In the other EA6 
countries, not only has full employment been achieved, but Singapore, Malaysia and 
Taiwan rely heavily on unskilled immigrant workers (Martin et al. 1996). The EA6 are 
also transferring labour-intensive operations to labour-abundant countries. 
The increased participation of women in work outside the home has been a 
marked feature of labour market changes. Family incomes thus rose rapidly and so did 
living standards. The role of unions has been weak as a result, although in more recent 
years in Korea and Taiwan unions have become more vocal. Unions have concentrated 
on working conditions rather than collective wage bargaining (Ranis 1995). Labour 
markets in the EA6 have been less regulated than in many other developing countries, 
notably in Latin America where slow income growth led to unrest. Wage regulation was 
generally not used to promote specific sectors (Fields and Wan 1989; Nugent 1991). 
Foreign direct investment 
With the exception of Korea, the EA6 were relatively open to foreign direct investment. 
In practical terms Korea was closed to it. Domestic firms were encouraged to borrow 
abroad instead. Korea wanted to prevent foreign firms from exploiting its protected 
domestic markets and was pressed by the chaebol firms not to allow competition from 
foreign corporations. In contrast, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand expected 
benefits from foreign investment, initially in opening up production for the domestic 
market and in the 1970s in production for export. Malaysia had a supplementary reason 
for encouraging foreign investment in seeking to offset domestic ethnic Chinese 
strength in the economy. It was believed that the costs of foreign investment could be 
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contained by regulations aimed at preventing the transfer of monopoly rents abroad and 
by pressuring TNCs to train local staff, and later, to export a substantial share of 
production. Trade liberalisation reduced the costs of foreign direct investment over time. 
The first foreign direct investment in the EA6 was in plantation agriculture in 
Malaysia before WWII. Investment in raw materials followed. Indonesia pioneered the 
management of the exploration and production of petroleum by foreign firms; this has 
widely been regarded as exemplary. Malaysia has followed the Indonesian system with 
regard to its own petroleum resources. Investment in import substitution industries 
followed. Finally, investment in export platforms began in the 1960s. Prompted by the 
GATT multilateral tariff reductions, TNCs from the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, the EC were looking for suitable locations for labour-intensive processes. The 
then emerging electronics industries were well-suited to the division of manufacturing 
processes by labour and skill intensity. 
Taiwan was the first EA6 country to take advantage of this trend towards 
"globalisation". In the 1960s, it provided a stable macroeconomic environment and a 
low cost, relatively well-educated labour force for foreign firms producing for global 
markets. 
American and European TNCs looking for places as export platforms chose 
Singapore because its infrastructure worked (Hughes and You 1969). The Economic 
Development Board of Singapore was a "one-stop shop" where TNCs could arrange to 
go into production very quickly. The Economic Development Board sent teams abroad 
to find TNCs looking for export locations. Malaysia benefited early from the spillover in 
Singapore as TNCs started to set up firms across the Singapore-Malaysia causeway. 
As export production developed, labour skills grew and wages rose. By the 1980s 
wages in the EA6 were considerably more than wages in other Asian countries. EA6 
firms became TNCs moving from Taiwan and Korea to Thailand and Indonesia, to other 
lower wage Asian countries and further afield. In the more advanced EA6 countries, 
foreign investment went into higher skill investments so that foreign investment 
continued to rise in all EA6 countries (except Korea) in the mid-1980s (Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.5 Private foreign direct investment inflows into the EA6, China and India ($million) 
1981-85 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Indonesia 236 682 1,093 1,482 1,777 2,004 
Korea 117 1,118 788 1,180 727 588 
Malaysia 1083 1,668 2,332 3,998 5,183 5,006 
Singapore 1349 2,887 5,575 4,879 2,351 5,016 
Thailand 279 1,775 2,444 2,014 2,116 1,762 
Taiwan 189 1,604 1,330 1,271 879 917 
China 850 3,393 3,487 4,366 11,156 27,515 
India 59 350 165 148 344 600 
Sources: Asian Development Bank, 1995. Asian Development Outlook 1995-96, Asian Development 
Bank, Manila. United Nations, 1994. World Investment Report, United Nations, New York. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1994. International Direct Investment 
Statistics Yearbook 1994, OECD, Paris. 
EA6 firms began to invest in Asia in the 1970s to evade Multifibre Arrangement 
quotas. From the mid-1980s sizeable trade surpluses in Taiwan and Singapore, 
combined with exchange rate realignments and rising wages, led to a considerable 
increase in outflows of capital to other Asian countries, especially to Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, China and the Philippines. EA6 firms became the largest investors 
in the Asian region after Japan (Table 2.6). Rapidly growing Asian markets led to an 
increase of exports to Asia. 
Table 2.6 Foreign direct investment outflows (US$millions) 
1982-87 1990 1991 1992 
annual average 
Korea 106 820 1357 1047 
Singapore 178 1352 1160 1347 
Thailand 29 140 167 136 
Taiwan 162 5243 1854 1701 
Source: United Nations, 1994. World Investment Report 1994, United Nations, New York. 
The liberalisation of EA6 trade regimes in the 1980s prompted the liberalisation 
of EA6 investment regimes because many regulations had become redundant (Pacific 
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Economic Cooperation Council 1995; Warr 1993). Approval measures were simplified, 
restrictions in sensitive sectors were eased, ownership rules were relaxed and 
restrictions on foreign banks were eased. Liberalisation is proceeding. 
The effects of EA6 policies 
Measures of GDP can vary, but it is clear that whatever measure is chosen, the EA6 
grew far more rapidly than most other developing countries (Table 2.7). In a sample of 
140 countries studied over three time periods ( 1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-90), Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan were among the nine countries that have 
achieved growth rates over 5 per cent in all three periods. The others were Botswana, 
China, Hong Kong and Turkey (World Bank 1993:28). 
Table 2. 7 Average annual growth rate of real GDP (per cent per annum) 
1960-70 1970-80 1980-93 
Indonesia 3.9 7.8 5.8 
Korea 8.6 10.l 9.1 
Malaysia 6.5 7.9 6.2 
Singapore 8.8 8.3 6.9 
Thailand 8.4 7.1 8.2 
Taiwan1 9.0 9.4 8.3 
Lower income economies2 5.0 5.1 1.6 
Middle income economies2 6.0 5.5 2.1 
Notes: 1 calculated from the World Bank World Tables, International Economic Databank, Australian 
National University. 
2 For 1960-80 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $410 per capita 
in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 per capita or more. 
For 1980-93, "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $695 per capita 
in 1993, "middle income economies" denotes economies with $696 to $8,625 per capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. 
Economic growth in the EA6 has been accompanied by falling population growth, 
so GNP per capita growth has also been high (Table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8 Real average annual per capita GNP growth and per capita income level, 1993 
(per cent) 
1960-80 1980-93 
Indonesia 4.0 4.2 
Korea 7.0 8.2 
Malaysia 4.3 3.5 
Singapore 7.5 6.1 
Thailand 4.7 6.4 
Taiwan1 6.4 7.1 
Lower income economies2 1.2 3.7 
Middle income economies2 3.8 0.2 
Notes: 1 this is calculated from the World Bank World Tables, International Economic 
Databank. Australian National University. 
2 For 1960-80 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than $410 per 
capita in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 per capita 
or more. For 1980-93, "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than 
$695 per capita in 1993 "middle income economies" denotes economies with $696 to $8,625 per 
capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New 
York. World Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
By any measure, the EA6 have a better record of improving income distribution 
than most other developing countries. In Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, except for a few 
social and geographical pockets, absolute poverty has been eliminated (World Bank 
1993). Rapid job creation through the expansion of labour-intensive production was the 
key transmission mechanism (Fields 1989; Bautista 1992). The result of the 
combination of high GDP per capita growth and increasing equality of distribution is a 
large and growing middle-class which in tum has resulted in rapid import growth of 
consumer products. 
Rapid income growth was accompanied by rapid growth of savings and 
investment. In 1960 the savings ratios (savings/GDP) of all the EA6 (except Malaysia) 
were below the average savings ratio of developing countries (World Bank 1993). By 
the 1980s they had outstripped developing and industrial countries (Table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9 Gross domestic savings (per cent of GDP) 
1960 1970 1980 1993 
Indonesia 10.9 13.9 37.1 30.5 
Korea 1.6 14.8 24.8 34.7 
Malaysia 27.7 26.6 32.9 38.1 
Singapore -2.6 18.4 37.5 47.4 
Thailand 14.1 21.2 22.9 35.9 
Taiwan 12.7 25.6 33.1 27.0 
Lower income economies' 18 20.0 22.0 27.0 
Middle income economies1 19 25.0 22.0 
EU 24.5 26.3 21.9 20.0 
us 19.4 18.4 19.3 15.2 
Notes: 1 For 1960 and 1970 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less than 
$410 per capita in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 per 
capita or more in 1981. For 1980 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less 
than $410 per capita in 1980, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with $410 
per capita or more in 1980. For 1993, "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with 
less than $695 per capita in 1993, "middle income economies" denotes economies with $696 to 
$8,625 per capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1982. World Development Report 1982, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New York. World 
Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. International 
Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Levels of investment have also been high. In 1960 the EA6' s domestic investment 
ratios were lower than the average for developing or developed countries. Domestic 
investment ratios increased from the 1960s to outstrip other countries (Table 2.10). In 
the 1980s, investment accelerated further. 
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Table i.10 Gross domestic investment (per cent of GDP) 
1960 1970 1980 1993 
Indonesia 9.2 15.8 24.3 28.3 
Korea 10.9 24.4 32.0 34.3 
Malaysia 15.3 22.4 30.4 33.2 
Singapore 11.4 38.7 46.3 43.8 
Thailand 15.4 25.6 29.1 40.0 
Taiwan 20.3 25.6 34.3 17.0 
Lower income economies1 19.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 
Middle income economies' 20.0 27.0 23.0 
EU 24.5 26.3 21.9 20.0 
us 19.4 18.4 19.3 15.2 
Notes: 1 For 1960 and 1970 "lower income economies" denotes developing countries with less 
than $410 per capita in 1981, "middle income economies" denotes developing economies with 
$410 per capita or more in 1981. For 1980 "lower income economies" denotes developing 
countries with less than $410 per capita in 1980, "middle income economies" denotes developing 
economies with $410 per capita or more in 1980. For 1993, "lower income economies" denotes 
developing countries with less than $695 per capita in 1993, "middle income economies" denotes 
economies with $696 to $8,625 per capita. 
Sources: World Bank, 1982. World Development Report 1982, Oxford University Press, New 
York. World Bank, 1983. World Development Report 1983, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. 
International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Recently controversy has arisen over the extent of improving productivity in the 
EA6. "Technical advance" denotes both "hard" technologies (for example, new 
machines) and "soft" technologies (for example, new management practices). The 
growth of GDP is accounted for by the growth of capital, labour, natural resources and a 
residual which is seen as technological advance. "Total factor productivity" growth 
reflects the increase in a country's efficiency. It has been suggested that total factor 
productivity growth has not played a large role in GDP and GNP growth in Singapore 
(Young 1992, 1993, 1995; Krugman 1994). Young suggested that in 1966-90, 
Singapore had negative total factor productivity growth and Korea and Taiwan had 
negligible total factor productivity growth. Kim and Lau (1994) obtained similar results. 
It has therefore been argued that GDP growth in these countries was mainly the result of 
capital and labour accumulation. Measuring total factor productivity growth, however, 
gives rise to major conceptual problems. Productivity increases are not only found in the 
"residual"; they are embodied in capital and labour. Changes in the quality of capital 
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and labour thus inflate the costs of capital and labour at the expense of the residual 
(Low and Swee 1996). The quality of products increases, but their prices do not rise 
proportionately. A new study, taking some of these problems into account, has produced 
higher estimates of total factor productivity growth in Singapore, although output is 
probably still underestimated (Rao and Lee 1995). The Rao and Lee study suggests that 
more conventional views that ascribe considerable productivity growth to the EA6 
economies are likely to explain their continuing competitiveness and growth. 
Recent trade liberalisation 
The EA6 have a strong commitment to the GATT-WTO multilateral trading system 
because growing global openness has been crucial to their export and hence to their 
overall growth. They supported the Uruguay Round strongly. The EA6 took part in the 
first World Trade Organisation Ministerial meeting in Singapore in December 1996. 
Their involvement in regional initiatives has been within the multilateral framework. 
In 1967, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
formed the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) largely in response to 
security threats (Kirkpatrick 1994). Economic cooperation was initiated through the 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures and ASEAN Industrial Complementation scheme 
following Latin American regional cooperation schemes. Both were abandoned. A 1977 
Preferential Trade Arrangement agreement was established to encourage intra-ASEAN 
trade by providing tariff preferences. The rules of origin required that the ASEAN 
content of a product be more than 50 per cent to qualify for tariff preference. On a case 
by case basis this could be reduced to 35 per cent. Initially, items for tariff preferences 
were negotiated on a product-by-product basis. In 1980, an across-the-board minimum 
margin of preference was introduced for imports above a certain value. Because 
countries were allowed to have exclusion lists the provision had little effect (Panagariya 
1994). In 1987, preferences were still minimal. At the Manila Summit in 1987, changes 
aimed at strengthening tariff preferences were adopted, but they have had little effect. 
In 1992, in response to pressures from the EU and North American Free Trade 
Association, ASEAN governments signed a declaration to achieve an ASEAN Free 
Trade Area in manufactured and processed agricultural goods by 2007. The Common 
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Preferential Tariff Scheme covers more trade than the 1977 Agreement. The minimum 
content for qualifying as an ASEAN product is lower (40 per cent) than in the 1977 
Agreement. While in the 1977 Agreement, the margin of preference could only be 
granted by the nominating country, in the 1992 Agreement, it is granted by all members. 
The new product lists cover from 80-94 per cent of trade among the member countries, 
or about 84 per cent of intra-ASEAN trade overall. The 1992 scheme also includes 
agreements to eliminate quantitative restrictions, including restrictive licensing, once the 
product is eligible for tariff concessions. In addition, other non-tariff barriers are to be 
eliminated gradually within five years after the product is eligible. There are also 
agreements to explore liberalisation in other areas including agriculture. 
Economic support for AFT A is lukewarm. Singapore does not want to see its 
essentially free trade diluted. The remaining five countries' markets are small in relation 
to world trade, so that for a majority of products, the most efficient producers lie outside 
ASEAN. Preferential trade is likely to lead to trade diversion. Levels of trade among 
ASEAN, though rising with incomes, are still small. Benefits would mainly go to 
Malaysia and Singapore, from preferential access to the liberalised markets of 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In any case, unilateral liberalisations have in 
most cases outstripped the AFT A schedule. 
Following a Malaysia initiative in 1990, the East Asian Economic Group/Caucus 
was launched as a response to growing regionalism in North America and the EU. It was 
intended to promote regionalism on a wider scale than under AFT A. The proposed 
membership included the ASEAN, Korea, Singapore, China and Japan. The US was 
opposed to the idea and was able to persuade Japan not to join the proposed scheme. 
The group did not become functional and was later recast as a consultation forum (the 
East Asian Economic Caucus) which appears to be dormant. 
The concept of a wider community covering the Asia-Pacific was officially 
endorsed with the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
group in 1989. By 1996 this group included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua and New 
Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States. APEC is a 
discussion forum aimed to encourage regional trade, but not at the expense of outsiders. 
Its posture is "open regionalism", that is non-discriminatory liberalisation of regional 
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trade. Although there have been some pressures within APEC to make trade 
liberalisation preferential, APEC reconfirmed its non-discriminatory liberalisation 
stance, at a heads of state meeting at Bogor in 1994. It is unlikely to lead to regional 
integration initiatives. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of heads of state was sought 
on the Asian side to balance North American pressures in APEC, by seeking ways to 
encourage trade between East Asia and the EU. The high level of EU participation 
suggests that the EU is genuinely concerned at the low level of economic relations with 
the East Asian countries, including the EA6. 
Tariffs 
Compared to other developing countries, EA6 tariffs were low before the Uruguay 
Round; the average base tariff was 12.8 per cent, the average applied tariff was 10.2 per 
cent. The Uruguay Round Agreement reduced base tariffs to 11.3 per cent and applied 
tariffs to 8 per cent. The EA6 used the Uruguay Round to increase tariff bindings. Prior 
to the Agreement, the proportion of bound tariffs in the EA6 was very low or nil. The 
Uruguay Round gave negotiating credits to countries which agreed to bind tariffs, even 
if the tariff was bound at a higher level than the applied tariff. Singapore and Indonesia 
traded off bindings against higher ceiling rates. 
In the EA6 context Korea was still a relatively highly protectionist country at the 
end of the 1970s. Its average applied tariff was reduced from 24 per cent in 1982 to 7 
per cent by 1995 (Table 2.11). The tariff on motor vehicles was not reduced as much but 
overall tariff dispersion was reduced significantly, with 90 per cent of rates below 20 
per cent. The Uruguay Round increased tariff bindings from 10 to 90 per cent of tariff 
lines. 
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Table 2.11 Tariff rates on manufacturing (trade weighted average) (per cent) 
Pre-Uruguay Round Post-Uruguay Round Applied 
Tariff rate %lines bound Tariff rate %lines bound 1988 1995 
Indonesia 18.6 10.0 37.1 93.0 11.7 11.3 
Korea 16.7 10.0 8.0 90.0 15.1 6.5 
Malaysia 9.7 0.0 8.8 62.0 9.5 
Singapore 11.3 0.0 5.9 65.0 0.6 0.4 
Thailand 33.9 2.0 26.9 68.0 33.6 13.1 
Taiwan1 5.8 4 7.4 
Notes: 1calculations for Taiwan are based on information supplied during negotiations for accession on 
the World Trade Organisation. 
Source: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 1995. Survey of Impediments to Trade and 
Investment in the APEC Region, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
Singapore is essentially free trade. Its pre-Uruguay Round applied rate was 0.6 per 
cent. A base rate of 11.3 per cent was used for negotiating purposes in the Uruguay 
Round. The applied rate fell to 0.4 per cent. Petroleum refinery products maintained an 
applied tariff of 50 per cent in 1995 and the tariff on motor vehicles stayed at 45 per 
cent, for revenue reasons and to limit motor vehicle traffic (Table 2.12). Singapore 
introduced motor vehicle assembly in its brief flirtation with protectionism in the 1960s, 
but it is one of the few countries in the world which abandoned it. Other applied tariffs 
were nil. The proportion of bound tariffs rose from 0 to 65 per cent. 
Taiwan's average base tariff in 1995 was 7.4 per cent. Tariffs ranged from 0 to 
105 per cent with high rates on food, beverages and tobacco and drugs. Chemicals were 
highly protected with tariffs from 17 to 105 per cent . 
Thailand was still highly protected by EA6 standards in the 1980s, with a base 
tariff of 33.6 per cent in 1988. Thailand used the Uruguay Round to cut the base tariff to 
13 per cent, making substantial cuts in clothing and textiles, non-metallic mineral 
products, machinery and other manufactures. The number of tariff rates will be reduced 
from 39 to 6 in order to simplify the system (WTO 1995). Tariff peaks of 100 per cent 
apply to imports of certain clothing, footwear, rubber products and motor vehicles. 
Specific tariffs, formerly widespread, are to apply to only 3 per cent of tariff lines. 
Thailand increased its share of bound tariffs from 2 per cent to 68 per cent. 
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Malaysia had low protection except for clothing and textiles, man-made fibres, 
communication equipment, durable consumer goods and motor vehicles. Prior to the 
Uruguay Round, tariffs ranged from 0 to 100 per cent. Between 1993 and 1995, the 
average tariff fell from 9.7 to 8.8. Malaysia raised the share of bound tariffs from 0 to 62 
per cent. 
Indonesia's Uruguay Round offer consisted of an across-the-board ceiling binding 
of 40 per cent (with some exceptions) but its base rate tariff was raised to 37 per cent. 
Many imports enter at concessional rates, mainly as intermediate inputs for approved 
investment projects and under drawback and exemption schemes for exporters. 
Additional exemptions are provided for specific users, for example, certain cable 
makers. The average applied tariff fell from 11. 7 to 11.3 per cent. Tariff peaks apply to 
pottery, china and earthenware manufactures, electrical machinery, motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and bicycles. Tariff predictability has been enhanced by the exclusive use 
of ad valorem tariffs. 
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Table 2.12 Maximum tariff rates in key sectors, 1993 and 1995 (per cent) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand Taiwan 
Commodity 1995 19931 19931 1995 1995 1995 
3522 drugs 40 11 10 0 60 50 
3529 chemical nes2 50 20 35 0 80 105 
3560plastics nes2 40 11.0 10 0 60 10 
3824 industrial mach. 40 11 100 0 35 15 
3825 office machines 30 11.0 10 0 40 97.0 
3829 machinery nes2 40 13 45 0 80 150 
3 831 electrical industrial 100 11 10 0 35 25 
3832 telecom 40 13 60 0 100 27.5 
3833 electrical 40 13 10 0 80 17.50 
appliances 
3843 motor vehicles 275 17 60 45 200 50 
3851 precision 20 11 35 0 60 25 
instruments 
Notes: 1 latest year available. 
2 "nes" is "not elsewhere specified". 
Source: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 1995. Survey of Impediments to Trade and 
Investment in the APEC Region, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
Non-tariff barriers 
It is often claimed that NTBs are widespread in the EA6, but they have been reduced 
over the years. For a "core" set of NTBs, which included quantitative import 
restrictions, licensing, anti-dumping and countervailing actions, and voluntary export 
restraints, the frequency ratios (percentage of total tariff lines covered) for the EA6 have 
fallen significantly over the period 1980-1994 (Table 2.13). This measure is only an 
approximate indication of apparently increasing protectionism, as there is no indication 
of how many items in a category have been restricted or how restrictive the barrier was. 
There have also been reductions in a wide variety of NTBs not captured in these indices. 
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Table 2.13 Core NTBs in manufactures, unweighted averages, EA6, 1984-93 (per cent) 
1984-1987 1988-1990 1991-1993 
Indonesia 93.l 7 2 
Korea 2 
Malaysia 3.2 3 2 
Singapore 14.1 0.2 0 
Thailand 7.8 8.8 4.2 
Taiwan 2 
Source: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 1995. Survey of Impediments to Trade and 
Investment in the APEC Region, APEC Secretariat, Singapore: 240-259 Appendix G 
In Korea, the frequency ratios of core NTBs fell from 10 per cent to 2 per cent 
between 1980-94. In 1993, only a quarter of 81 manufacturing categories had any core 
NTBs. Frequency ratios ranged from 0 per cent to 50 per cent (dairy products and 
beverages). Import licensing, which covered 20 per cent of tariff lines in 1983, was less 
than 3 per cent of tariff lines by 1993. Regulatory laws have been streamlined. 
Safeguard provisions were brought into line with GATT provisions in 1987. In 1989 the 
list of items subject to surveillance in order to limit surges in imports was abolished. 
The use of trade measures for balance of payment reasons allowed under the GATT 
were revoked in 1990. Most remaining restrictions are in agriculture and plans have 
been made to liberalise them. All remaining restrictions are to be brought into line with 
GATT, or eliminated, by 1July1997 (GATT 1991c). 
Singapore has not used NTBs. 
Taiwan had removed core NTBs on 98 per cent of imports by the late 1980s. The 
major exceptions were tobacco, fertilisers and motor vehicles. 
Indonesia reduced core NTBs from over 90 per cent of imports in 1984-87 to 2 
per cent in 1990-1993. The majority of tariff lines have zero core NTBs. The main 
exceptions are beverages. Import licenses have been reduced dramatically from 1100 
lines in 1990 to 260 lines in 1995. Surcharge rates that were used to protect against 
alleged dumped items or to compensate producers where import licences have been 
removed have been rationalised. Quantitative restrictions fell from 43 per cent of 
imports in 1986 to 13 per cent in 1991. 
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Support for self sufficiency remains strong in Indonesia in the cement, fertiliser, 
steel and transport equipment industries. Some 180 public enterprises and privileged 
private entrepreneurs are granted import privileges. Domestic content is a major issue in 
motor vehicle production. Anti-dumping legislation has been reactivated (Low and 
Yeats 1995). Tariff surcharges have been used as a de facto means of protecting 
domestic industries from dumped imports. 
Malaysia has generally not used NTBs. The frequency ratios for core NTBs fell 
from a low 3 per cent to 2 per cent of tariff lines between 1980-94. Malaysia has no 
frequency ratios over 20 per cent except in manufactures of sugar (96 per cent) and 
cement lime and plaster (28 per cent). 
In Thailand, core NTBs fell from 8 per cent to 4 per cent between 1980 and 1994 
and other NTBs were reduced. In 1989 some bans on imports were lifted. Licensing was 
lower than in the 1970s, but has not yet fallen to 1982 levels. Translation of quantitative 
restrictions to tariffs has also occurred. In 1992 import surcharges on motor vehicles, 
which had ranged from 20 to 50 per cent, were removed. Thailand has, however, 
introduced excise taxes on motor vehicles, ranging from 27 to 45 per cent. Local content 
rules are extensive but are to be eliminated by the end of 1999. Import licensing was 
reduced in the 1990s, but still applies for some products. Motorcycles and some buses 
are subject to conditional import prohibitions. Thailand's only remaining import quota 
is imposed on garlic. 
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Table 2.14 Average Import tax equivalents of tariff and non-tariff barriers in 1993 (per cent) 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore ASEAN41 
Non-metallic mineral products 10.2 30.3 
Fabricated metal products 10.2 24 
Textiles 7.6 36.4 
Clothing 7.3 44.7 
Leather, fur etc 10.5 36 
Lumber and wood products 8.7 47.8 
Pulp, paper and printing 3.5 12.5 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 7.5 19.2 
Transport equipment 11.7 26.2 
Other machinery and equipment 8.1 20.5 
Other manufacturing 4.8 26.3 
Notes: 1 ASEAN4 include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
Source: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 1995. Survey of Impediments to Trade and 
Investment in the APEC Region, APEC Secretariat, Singapore: Table 4.3, p49. 
In Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the combination of tariffs and NTBs protect 
most sectors more than in Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Table 2.14). Although tariffs 
are being reduced and although the complexity of NTBs has also substantially fallen, 
with the exception of Singapore and Taiwan, considerable room appears to remain for 
efficiency gains through trade liberalisation. This hypothesis is tested in the CATO 
model in chapter 7. 
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3 The European Union 
The European Union has a diverse membership (Table 3.1). The member countries 
range in size from tiny Luxembourg to Germany. Some states are rich in natural 
resources. Denmark, Netherlands and United Kingdom have oil and natural gas 
resources. Portugal has ample wood resources. More than 80 per cent of land in Ireland 
is agricultural. Portugal's GNP per capita is less than Taiwan's, while Denmark has the 
fourth highest GNP per capita in the world. 
Table 3 .1 Basic indicators for the EU in 1994 
Landmass 
'000 square km 
EU 
Belgium 31 
Denmark 43 
France 552 
Greece 132 
Germany 357 
Ireland 70 
Italy 301 
Luxembourg 3 
Netherlands 37 
Portugal 92 
Spain 505 
United Kingdom 245 
Austria 84 
Finland 338 
Population 
millions 
10.1 
5.2 
57.9 
10.4 
81.5 
3.6 
57.1 
0.4 
15.4 
9.9 
39.1 
58.4 
GNP per capita dollars 
22,870 
27,970 
23,420 
7,700 
25,580 
13,530 
19,300 
39,600 
22,010 
9,320 
13,440 
18,340 
8 24,630 
5.1 18,850 
Sweden 450 8.8 23,530 
Source: World Bank 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
Table 3.2 shows the importance of the EU in terms of GDP and capital flows. 
The EU is also the largest trading region in the world (see Table 2.8 in chapter 2). The 
EU is an important world market and therefore economic policy developments in it are 
of significant interest to the EA6. 
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Table 3.2: The EU in the world economy 
GDP Share of world FDI outflows FDI inflows 
$million GDP $million $million 
EU 6821585 27 1005581 103001 
USA 6648013 26 49370 49440 
Japan 4590971 18 17970 890 
World 25223462 100 
Notes: 1 includes flows among the EU countries. 
Sources: World Bank 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New 
York. International Financial Statistics, International Economic Databank, Australian 
National University. International Monetary Fund, 1995. Balance of Payments Statistics 
Yearbook, Part 1 1995, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
The EC adopted conservative policies during the stagflation of the 1970s. 
Inflation and rising unemployment dominated economic strategies and economic 
growth slowed. In 1983 the European Council of the Heads of State agreed on the need 
for a new initiative. In 1985 the EC members decided to create a Single European 
Market (SEM) set out in the White Paper on "Completing the Single Market" 
(Commission of the European Communities 1985) which was due for completion by the 
end of 1992. New proposals were made in the Treaty of European Union, in 1992 at 
Maastricht, for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to be formed shortly after 2000. 
The integration movement was still mainly driven by the desire for political cohesion 
but, in addition, the SEM and the EMU were expected to yield large economic benefits 
(Emerson et al. 1988; Cecchini et al. 1988; Winters and Venable 1990; Commission of 
the European Communities 1990). 
One of the objectives assigned to the Communities was to improve living and 
working conditions and to strengthen social cohesion. The treaties did not, however, 
map out any coherent scheme for a future common policy. There were major 
disagreements within the EC from the outset over whether the establishment of a 
common market required the broad alignment of social security costs or whether in 
practice it would inevitably lead to the alignment of members' social security systems. 
Experience showed that the common market did not automatically lead to convergence 
of social policies. In 1974 the EC adopted a new social action programme. The Single 
European Act gave the EC wider powers in the field of social policy enabling it to press 
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ahead with building a coherent EC social policy. A further key component of the EC' s 
social policy is the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers which was 
adopted in 1989 by 11 member states. The United Kingdom opted out. Attempts to 
incorporate a comprehensive legal basis for common social policy in the Maastricht 
Treaty foundered against opposition from the United Kingdom. The 11 other members 
decided to form a separate agreement on social policy. 
The Single European Market 
The 1985 White Paper detailed the steps that were to be taken to achieve a unified 
Market. The Single European Act (Commission of the European Communities 1986), 
when it was ratified by the twelve national parliaments in 1987, modified the Treaty of 
Rome accordingly. The Single European Act included a timetable for the creation of a 
unified market by 31 December 1992. It also made the institutional provisions for the 
establishment of the European Union, which by 1992 comprised 12 countries. By 1995 
the EU had expanded to the present 15 countries. 
Two major innovations were made to help establish the SEM. 
The first was the introduction of 'qualified majority voting'. The Treaty of Rome 
provided three ways of making Council decisions: by unanimity, by qualified majority 
or by simple majority voting. If qualified majority voting applied, the votes of two large 
countries and one small country, or one large country and three small countries, are 
necessary to block a directive proposed by the EU Commission. The choice between 
these options affected the speed and adaptability of EU law-making. Unanimity, by 
protecting national interests from being overridden, was the slowest form of decision-
making. A simple majority was the fastest. 
The Treaty of Rome proposed a gradual move towards majority voting, but the 
"Luxembourg compromise" (1966) replaced majority voting with unanimity in all cases 
where a member country contended that its "national interest" was at stake. In practice 
this applied to most decisions. The Luxembourg compromise slowed the process of 
integration as decisions were confined to conditions of crisis (Hine 1985). The Single 
European Act re-introduced qualified majority voting in all areas except those that relate 
to the free movement of persons, the harmonisation of taxes and the rights of 
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employees. In these instances, unanimity still applied. This initiative was effective in 
curbing the desires of member-states to invoke the provisions of the Luxembourg 
compromise (Teasdale 1993). 
The Single European Act recommended that the 'mutual recognition' of national 
standards be adopted in most cases of trade in goods and services. This required that 
products lawfully produced or marketed in one member state have access to all member 
states. The validity of this principle was the main message behind the European Court 
of Justice ruling allowing the French liqueur, Cassis de Dijon, to be legally sold in 
Germany, even though it did not meet German consumer standards, because it was 
legally produced and sold in France1• This was followed by similar judgements. Thus 
the European Court of Justice played a pivotal role in the adoption of the mutual 
recognition principle in the Single European Act (Hoekman and Sauve 1994). 
The adoption of mutual recognition was expected to reduce the need for 
"harmonisation" which was the alternative approach to reducing technical barriers to 
intra-EC trade. The process of the harmonisation of national technical regulations 
required the formation of EU directives that indicated mandatory requirements for 
national regulations. In 1985 a "new approach" to harmonisation was adopted. This 
dispensed with the earlier type of detailed directives which were slow and which 
quickly became obsolete. The new type of directive indicated only the essential 
requirements and gave more leeway to producers to satisfy these requirements. 
Although mutual recognition was expected to accelerate the elimination of 
technical barriers the process was still slow because member states were often unwilling 
to accept standards that were different from their national ones. Harmonisation has 
remained an important instrument for the creation of the SEM, leading to thousands of 
pages of detailed legislation (Hindley and Howe 1996). 
The 1985 White Paper contained three hundred recommendations (subsequently 
reduced to 282) for microeconomic measures aimed at eliminating barriers to the free 
flow of goods, services, capital and labour within the EU. The measures can be 
categorised as follows (Hitiris 1991). 
Tariff and non-tariff barriers included: 
1 Cassis de Dijon case (Rewe-Zentral v. Bundes-monopolverwaltung fur Branntwein), Case 120n8 (1979) 
3 CMLR494. 
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• Tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Monetary compensatory amounts involving 
border taxes or subsidies applied on trade in agricultural products. Some production 
quotas still applied to steel and certain agricultural products. Quotas at the member-
state level for imports from non-member countries still applied. Road and air 
transport were subject to "market-sharing arrangements" that, in effect, restricted 
trade. 
• Different norms and technical regulations between member states. 
• Border controls. Customs formalities and other administrative burdens caused 
frontier delays, such as those arising from different VAT rates and excise taxes, 
applications of monetary compensatory amounts and different quarantine regulations 
for live products. 
• Market-distorting subsidies at the EC and national levels. 
Market entry restrictions included: 
• Protectionist public procurement practices. Member state governments were biased 
towards domestic suppliers of goods and services. This was indicated by the 
exceedingly low penetration of this market by foreign suppliers in most member-
states. 
• Different regulations in services. Transportation (air, freight), finance (banking, 
insurance, stock markets) and communications were subjected to regulation. There 
were restrictions on cross-border transactions or in establishing certain services over 
the border. 
• Controls on the movement of capital. In 1985, eight of the twelve EC countries had 
maintained some degree of control over capital movements to or from other member 
states. Liberalisation of capital movements was, however, attained quickly in a 
number of member states, notably in Belgium, France and Spain where heavy 
regulation had previously been in place (Gual and Neven 1993; Bisignano 1993). 
Much of the reduction in barriers resulted from domestic deregulation in the 1980s. 
Anticipation of the SEM was important. 
• Different legal frameworks for business. Differing national laws and regulations 
introduced delays in cross-border business activity such as mergers and joint 
ventures. 
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Thus in 1985, the EC economy remained fragmented along national lines. 
Substantial price differences between member countries were documented in Emerson 
et al. (1988). They provided evidence of the internal fragmentation. 
Progress to the SEM 
The SEM came into force, in a formal sense, on 1 January 1993. Despite the delays in 
translating EC proposals into national laws, customs posts were abolished. The EC 
Commission's report on the SEM in June 1995 showed that there were gaps in the 
programme and some concern about implementation in places (Commission of the 
European Communities 1995). 
By the end of 1995 the rate of transposition of SEM measures agreed in the 
Council was 93.2 per cent. This disguised much lower rates in various areas. These 
include public procurement, intellectual and industrial property, new technologies and 
insurance. Community-wide labour mobility also has not been achieved (Redmond 
1996). Technical barriers to trade were still important as member states failed to observe 
the principle of mutual recognition in areas which had not been harmonised such as road 
vehicles, foodstuff and pharmaceuticals. 
As may be expected delays have occurred in areas where unanimity voting still 
applies. To achieve a quick passage through the EC Council, many of the White Paper 
proposals did not outline the political ramifications of the proposal. The approach was 
to suggest practical tasks such as 'eliminating security checks on frontiers' rather than 
drawing out their political implications such as 'forming a common immigration policy' 
(The Economist 917 /88). With a clearer understanding of the impact of some of the 
proposals, some countries have become reluctant to make appropriate changes to their 
national laws. Regional governments sometimes have had the unwelcome responsibility 
of implementing legislation supported by their national representatives in the European 
Council. Delays have occurred as a result of a lack of administrative resources or 
political will. 
The EU Commission observed that the quality of implementation of SEM rules 
varied (Redmond 1996). The White Paper's attempt to gain quick acceptance left room 
in some proposals for governments to go against the spirit of the proposals in 
43 
interpretation and enforcement. The awareness that new national barriers could be 
erected to substitute for those being eliminated led the EU Commission to focus on 
evasion in its medium-term strategy, using court action and pressure from other 
members to close gaps in the SEM (Commission of the European Communities 1993). 
In July 1996 the EU Commission accelerated its use of infringement procedures. While 
the Maastricht Treaty has strengthened the enforcement of EU legislation by enabling 
the EU to fine member states if the Court confirms a violation of treaty obligations, 
governance of Europe's markets at the European level is of limited effectiveness 
(Centre for Economic Policy Research 1996). 
Economic effects of regional trade arrangements 
Regional trade arrangements (as defined in GATT article XXIV), customs unions and 
preferential trade arrangements are analysed within the theory of the "second best" 
(Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). "Second best" theory postulates that if all the conditions 
required to maximise welfare or reach Pareto optimality cannot be achieved, attempts to 
satisfy as many of these conditions as possible does not necessarily, or even usually, 
lead to a second-best outcome. Thus the welfare effects of a second best policy are 
theoretically ambiguous. A regional trade arrangement is an example of a second-best 
policy with the first-best policy being global free trade. Hence, a priori, the welfare 
effect of a regional trade arrangement cannot be predicted. 
Prior to Viner (1950) it was generally believed that a customs union, or deeper 
forms of integration such as a common market, would neccessarily increase the income 
of the members of the regional arrangement, and since it would not have any negative 
effects on non-members, the welfare of the world would unambiguously increase. Viner 
(1950) showed that a customs union led to both freer trade (between members) and 
more protection (towards non-members) at the same time. The effect on trade of the 
former dimension was called "trade creation" and the effect on trade of the latter 
dimension, "trade diversion". Viner' s concept of trade creation was based on a more 
efficient allocation of production within the regional trade arrangement countries: as 
tariff barriers fell between members, production moved from less efficient domestic 
producers to more efficient foreign producers within the region. Trade diversion is a 
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shift of imports from a more efficient non-member to a less efficient member of the 
region. This happens when duties fall within the region, so that the preference margin 
enjoyed by a partner country shifts the import price plus duty in favour of its goods 
away from the goods of non-member countries, even though production costs are less 
outside the regional trade arrangement. 
Viner (1950) analysed trade creation and trade diversion in terms of effects on 
production resulting from the change in relative prices from new tariff preferences. 
Because production efficiency and resource allocation is improved by trade creation it 
raises the welfare and income of member countries. Under small country assumptions in 
which terms of trade remain constant, trade diversion reduces the welfare of member 
states because it worsens their resource allocation. Thus net trade-creating arrangements 
were viewed as welfare-increasing and net trade-diverting ones were seen as welfare-
reducing. 
Meade (1955) and Gehrels (1956-57) demonstrated that when consumption 
effects are included, a net trade-creating customs union is not necessarily welfare-
increasing; nor is a net trade-diverting customs union necessarily welfare-decreasing. 
The welfare-increasing effect of equating the marginal rate of substitution between the 
goods in consumption with their marginal transformation rate in production, which was 
assumed to be initially distorted by a non-preferential tariff, can offset the loss in 
welfare due to trade diversion. As Krauss (1972:417) points out, once consumption 
effects are allowed for, labelling a customs union after its production effect is "un-
illuminating". In Johnson's (1962) framework regional trade arrangements are not given 
these labels and the terms "trade creation" and "trade diversion" are defined to include 
production and consumption consequences. The overall conclusion, however, that 
customs unions have positive and negative effects on welfare, did not change. 
Johnson (1965) showed that allowing for the effects of relative price changes on 
consumption as well as production led to more complex static short term effects. These 
effects can be illustrated in Figure 3.1 (based on El Agraa 1990). This assumes perfect 
competition in both commodity and factor markets, full adjustment of all resources, 
costless adjustment procedures, perfect factor mobility nationally but perfect immobility 
across national boundaries, prices determined by cost and three countries (E is the home 
country, C is the partner country and Wis the rest of the world). 
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Sw is the supply curve for product X. SE is E's supply curve. SE+c is the joint E 
and C's supply curve. In a free trade situation Oq5 will be imported and this amount 
will be consumed. 
If there is a non-discriminatory tariff imposition of AD (ttt) by E, the effective 
supply curve facing Eis BEFQT. This is E's domestic supply curve up to point E, and 
W's, subject to the tariff (Sw(l +ttt) ), after that. The domestic price OD gives rise to 
domestic production of Oq2, domestic consumption of Oq3 and imports of q2q3 from 
W. Country E pays q2q3ML for these imports, while domestic consumers pay q2q3FE. 
The difference between these expenditures is the tariff revenue that accrues to the 
government of country E. 
If E and C form a customs union and the tariff imposition still applies to W, the 
effective supply curve is BRGQT. The price of X in country E falls to OC. Domestic 
production falls to Oql. Consumption increases to Oq4. Imports increase to qlq4. These 
imports now come from country C. As a result of increased consumption, consumer 
surplus rises by CDFG. Part of this, CDEJ is a fall in producers' surplus due to the 
decline in domestic production and IEFH is a part of the tariff revenue now transferred 
back to the consumer. These leave the triangles JEI and HFG. The fall in domestic 
production from Oq2 to Oql leads to increased imports of qlq2. These cost qlq2U to 
import from C while they originally cost qlq2EJ to produce domestically. There is 
therefore a saving of JEI. The increase in consumption from Oq3 to Oq4 leads to new 
imports of q3q4 which cost q3q4HG to import from C. Therefore there is a gain of 
HGF. But the initial imports of q2q3 cost the country q2q3IH, whereas in the previous 
situation they cost the country q2q3ML. Therefore there is a loss of LMHI. The triangles 
IEJ and HGF have to be weighed against the loss LMHI to establish whether the 
regional trade arrangement is beneficial to the members or not. While qlq2 and q3q4 
represent trade creation, q2q3 represents trade diversion. 
Figure 3.1 shows that the size of gains and losses depends in part on the size of 
the gap between D and C (the preference margin). If, on the one hand, the initial tariff 
rate was high enough to be prohibitive (high enough that the initial price was given by 
an intersection of DE and SE and there were no imports from W or C in the initial 
situation) then the regional trade arrangement would result solely in trade creation. If, on 
the other hand, a lower tariff led to an initial price equal to OC, then the regional trade 
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arrangement would result in pure trade diversion. If the tariff was very low such as at 
OR then imports from outside the arrangement would only be marginally more costly 
than imports from within which would minimise trade diversion (and trade creation). 
The figure shows that the size of the gains and losses depend on the price elasticities of 
SE, SE+c, and DE. The divergence of Sc and Sw (the production cost differences between 
W and C) is also important. The smaller the divergence between these supply scheduled 
the more trade there would be with the regional partner before the agreement. Trade 
diversion would be lower the more the trade between regional partners before the 
agreement. 
Figure 3.1 Trade creation and trade diversion 
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These conclusions do not lead to simple policy prescriptions. Like all "second 
best" analyses, gains and losses depend upon the starting conditions. The net welfare 
effects of regional trade arrangements have to be assessed empirically on a case-by-case 
basis. 
What about the effects on non-members? Trade diversion reduces the welfare 
and income of non-members if demand for their exports is diverted to members' firms. 
If the net effect of an regional trade arrangement is an increase in members' incomes, 
this will lead to an expansion of demand for imports from non-member countries. The 
extent of this increase will depend on the income elasticity of demand for imports from 
non-members into the region. This is sometimes called external "trade creation" in the 
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literature. It could offset any decrease in the region's demand for non-members' imports 
from trade diversion. Whether trade diversion outweighs external trade creation is 
essentially an empirical question. 
Kemp and Wan (1976) following Meade (1955) demonstrated that it was 
possible for a regional trade arrangement to leave non-members' trade unaffected. 
Meade noted that if members had quotas on all their trade with non-members, and these 
quotas remained unchanged after integration between members, there would be no trade 
diversion. Kemp and Wan (1976) then demonstrated that trade with non-members can 
be held constant without the need for quotas, by selecting an appropriate external tariff. 
All other things being equal, this will leave non-members welfare unchanged. As 
Winters (1995) points out the Kemp-Wan paper is wrongly interpreted to assess the 
welfare effects of a regional trade arrangement for non-members by simply checking 
whether the regional trade arrangement leads to an increase or decrease in imports from 
non-members, and therefore and increase or decrease in their welfare. Winters observes 
that if the Kemp-Wan model were correctly applied, an increase in imports from non-
members' would be ironically ore likely to be welfare-decreasing than increasing. Kemp 
and Wan do not suggest that welfare assessments of a regional trade arrangement can be 
made solely on the basis of the effect on trade with non-members'. Terms of trade 
effects and imports by non-members of members' exports influence the welfare of non-
members. 
In more recent arguments the so-called dynamic benefits of regionalism have 
been emphasised (Balassa 1961; Robson 1993). These discuss the ways in which GDP 
growth rates of participating countries can be boosted as a result of regionalism. These 
effects have also been emphasised in the EC Commission's evaluation of the effects of 
the SEM (Emerson et al. 1988). Regionalism benefits economies in the following ways: 
• Scale economies are exploited because of the increase in market size faced by 
domestic firms. 
• Competition increases which increases the "X-efficiency" of production. 
• The location and volume of real investment is influenced sometimes towards more 
efficient allocation. 
The effects of scale economies can be demonstrated with orthodox economic tools, 
unlike X-efficiency effects (Krauss 1972; El-Agraa 1990). The effects of economies of 
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scale are depicted in Figure 3.2. DE,c are identical demand curves in country E and 
country C. Sw is the world supply curve. ACE and ACc are the average cost curves for 
commodity X in countries E and C. W has constant average cost and is the most 
efficient supplier of the commodity. Hence free trade is the best policy, resulting in 
price OA with consumption at Oq4 in both E and C and total consumption at Oq6. 
Under free trade the entire consumption in both countries C and E would be imported 
from W. 
Figure 3.2 Economies of scale gains from a regional trading arrangement 
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E and C impose tariffs of AD and AC respectively. This results in Oql and Oq2 
production in E and C respectively. If E and Center a customs union, C being the 
cheaper producer will produce the entire output for both E and C, Oq5 at price OB. At 
price OB, consumption is Oq3 in both countries with gains BGED and BGFC for E and 
C respectively. Parts of these gains are "cost reduction" effects. There will also be a 
production gain for C and a production loss for E. Unilateral trade liberalisation, 
however, is the "first best" policy because it leads to more opportunities for economies 
of scale than regional arrangements. 
The argument that a large but protected market is required for EU firms to 
achieve economies of scale and thus become more competitive on world markets is 
closely related to the infant industry case for protection. The infant industry case rests 
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on the existence of economies of scale. According to this argument, domestic investors 
are unable to achieve the size required to fully exploit economies of scale if there are 
established foreign competitors already operating at that size. Faced with competition, 
means that there will be less than optimal domestic investment in the activity 
concerned. Tariff protection is used until economies of scale have been attained. Giving 
trade preferences is argued to provide a competitive margin to nascent industries in 
export markets as well. It is assumed that protection does not allocate resources to 
industries which have no hope of being competitive once they face international 
competition in the absence of a preference margin. However, a first-best policy in this 
case would be addressing capital market imperfections or for directly subsidising 
labour. 
Regional trade arrangements are believed to increase X-efficiency in industries. 
The opening of domestic markets toother members' firms leads to new arbitrage 
possibilities. The pressure of competition on prices should reduce price-cost margins 
and provide incentives for firms to increase their technological and economic efficiency. 
Competitive pressures should improve the allocation and utilisation of human, physical 
and financial resources. Room for increased efficiency could be particularly important 
in managerial and executive behaviour (Scherer 1980, Primeaux 1977). Again, a 
regional arrangement is a "second best" policy for engendering competition. The 
reduction of barriers on a most-favoured nation basis would be a more effective option, 
because it avoids the competition restricting effects of trade diversion. 
Rising incomes and improved competitiveness in member-states will increase 
incomes and lead to higher "external" trade creation. Combined with static trade 
creation and trade diversion, these two "dynamic effects" will influence the terms of 
trade between members and non-members. On the one hand, any increase in 
competitiveness of members' industries will put downward pressure on their terms of 
trade. On the other hand, trade diversion may boost the members' terms of trade: by 
buying fewer imports from non-members and selling fewer imports to them, a large 
regional trade agreement area would lead to lower world prices for its imports and 
higher world prices for its exports disadvantaging third countries (de la Torre and Kelly 
1992; Robertson 1992). 
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The globalisation of production and accompanying rapid increase in foreign 
direct investment flows has further complicated the analysis of regional trade 
arrangements (Robertson 1992). Trade policies are still the domain of national 
administrations but the trade diversion and trade creation effects of a regional trade 
arrangement also affect foreign firms operating within the region, or domestic firms 
operating outside the region. The gains from internal trade creation accrue to the firms 
of non-member countries located within the region. The losses from trade diversion will 
affect firms owned by the residents of the region, located in non-member countries. This 
needs to be accounted for in the calculation of gains and losses for a member country. 
Moreover, trade diversion and creation effects will influence TNCs' investment 
decisions (Bhagwati and Brecher 1980; Nielsen et al. 1992). Anticipation of a boost in 
economic growth, increased market size and increased efficiency in production may 
encourage foreign investment inflows and relocation of production to the region 
(Yannopoulos 1990). The prospect of trade diversion may cause firms from non-
member countries to invest in the region. This investment may benefit members, but 
represents a policy-induced diversion of investment and in this sense is analogous to 
trade diversion. Non-members incomes are likely to be adversely affected. The 
distribution of non-members investment and thus the distribution of gains among 
member states will be affected by the differences in investment policies of each 
member. Foreign direct investment may be attracted to the country with most liberal 
attitude to foreign investment. Products are then shipped to other members of the 
region. 
Quantification of the expected effects of the SEM 
The static effects and "dynamic" effects of the SEM were estimated by Emerson et al. 
(1988). Emphasis was put on the dynamic effects. A greater exploitation of economies 
of scale would occur through increased output in existing plants and through the 
restructuring of output to the lowest cost EU producers. Firms could also exploit 
economies of scale by specialising in particular brands; that is, by reducing the number 
of differentiated products produced in each plant and increasing production runs (Klein 
and Salvatore 1995). More competitive markets would lead to improved efficiency in 
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enterprises, a rationalisation of industrial structures and a setting of prices closer to costs 
of production. In addition, a flow of innovations, new processes and new products 
would be stimulated by the dynamic of the internal market. 
It was argued by Emerson et al. that the productivity gains from the SEM would 
ease the EU' s macroeconomic constraints (inflation, budget deficits and external 
deficits). This would occur because productivity gains would be passed on as price 
reductions. This would alleviate inflation and lead to an increase in exports which in 
tum would ease the external deficit constraint. The rise in incomes would ease the 
budget deficit constraint. This easing of constraints was equivalent to additional growth 
potential. Fiscal and monetary policy would play a major role in determining how the 
growth potential generated by the SEM was manifested and distributed. For example, 
the expected reduction in public deficits gives more room for policymakers to 
manoeuvre. It may be used in the short term to ease the tax burden or to participate in 
large-scale European infrastructure projects. In this case the easing of the budgetary 
constraint would immediately translate into a spur to activity. Or it could lead to a 
resolve on the part of public authorities to reduce their level of indebtedness and thus 
speed up the process of restoring balance to public finances. Any fall in the external 
deficit, or fall in the rate of inflation is equivalent to an upturn in economic activity 
achieved through the former option. 
It has been suggested that the SEM would lead to an "induced capital effect" 
(Baldwin 1989). The higher returns to capital in a common market would lead to higher 
savings and investment. In the medium term, the economy would move towards higher 
capital-labour ratios, income would rise by more, hopefully by much more, than the 
original static efficiency gains. Recent growth theory (Romer 1983) argues that income 
gains would be high because under certain types of scale economies, the marginal 
product of capital would continue to increase and savings and investment would 
continue to rise. 
The EC Commission study paid little attention to the effects on non-member 
countries. Nevertheless, there was a spate of other studies which focussed on non-
members (Robertson 1991a and 1991b, 1992; Greenaway 1991; Davenport and Page 
1991; Hiemenz 1991). As with other regional integration initiatives, the SEM would be 
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expected to have some trade diverting and external trade creation effects as well as 
terms of trade effects, for non-members. 
The SEM was expected to improve market access to non-members including the 
EA6 in some ways; reducing some of these barriers was akin to multilateral trade 
liberalisation, because they did not allow selective discrimination between trading 
partners (Emerson et al. 1988; Yannopoulos 1990). For example, it was impossible to 
have different technical standards and packaging regulations for goods from EU and 
non-EU sources. The Emerson et al. study assumed that a given percentage of direct 
cost reductions would apply to the imports of non-members. In the light of sectoral 
studies findings on the cost savings from the abolition of technical barriers, this was set 
at 10 per cent. The expected boost in income would be expected to increase imports 
from non-members. The EC Commission suggested that the SEM would boost growth 
in other countries, that is, "external" trade creation would be greater than trade 
diversion. This conclusion was supported by other studies (Page 1991; Davenport and 
Page 1991; Hiemenz 1991). Other studies emphasised the character of the EC common 
external trade policy for the unified market as determining the extent to which non-
members would reap the potential benefits of increased income in the EC (Robertson 
199la, 1991b; Greenaway 1991; Davenport and Page 1992; Hughes-Hallett 1992; Pohl 
and Sorsa 1992 ). The fear of an increase in the EU' s external trade barriers ("fortress 
Europe") was discussed in the light of the EC' s record of discriminatory non-tariff 
barrier protection, the increasing demands for reciprocal market opening on a bilateral 
basis and the expected adjustment pressures of the SEM. 
In addition, by promoting competition and creating opportunities for scale 
economies efficient EC firms would be assisted in capturing markets served by imports 
without having to rely on increasing protection. Emerson et al. estimated that EC 
imports may be reduced by 5.5 to 7.7 per cent by both trade diversion and productivity 
effects. Improved EC competitiveness was also expected to increase EC exports to other 
markets. 
The EU Commission estimated that the SEM would increase the EU' s income 
by up to 4.8-6.4 per cent over five to ten years (Emerson et al. 1988). In the shorter 
timeframe, 4.8 per cent was equivalent to a 1.4 per cent increase in GDP per annum 
over five years (Table 3.3). The estimations were acknowledged to have wide margins 
of error. As partial equilibrium calculations, they did not take into account "second 
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order effects" resulting from changes in relative prices between sectors. They assumed 
perfectly competitive markets and omitted the costs of adjustment, postulating a full 
employment equilibrium. They excluded some dynamic effects, notably the favourable 
effect of competition on technological progress. 
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Table 3.3 Estimates of the total economic gains from completing the internal market, according 
to partial equilibrium estimation methods (EUR7, based on benchmark data for 1985, at 1985 
prices) 
Stage 1 
Cost of barriers affecting trade only 
Stage 2 
Cost of barriers affecting all production 
Total direct costs of barriers 
Stage 3: Economies of scale from 
restructuring and increased production 
Stage 4: Competitivity effects on X-
inefficiency and monopoly rents 
Total market integration effects 
Variant I (sum of stages 3 and 4 above) (b) 
Variant II (alternative measures for stage 3 
and 4 (c) 
Total costs of barriers and market 
integration effects 
Variant I= (a) +(b) 
Variant II= (a) and (c) 
billion ECU 
A 
8 
57 
65 
60 
46 
106 
62 
171 
127 
Variants 
B 
9 
71 
80 
61 
46 
107 
62 
187 
142 
A 
0.2 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
1.6 
3.6 
2.1 
5.8 
4.3 
%GDP 
Variants 
B 
0.3 
2.4 
2.7 
2.1 
1.6 
3.7 
2.1 
6.4 
4.8 
Notes: Variants A and B relate to the use of alternative primary sources of information introduced in 
the calculations in stage 1 and stage 2. 
Variants I separates gains from economies of scale and gains due to increased competition. The latter 
is computed from the Venables and Smith model but the former is computed from the other models. 
Variant II uses results from the Venables and Smith model to calculate the ratio of direct to indirect 
gains, it includes competitivity and scale effects. 
When the total figures, ranging above from 127 to 187 billion ECU for seven Member States in 195 
prices are scaled up to represent the same GDP share for the 12 Member States in 1988 prices, the 
range becomes 173 to 257 billion ECU 
Source: Emerson, M., Aujean, M., Catinat, M.,Goybet, P. and Jacquemin, A. 1988. The Economics of 
1992: the EC's assessment of the economic effects of completing the internal market, Oxford 
University Press, New Y ork:203 
The macroeconomic approach using the EC' s Hermes and OECD' s Interlink 
macroeconomic models corroborated the orders of magnitude of the gains suggested by 
the Commission's microeconomic work. Estimates of GDP increases were between 4.5 
and 7 per cent of GDP over 5-10 years, depending on macroeconomic policy 
assumptions (Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 Macroeconomic gains from the SEM (per cent) 
GDP CPI Employment Public External 
Deficit Balance 
Without economic 4.5 -6.1 1.8 2.2 1.0 
policy measures 
With policy measure 
I 7.5 -4.3 5.7 0.0 -0.5 
II 6.5 -4.9 4.4 0.7 0.0 
Notes: Policy measure I and II represent more expansionary and less expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
Source: Emerson, M., Aujean, M., Catinat, M.,Goybet and P. Jacquemin, A. 1988. The Economics of 
1992: the EC's assessment of the economic effects of completing the internal market, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Baldwin's study of medium term effects suggested dramatically larger increases 
in GDP of up to 13 per cent over approximately ten years. The application of Romer's 
model suggested a 35 per cent increase in GDP over the long term. These estimates 
were admitted to be "rough, back-of-the envelope calculations" (Baldwin 1989:251). 
These benefits were disputed by other studies (Geroski 1988; Pelkmans and 
Winters 1988; Peck 1989), creating a division between supporters and opponents of the 
SEM. Critics have argued that the economies of scale opportunities in the EC had 
generally been exhausted and that few of the barriers to be removed in the 1992 
program had directly inhibited the exploitation of scale economies (Pelkmans and 
Winters 1988). 
The macroeconomic estimates were subject to wide margins of error. Modelling 
the effects of enhanced competition was complicated by market structures that differed 
widely between sectors; parameter estimates and the degree of remaining market power 
were uncertain. The latter depended on assumptions about the entry and exit of firms, 
the degree of product differentiation and pricing strategies. The precise assumptions 
adopted bear heavily on the results. Different but reasonable assumptions generated 
widely different welfare gains (Peck 1989). Peck questioned the plausibility of the EC 
Commission's study. Using the car industry as a case in point, he showed that with 
different but reasonable assumptions Smith and Venables (whose parameters were used 
in the EC Commission's study) obtained a wide range of results and that the EC 
Commission study had selected the highest welfare gains for final report estimates. He 
compared the EC Commission's results with another study which assumed full 
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realisation of economies of scales in the car industry but obtained much lower estimates 
of the benefits. Even the alternative approaches to estimation mentioned in the Emerson 
study (surveys, price convergence approach) all had smaller estimates of the gains. 
What are the effects of the SEM so far? 
By 1994 (the latest data available) the progress made towards achieving the SEM 
should have shown some measurable effects. It should be kept in mind that some 
legislation only came into force in 1994 and 1995, thus the SEM has not had its full 
effect. Not only do some SEM proposals still have to be adopted by national 
legislatures, but attitudes and practices have to change at the grass roots level (Hoeller 
and Louppe 1994). 
Evaluating the effects of the SEM is very difficult because a range of other 
influences were important in economic developments in the EU since the mid-1980s. 
These include the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s and secular trends in technology 
and the globalisation of firms. The creation of the SEM coincided with a worldwide 
recession which damped down economic growth and exacerbated unemployment. 
European integration was boosted by the accession of Spain and Portugal and the 
unification of Germany. Economic performance also reflects the impact of different EU 
and national policies over the period of implementation of the SEM. The EU countries 
have a range of monetary and fiscal policies, financial and macroeconomic policies that 
have affected inflation, investment, export and overall growth. The EU' s predilection 
for regional trade arrangements (which is discussed in chapter 5 and evaluated in 
chapter 7) may have contributed to slower growth through trade diversion effects. 
Notably restrictive trade policies remain in certain sectors (agriculture, coal and steel, 
clothing and textiles). The use of discriminatory contingent protection against low cost 
suppliers of manufactures would also be expected to reduce the EU' s income. This issue 
is examined in chapter 7 using the CATO model. The degree of competition in the EU 
market is not only affected by the impact of regional trade policies, but also by its 
multilateral trade policy and national competition policies which vary among EU 
members. These affect mergers and monopolies and access to markets. 
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Between 1990 and 1994, EU members grew relatively slowly, with the 
exception of Ireland, which had lagged the rest of Europe for at least two decades (Table 
3.5). 
Table 3.5: Average annual growth of real GDP (per cent) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 
Belgium 3.0 1.9 0.9 
Denmark 2.2 2.4 1.8 
France 3.2 2.4 0.8 
Germany 2.6 2.2 1.1 
Ireland 4.9 3.3 4.5 
Italy 3.8 2.4 0.7 
Netherlands 2.9 2.1 1.5 
Portugal 4.3 2.9 0.6 
Spain 3.5 3.2 0.7 
United Kingdom 2.0 3.2 0.8 
Norway 4.8 2.9 3.3 
Switzerland 0.5 2.2 0.1 
United States 2.8 3.0 2.5 
Sources: World Bank, 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank, 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York 
With the exception of Spain, inflation in EU member countries has fallen in 
recent years (Table 3.6). This trend, however, started after the adoption of rigorous 
monetary policies in the early 1980s, before the move toward the SEM. National 
policies rather than the SEM appear to have been the principal causes of declining 
inflation. 
Table 3.6: Average annual growth of consumer prices (per cent) 
1980-89 1990 1993 1994 
Belgium 4.9 3.5 2.8 2.4 
Denmark 6.9 2.6 1.3 2 
France 7.3 3.4 2.1 1.7 
Germany 2.9 2.7 4.5 2.7 
Italy 11.2 6.1 4.2 3.9 
Netherlands 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.8 
Portugal 17.5 13.4 6.5 5.2 
Spain 10.2 6.7 4.6 4.7 
United Kingdom 7.4 9.5 1.6 2.5 
Norway 8.3 4.1 2.3 1.4 
Switzerland 3.3 5.4 3.3 0.9 
United States 5.5 5.4 3.0 2.6 
Source: Bank oflnternational Settlements, 1996. 66th Annual Report, Basie. 
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Between 1990 and 1994, gross domestic investment fell in all EU economies except 
Belgium. In the same period it rose in the US (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7: Average annual growth of gross domestic investment 
1980-90 1990-1994 
Belgium 2.6 2.7 
Denmark 4.0 -6.9 
France 2.8 -6.3 
Germany 2.0 -1.8 
Ireland -0.4 -10.8 
Italy 2.1 -5.9 
Netherlands 3.3 -2.8 
Portugal 2.6 2.7 
Spain 5.7 -5.4 
United Kingdom 6.4 -2.0 
Norway 0.6 -0.4 
Switzerland 4.8 -7.3 
United States 3.4 4.1 
Source: World Bank 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York. 
The SEM was expected to have a strong impact on trade flows. Trade integration 
was an important factor in promoting intra-EC trade from the late 1950s and leading to 
a decline in the share of trade with most other regions (see chapter 4). Since the mid 
1980s, the share of intra-EC merchandise trade has risen even further (Table 3.8). 
Increases were very high for Greece, Portugal and Spain as their accession to the EC 
played a role in fostering trade. Changes in trade shares were also influenced by oil 
price shocks and the swings in effective real exchange rates in the 1980s (Hoeller and 
Louppe 1994). Interestingly enough, intra-EU trade declined in the 1990s. This 
probably arose because growth in the EU was slower than in many of its trading 
partners. 
Table 3.8 Intra-EU imports and exports as a percent of respective totals merchandise goods 
Merchandise 
exports imports 
1980 55.8 49.4 
1985 54.7 52.9 
1990 60.7 58.2 
1994 57.4 55.6 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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"Trade openness" as measured by the average of extra-EU nominal goods exports and 
imports as a per cent of GDP declined from the mid 1980s to 1994 (Hoeller and Louppe 
1994). The US and Japan show somewhat lower levels of "trade openness" in 1980 but 
over the decade US openness has increased and almost reached EU levels. Differences 
in relative development of aggregate and goods imports prices influence this data: 
between 1985 and 1993 volume imports of goods and services in the EC, United States 
and Japan have risen considerable faster than GDP. Sapir (1992) shows that both the 
shares of intra- and extra-EC imports in apparent consumption rose by 2 percentage 
points between 1985 and 1991 (for an EC-9 aggregate) The EU Commission has 
observed that extra-EU manufactured imports have increased their share in consumption 
between 1980 and 1993 from 12 to 14 per cent (Commission of the European 
Communities 1996). This does not, however, measure the relative importance of trade 
creation and trade diversion. The effects of the SEM would be distributed differentially 
among non-member countries with some gaining while other lose from trade diversion. 
The result would partly depending on the differential restrictiveness of EU trade barriers 
with non-member trading partners. The relative importance of trade diversion and trade 
creation would also differ at a sectoral level. A key difficulty lies in determining the 
reference scenario. Would extra-EU imports share of consumption have been higher 
without the SEM--particularly for countries that are liberalising their trade regimes and 
increasing their export competitiveness in the 1980s and 1990s? In chapter 7 this issue 
is examined in the context of one of the EU' s recent regional trade arrangements. 
The SEM was expected to increase the EU' s global competitiveness. Total 
export growth in all EU economies, however, was less than in the US except for Italy 
and the Netherlands in the period 1990-94 (Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9 Average annual growth of exports (per cent per annum) 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-94 
Belgium 5.6 4.4 2.4 
Denmark 4.4 4.4 5.4 
France 6.8 4.1 2.3 
Germany 5.6 4.6 2.2 
Ireland 9.2 9.3 11.4 
Italy 6.9 4.4 6.0 
Netherlands 5.2 4.5 5.8 
Portugal 1.5 12.2 0.5 
Spain 12.6 6.9 11.2 
United Kingdom 4.3 4.4 1.8 
Norway 6.5 6.8 6.5 
Switzerland 4.6 6 3.3 
United States 7.0 3.6 5.6 
Sources: World Bank 1995. World Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, New York. 
World Bank 1996. World Development Report 1996, Oxford University Press, New York. 
There has been a rapid rise in foreign investment flows in the EU. The EU 
absorbed 44 per cent of global foreign investment flows in the early 1990s compared to 
28 percent in the mid-1980s (Commission of the European Communities 1996). Flows 
from non-EU sources came mainly from the United States and Japan. 
Table 3.10: Foreign direct investment into the EU, Japan and the United States 
(billion dollars) 
EU1 Japan United States 
1980 20.74 0.28 16.93 
1985 15.16 0.64 20.01 
1990 94.44 1.76 47.92 
1994 63.24 0.92 49.76 
Notes: 1Includes flows from EU member states. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The increase has been attributed to the globalisation of firms' strategies in 
production and marketing and the globalisation of financial markets. Several authors 
have speculated that the SEM was also a key factor (Balasubramanyam and Greenaway 
1992; Neven and Siotis 1993). Aristotelous and Fountas (1996) used cross section and 
time series data from the 1980s and 1990s on US and Japanese foreign direct investment 
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in the EU and found strong evidence of an SEM effect especially on US foreign direct 
investment. To what extent this represents investment diversion from other sources was 
not investigated. 
For the period 1987-1992, Italianer estimates that the SEM has contributed 0.4 
per cent per annum or a cumulative total of 2.4 per cent (Italianer 1994). Even the EU 
Commission's own estimates suggest that by 1994 EU income was only 1.1to1.5 
percentage points higher due to the Single Market. Half of these effects came from 
increases in competition and efficiency improvements, the rest from improvements in 
technical progress associated with the SEM (European Commission 1996b). The EU 
Commission has also concluded that the SEM has had benefits for investment (boosted 
by 1 to 3 percent), inflation (reduced by 1 to 1.5 per cent) and job creation (increased by 
300, 000 to 900,000 jobs) by comparison with what these variables would have been in 
the absence of the SEM. 
The EU's predilection for regional trade arrangements (which is discussed in 
chapter 5 and evaluated in chapter 7) may have contributed to slower growth through 
trade diversion effects. Notably restrictive trade policies remain in certain sectors 
(agriculture, coal and steel, clothing and textiles). The use of discriminatory contingent 
protection against low cost suppliers of manufactures would also be expected to reduce 
the EU' s income. This issue is examined in chapter 7 using the CA TO model. 
The unemployment problem 
Growing unemployment in the EU since the 1970s has drawn particular attention to 
national labour market policies and social security policies. Unemployment has been 
increasing from recession to recession with a 'ratchet effect', not clearing during 
economic upturns. Almost 19 million people were unemployed in the EU in 1995 
according to the International Labour Organisation definition (OECD 1996a). 
Unemployment rates ranged from 23 per cent in Spain to 7 per cent in the Netherlands 
(Table 3.10). 
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Table 3.10: Unemployment (percentage of labour force and millions) 
Average 1994 1995 Millions 
1983-93 
1995 
EU 9.5 11.6 11.2 18.4 
Belgium 11.2 13.1 13.0 0.6 
Denmark 9.7 12.2 10.0 0.3 
France 9.9 12.3 11.6 3.0 
Germany 7.5 9.6 9.4 3.6 
Ireland 15.5 14.2 12.9 0.2 
Italy 9.3 11.3 12.0 2.7 
Netherlands 7.7 7.6 7.1 0.5 
Portugal 6.4 6.9 7.2 0.3 
Spain 19.3 24.2 22.9 3.6 
United Kingdom 9.2 9.2 8.2 2.3 
Norway 4.0 5.4 4.9 0.1 
Switzerland 1.3 4.7 4.2 0.2 
United States 6.8 6.1 5.6 7.4 
Source: OECD, 1996. Employment Outlook, July 1996. OECD, Paris 
Unemployment is most severe among low-skilled groups and those lacking work 
experience, particularly the youth. Youth unemployment is twice as high as adult 
unemployment. OECD estimates of "market slack" indicate that a more inclusive 
definition of unemployment, taking into account those in involuntary part-time work, 
those in government sponsored training programs and those who have dropped out of 
the labour force, are considerably higher than the above estimates. Unemployment 
reduces output directly. In addition, although social security outlays limit the downward 
multiplier effects of unemployment, social security outlays have high budgetary costs. 
They reduce public and private savings and crowd out investment expenditure. 
Technological change has been a key underlying reason for unemployment. 
Inflexible labour markets in EU countries have also contributed to the high 
unemployment (OECD 1996b ). The US and some other OECD members that have more 
flexible labour markets have lower unemployment. It has been argued that figures for 
the US are misleading because the "working poor", although employed, earn wages that 
leave them below poverty levels. Within the EU there is controversy about the 
underlying philosophy of labour market dynamics (Scott 1996). In 1995, the debate 
increasingly polarised around two camps, with some countries wishing to maintain the 
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"European approach" to the labour market. This approach emphasises the rights and 
conditions of employed persons and the provision of a relatively high "social wage" for 
those who are unemployed. Other countries favoured greater emphasis on deregulation 
of labour markets, including the erosion of workers' rights and lowering the welfare 
support offered to the unemployed. 
The increasing importance of social regulation in the EU was revealed by the 
Community Social Charter which was adopted by member states with the exception of 
the United Kingdom, on 9 December 1989. The 20 directives in the program relate to 
occupational health and safety, living and working conditions and equal treatment of 
workers. According to some commentators the rules in the "Social Charter" are 
expected to increase inflexibility, raise employment costs and thus reduce international 
competitiveness and further increase unemployment. 
The combination of high unemployment, especially among unskilled workers, 
and the adoption of the Social Charter has helped rekindle an old protectionist saw: 
labour rights as a justification for trade protection (Lall 1981; Goldsmith 1994). 
Proponents of this argument have called for the inclusion of a "social clause" in the 
WTO as a precondition for access to MFN tariff reductions, market access and/or 
recourse to disciplines (Allen and Smith 1996). The content of the social clause is not 
clear. It may be modelled after the EU' s social charter. The social clause argument in 
the WTO follows the NAFTA Side Agreement on Labour in 1992, proposals made in 
the GATT during the negotiations of MF A in 1970s and 1980s, and in the EU context, 
the renegotiation of the Lome and GSP agreements. 
Trade restrictions and sanctions against lower wage countries based on labour 
issues are at best likely to be ineffective in their aims and may make the situation for 
workers worse. Most countries have already ratified international labour standards in the 
ILO or UN agreements. The introduction of other aspects may be difficult to implement 
because they put a large strain on government budgets and administrative capabilities. If 
minimum work conditions are applied in developing countries, labour costs will rise, 
while employment opportunities will diminish. The reduction of exports due to trade 
restrictions will exert downward pressure on real incomes and probably worsen the 
conditions of those who are denied employment (Robertson forthcoming (a)). 
Behind the moral argument for improving working conditions is the familiar 
case for import protection to prevent living standards in the EU from being undermined 
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by imports from lower wage economies. Groups of unskilled workers have suffered 
most from structural changes. These workers are located in declining industries where 
competition from EA6 countries and other Asian countries has been very strong. These 
sectors are among those with the highest level of protection in the EU. This is 
particularly relevant to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand as the other EA6 have shifted 
export composition to more skill and capital intensive goods (see chapter 4). 
Imports of low cost manufactures from lower wage countries are not strongly 
linked to unemployment (OECD 1994b; Baldwin 1994; Messerlin and Reed 1995). 
Employment depends on macroeconomic aggregates and raising employment depends 
on raising growth. Protectionism will aggravate the unemployment problem by reducing 
overall economic growth. While manufactured imports from the EA6 have been 
increasing the EA6 countries represent a potentially large market for the EU (although 
the labour intensity of exports to the EA6 may be lower than the industries under 
pressure from exports from some of the EA6). Increasing protection towards them risks 
the loss of that market. 
European Monetary Union 
The attainment of a single currency is seen by many Europeans as a key part of forming 
a genuine single market. The EU member states are committed to forming an Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) by the Maastricht Treaty. This requires locking their 
exchange rates together permanently with the aim of merging their currencies into a 
single currency (the "Euro") as soon as possible. It also involves the establishment of an 
independent central bank. 
Controversy surrounds the EMU although EU politicians appear to be 
committed to it. Political conflicts over details still need to be resolved. Germany 
disagrees with the other major EU countries; it would have its power to determine 
monetary policy reduced while France and others would regain some influence over 
monetary policy (De Grauwe 1993). The Maastricht Treaty specified convergence 
requirements for inflation, interest rates, government budget deficits and national debts. 
To realise these convergence criteria involves cutting budget deficits and maintaining 
low inflation rates and stable exchange rates. Because of high unemployment and social 
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security commitments, tightening macroeconomic policies to meet EMU convergence 
criteria is leading to serious policy dilemmas and generating opposition to the EMU. 
The effects of meeting the convergence criteria on the EU economies are 
debatable. Englander and Egebo (1993) found that meeting the convergence criteria 
would have very small negative effects on GDP. Buiter et al. (1993) expect larger 
losses. A key problem in evaluating the effects of meeting the convergence criteria is 
the reference scenario. What would happen without convergence? With or without 
convergence to the EMU criteria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy must reduce their 
fiscal deficits promptly. 
The economic rationale for the convergence criteria has been extensively 
debated (Corsetti and Roubini 1992; Eichengreen 1990; De Grauwe 1993). At present 
the criteria stand. Finance Ministers meeting in June 1995 have, however, informally 
ruled out the possibility of the early starting date suggested in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Not all EU members are likely to join the EMU initially. Germany's participation in 
EMU is crucial, both economically and politically (Taylor 1995). Germany as the 
largest economy, had the best inflation record until re-unification and is generally 
perceived to have had successful central bank policies. In early 1998 the countries 
eligible to participate in the third stage of EMU beginning on 1 January 1999 will be 
designated. 
If EMU goes ahead, it is argued that it will increase EU GDP for several reasons 
(Commission of the European Communities 1990). The Commission's estimated gains, 
however, were very small, with wide margins of error, while the unquantifiable 
expected gains are very controversial. The EMU would also have costs that have not 
been quantified. 
If a single currency replaces 12 national currencies, the resources currently 
devoted to money-changing, multi-currency accounting and other related operations 
would be saved (Commission of the European Communities 1990). Exchange rate 
uncertainty would be reduced. Uncertainty is seen to inhibit firms from entering foreign 
markets in trade or investment (Feldstein and Horioka 1980). Empirical evidence, 
however, shows that the relation between exchange rate uncertainty and international 
trade, or foreign direct investment is very weak (Edison and Melvin 1990; Chang and 
Kogut 1992; Goldberg and Kolstad 1993; Campa and Goldberg 1993). Benefits from 
elimination of nominal exchange rate uncertainty are expected to be substantial in the 
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long run but not quantifiable. Other gains could come from induced capital formation 
along the lines discussed earlier with regard to the SEM. 
EMU is expected to promote price stability (Commission of the European 
Communities 1990). There are two parts to the argument: 1) eliminating inflation would 
have considerable net benefits and 2) the EMU central bank would be better able to 
achieve price stability than individual members' banks. 
The EC Comission' s view on the benefits of lower inflation is part of the 
orthodox economic view (Taylor 1995). Price stability would confer longer run benefits 
through lower unemployment and higher per capita incomes .. Recent empirical studies 
tend to support a negative long-run relation between output growth and high inflation 
among a large sample of countries (Fischer 1993) although such a relationship is not as 
well established for the industrial economies {Taylor 1995). The benefits from 
achieving and maintaining price stability are expected to be large but are too difficult to 
quantify. Price stability, however, could be achieved at the cost of high unemployment. 
Econometric work gives some support to a negative link between inflation and 
central bank "independence" (Eijffinger and Schaling 1993) but the results need to be 
interpreted with much care. As Taylor (1995) suggests that the indices used may not 
capture "independence" very well and the apparently negative relationship owes much 
to a few outlier observations. Reverse causality or common dependence on third factors 
remains a possibility. In addition, as other studies show there appears to be no strong 
link between central banking independence and output growth (Grilli et al. 1991; 
Cukierman et al. 1993). 
The establishment of an independent central bank with a clear mandate to secure 
price stability is expected to be instrumental in reducing inflation rates to those of the 
best performing EU states. This would work through its effect on inflation expectations 
due to increased policy credibility acquired through strong political commitment to the 
EMU. 
Whether EMU is better than the ERM in securing price stability depends on the 
effect on political commitment of the Treaty's provisions and on the provisions of the 
new bank's constitution (Taylor 1995; Corden 1993; Currie 1992). Commitments under 
the exchange rate mechanism were not binding at various times due to economic 
pressures, currencies were realigned or member countries left the system. Such action 
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would be more difficult under EMU but still possible (EU Commission 1990; Krugman 
1990). 
Savings in transactions and hedging costs arising from the use of the Euro in 
transaction with non-residents would be key from the evolution of the Euro to being a 
major world currency. The implied temporary increase in the flow of Euro assets 
supplied to non-residents might be accompanied by a rise in the exchange rate, which 
would in tum lead to a rise in imports. Alternatively, or in addition, there could be a rise 
in outflows of capital. But Alogoskoufis and Portes ( 1991) believe that the Euro is 
likely to become the dominant payment unit in Europe, but probably will not have a 
large influence in to the Pacific Rim. The redistributive effects of the EMU will be 
raised, if for example, the weaker currency states receive significant inflows from non-
member investors diversifying from D-mark denominated bonds into the Euro. 
The international policy gains are debatable. The EU Commission argues that 
the EU will gain bargaining power in the G-7 nations from the greater spillover effects 
of EU policies under EMU and will be seen as having greater importance than at present 
(Taylor 1995). This assumes that the EU will speak with one voice whereas Kenen 
(1992) and Goodhart (1992) have sugg~sted that this will not be neccessarily the case. 
The Treaty on European Union allows member states' finance ministers to negotiate in 
international bodies. Thus wider scope of cooperation between EU leaders would be 
necessary for the EU Commission's claim to be borne out (Taylor 1995). 
Costs of a monetary union are usually analysed within the framework of an 
optimum currency area (Wihlborg and Willett 1991; de Grauwe 1992). This approach 
stresses the need for a sufficient amount of wage flexibility, labour mobility, or fiscal 
transfers to minimise adjustment problems when countries are hit by asymmetric 
economic shocks. Numerous empirical studies suggest that such conditions are unlikely 
to be satisfied in the EU (Eichengreen, 1990; de Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke 1991; von 
Hagen and Neumann, 1991; Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1992; De Grauwe and Heens 
1993). Being less integrated, the peripheral EU member states are likely to be less 
capable of managing asymmetric shocks and the loss of freedom to pursue monetary 
policy could be especially important for them. The large sheltered wage sectors, 
especially in peripheral countries, may compound this. Fiscal policy will probably be 
called upon to play a more active stabilisation role under EMU but if there are rules in 
EMU restricting annual government deficits to small percentages of GDP, the role of 
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fiscal policy will be more limited. The EMU is likely to lead to net costs for a number 
of member countries through the loss of the exchange rate policy tool and the loss of the 
relative independence of monetary and fiscal policies (Taylor 1995). 
The creation of a single currency is an unprecedented move that is difficult to 
quantify. Its effects are uncertain. If there are large transition costs and adjustment costs 
this may rekindle protectionist pressures particularly in the peripheral states that adjust 
less quickly to shocks. The evolving EU institutions may encourage protectionism. This 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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4 Trade patterns between the East Asian-Six 
and the European Union 
To shed light on the trade patterns of the EU and the EA6, Table 4.1 shows five 
theoretical approaches to the determination of trade patterns. Column 2 shows what 
the dependent variable is, that is, what aspect of international trade patterns the 
different approaches try to explain. In column three the independent variables, that is, 
causal factors are identified. The newer perspectives on international trade patterns 
have points of common interest, and otherwise do not necessarily contradict one 
another or neoclassical theory. 
Table 4.1 Approaches to explaining international trade patterns 
Approach 
Neoclassical 
Technology-based 
Intra-industry 
Intra-firm 
Intra-regional 
Variables of concern 
Exports, imports 
Technology intensive products, 
product cycles 
Intra-industry trade 
Determinants 
Resource and factor endowments 
Traditional determinants and quasi-rents 
Product differentiation and scale 
economies 
Trade among TNCs as a share of Oligopolistic and competitive strategies 
total trade 
Bilateral trade flows Trade resistances such as distance and 
trade barriers 
Source: Based on Grant, R., Papadakis, M. and Richardson, J.D., 1993. 'Global trade flows: old 
structures, new issues, empirical evidence', in F. Bergsten and M. Noland, (eds), Pacific Dynamism and 
the International Economic System, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 
Neoclassical trade theories suggest how one country's endowments of the 
primary factors of production --labour, capital, land and other natural resources --in 
relation to the endowments of other countries, determine the composition of its 
imports and exports. Under specified conditions, a country's exports will embody 
resources and the services of factors in which it is relatively abundant and its imports 
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will embody resources and services of factors that are relatively scarce in that country. 
Thus, following their comparative advantage, the EA6 initially became vigorous 
exporters, of unskilled labour-intensive exports (chapter 2). 
Endowment-based trade is evident between countries with differences in 
natural resources and levels of development, the latter being associated with 
differences in labour and capital endowment. In countries that have converged, or are 
converging towards high levels of development, capital and labour resources 
(including skilled labour) are similar so that the demand for differentiated products, 
economies of scale and technology have come to be seen as playing important roles in 
determining trade flows. 
Intra-industry trade is defined as the exchange of goods within the same 
product category (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975; Greenaway and Milner 1986). The 
definition of "industry" is critical because intra-industry trade levels change according 
to the level of industry disaggregation (Grubel and Lloyd 1975). The broader an 
industry category, the higher the intra-industry trade share in total trade is likely to be. 
At one extreme, if all industries are classified under one heading, then the industries' 
products would be both imported and exported so that all trade is intra-industry trade. 
At the other extreme, at a very fine level of disaggregation, there is no intra-industry 
trade. If the measurement of intra-industry trade is made at the 3-digit standard 
international trade classification (SITC) level, which covers some 130 manufacturing 
industries, intra-industry trade is high between highly developed countries with 
similar natural endowments. 
Opportunities for monopolistic competition and product differentiation 
contribute to intra-industry trade by affecting the competitiveness of firms 
(Greenaway and Milner 1986, 1987; Globerman and Dean 1990). Products meet 
demands for quality, durability, serviceability, proximity and fashionability, generally 
regarded as non-price competition, as well as cost competitiveness. The expansion in 
the variety of products available in the importing country when intra-industry trade 
expands is seen as a benefit of trade. Buyers are able to purchase items that meet their 
precise combination of needs for durability, serviceability, quality, and so on. The 
particular types of products that develop may have historical origins, be a matter of 
chance, or result from policy induced distortions (see further). High fixed costs in 
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production or marketing stimulate intra-industry trade. Each country's firms find it 
profitable to specialise in a limited number of products differentiated by quality, 
durability and other product characteristics. Economies of scale, particularly in global 
marketing, have made TNCs a common vehicle for this type of intra-industry trade. 
Empirical research shows the intensity of intra-industry trade to be positively 
correlated with income per capita and market size negatively correlated with trade 
barriers, distance and per capita differences between two countries. These do not have 
a direct link with product differentiation, scale economies or technology. 
Intra-industry trade is a component of the "globalisation" of manufacturing. 
Falling transport and communication costs have enabled production processes to be 
divided into processes of different factor intensities which may be located in different 
countries. Intra-industry trade follows as components are imported, processed then re-
exported. Production locations are chosen for comparative advantage reasons; the 
movement of labour-intensive production to low labour cost countries led to a great 
deal of Heckscher-Ohlin type intra-industry trade. 
Intra-industry trade shifts may have lower adjustment costs than changes in 
inter-industry trade because resources are mainly reallocated within firms in an 
industry rather than between firms in different industries. The argument holds whether 
the intra-industry trade is Heckscher-Ohlin based or based on product differentiation 
and economies of scale. At some point, however, a firm may lose its business, so that 
intra-industry trade becomes inter-industry trade. The shift of US television 
production out of the United States is an example. 
It has, nevertheless, been argued that intra-industry trade may lead to greater 
political-economic stability than inter-industry trade (Marvel and Ray 1987). When 
similar goods are being imported and exported, pressures for protectionism in an 
industry from domestically-oriented firms may be resisted by export-oriented firms in 
that industry. The exporting firms fear protection of that industry will lead to 
retaliation in the markets to which they export. Where import ratios for some 
manufactures are low, as in Japan, the country tends to experience greater retaliation 
in its overseas markets because there are fewer firms benefiting from exports to Japan 
(Ravenhill 1993). This has been a component of the US attack on Japan's trade 
surplus and trade policies, but it seems to have little general application. 
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Increasing international mobility of labour, capital and technology, including 
research and development and professionally skilled labour (for example, in 
engineering, marketing, legal and financial services) also influence trade patterns. 
Movements of factors across borders can both complement and substitute for the 
movement of goods and services. 
Transnational corporations have had an increasing role in trade patterns. They 
are said to account for about one third of world trade at present (The Economist, 
15/12/96). The effect differs according to the incentives leading to the location of a 
TNC. In response to import substitution, TNCS have attempted to exploit national 
protected markets through oligopolistic discriminatory pricing (Hymer 1976). As 
TNCs recognised the opportunities for export based production in the EA6, 
investment in import substitution has declined in relative terms. The profitability of 
producing for world markets became much greater than producing for small protected 
domestic markets. Transnational corporations have thus located plants in labour 
abundant countries to produce labour-intensive goods for export back to industrial 
countries (Vernon 1966; Dunning 1977). 
Technology gap theory (Posner 1961; Hirsch 1965) postulated that firms were 
able to realise temporary quasi-rents during the lag in international diffusion of 
innovations; subsequently quasi-rents were eroded by imitators' production. Due to 
the large investments required for radical technological change, it is sometimes 
believed that technology gaps can be systematically created and maintained through 
technology policy, giving rise to inter-industry specialisation. Such thinking is behind 
attempts to 'pick winners' in biotechnology, aerospace and microelectronics and 
general enthusiasm for trade in technology-intensive goods, instead of being seen as, 
at best, leading to quasi-rents. 
Product cycle theory focussed on the movement from unstable first generation 
innovations to standardised mass market goods and the transmission of innovations 
through foreign direct investment (Vernon 1966). It was argued that certain products 
began with an non-standardised phase (where inputs and processing specifications 
covered a wide range of options) and then a standardised phase (commitment to a 
certain form and process). These phases had different implications for location 
decisions. In the former phase, the degree of freedom to change inputs and processes 
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was important, the elasticity of demand was very low (high differentiation) and 
therefore small cost differences were not very relevant. Swift communication was 
needed between buyer and supplier so that production was more likely to be located in 
the country where the innovation occurred. As the product matured and output 
expanded and became standardised, the need for flexibility declined. Production 
moved to locations which increased the competitiveness of production. Although 
these theories provided useful insights, quasi-rents are eroded more quickly as the 
dissemination of technological change becomes more rapid, so that these theories 
appear to be less applicable. 
The analysis of the determinants of bilateral trade levels identifies a number of 
barriers to trade which influence not only the size, but also the commodity 
composition and welfare effects of bilateral trade flows. "Objective" resistances 
denote the costs of overcoming distance such as transport and communication costs, 
and the costs of overcoming official trade barriers. "Subjective" resistances are 
generated by perceptions of risk and uncertainty about property rights and valuations 
at different stages of trade transactions, from imperfectly available information to 
business people and from the constraints in the processes by which firms make 
decisions to trade (Drysdale and Gamaut 1994a). Differences in political and legal 
frameworks, culture and language can be seen as factors affecting the costs of 
overcoming subjective resistances. The cost of overcoming resistances varies across 
bilateral trading relationships. As a result, the price a country receives for its exports 
varies with the market to which it is sold and the price of imports varies with the 
market in which it is purchased. The costs of overcoming various types of resistance 
to bilateral trade, objective and subjective, are closely interrelated. Economies of scale 
affect the cost of overcoming all resistances except official trade barriers. 
The gravity model approach (Tinbergen 1962) treated each bilateral flow as 
independent and sought to explain each flow in terms of the "trade potential" of two 
economies and the resistances in their bilateral trade. Tinbergen identified two 
potential trade variables (the GNPs of the exporting and importing countries) and 
three resistance variables (distance, common border and membership of a preferential 
area). Empirical analysis suggests that the assumption of independence in bilateral 
trade flows is, however, very strong (Drysdale andGamaut 1994b ). The intensity 
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approach (Brown 1949; Kojima 1964) takes total imports and exports as given and 
seeks to explain deviations from bilateral trade flows that would be obtained if 
resistances to trade were equal on all bilateral routes. 
The new perspectives on technology, intra-industry trade, intra-firm trade and 
bilateral trade suggest possibilities for policy-determined dynamic comparative 
advantage and competitiveness. The ability to devise policies that "pick winners" has 
therefore come to be regarded as an independent source of comparative advantage and 
competitiveness (Krugman 1987). The stock of factors of a country are less important 
than the rate at which a country upgrades them, especially with regard to technology-
intensive industries. It is argued that economies of scale and product differentiation, 
with ensuing increasing returns to scale, mean that monopolistic behaviour could 
benefit exporters; tariffs and export subsidies could help firms attain monopolistic 
positions. When subject to rigorous analysis the "new" theories were found to apply to 
extremely limited situations (Pomfret 1991). The role of government in establishing a 
policy framework favourable to trade as part of overall growth oriented policies 
remains. Drysdale and Garnaut (l 994a), for example, have pointed to the presence of 
externalities in investment to reduce subjective resistances to trade and to reduce 
transport and communications costs. 
The composition of EA6 trade 
In this section two main classifications of international trade are used. Trade in 
commodities is classified into 10 broad groups labelled by the one-digit numbers 0 to 
9 in the SITC. Disaggregated data of up to 8 digits are available. These items, when 
summed, comprise total commodity trade. Another classification used in this study is 
the division of total manufactured commodities into five groups according to their 
factor intensity to examine changes in export specialisation in the EA6. The 
breakdown is a modified version of Krause (1982). The five groups are agriculture-
intensive, natural-resource-intensive, unskilled labour-intensive, semi-skilled labour-
intensive and capital-intensive. Capital-intensive production is generally associated 
with skilled labour inputs and complex technology. Details are given in Appendix 4.1. 
to this chapter. Neither classification is detailed enough to identify all the important 
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changes in production for export, notably the increase in the use of more skill-
intensive techniques in the production of a given item and the improvements in 
product design. It does, however, provide a starting point for more detailed analysis. 
Continuing the trends established in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in the 
1960s, EA6 exports of manufactures grew rapidly in 1980-93 (Table 4.2). The second 
half of the 1980s saw a rapid increase in labour-intensive exports from Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia, which led to higher export growth rates for the decade than 
for the three more advanced EA6. By 1994, manufactures dominated the merchandise 
exports of the EA6 (Table 4.2). The share of manufactures in Indonesian merchandise 
exports rose sharply from 2 per cent in 1980 to more than 50 per cent by 1994. 
Resource exports have, nevertheless, remained a considerable share of merchandise 
exports in Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, reflecting those countries' relatively rich 
natural endowment. 
Table 4.2 Real average annual growth rates for 1980-931 and shares of manufactures in 
merchandise trade in 1980 and 1994 (per cent) 
Manufactures as a percentage of merchandise trade Real average annual 
growth rate 1980-93 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1980 1994 1980 1994 
EA6 49 82 54 79 16.8 14.2 
Indonesia 2 52 65 75 31.2 6.4 
Korea 90 93 43 67 11.9 14.5 
Malaysia 19 74 67 88 21.7 12.6 
Singapore 54 84 55 83 15.l 12.5 
Thailand 28 73 57 82 23.5 15.8 
Taiwan 88 93 52 82 10.0 12.3 
Notes: 1 Data only available till 1993. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The share of skill/capital-intensive goods has risen for the EA6 as a group but 
not for Malaysia or Indonesia (Table 4.3). The share of unskilled labour-intensive 
exports has fallen in Singapore, Korea and Taiwan and risen in Indonesia. Table 4.4 
shows that the SITC (2 digit) share of electrical machinery has risen (except in 
Indonesia and Malaysia) and so has the share of non-electrical machinery, which 
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includes office equipment (except in Indonesia). The share of clothing exports has 
declined (except in Indonesia) and is still a large share in Thailand. Footwear has 
declined, except in Indonesia and Thailand. Textiles have declined in all EA6 
countries but the share is till large in Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. 
Table 4.3 Share of exports of different factor intensities in 1980 and 1994 (per cent) 
agriculture mineral unskilled semi-skilled skill/capital 
labour labour 
EA6 
1980 4 2 44 21 29 
1994 3 1 24 21 51 
Indonesia 
1980 17 6 33 10 35 
1994 24 1 45 18 12 
Korea 
1980 3 2 55 22 18 
1994 2 1 31 25 42 
Malaysia 
1980 9 1 18 10 62 
1994 4 1 12 25 58 
Singapore 
1980 3 1 18 24 54 
1994 0 0 7 19 73 
Thailand 
1980 5 11 47 11 25 
1994 2 4 34 21 39 
Taiwan 
1980 5 0 54 21 20 
1994 1 0 29 18 52 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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Table 4.4 Share of exports at 2 digit SITC level in 1994, and change from 1980, for the EA6 (per cent) 
Korea Change Singapore Change Taiwan Change Indonesia Change Malaysia Change Thailand Change 
from from from from from from 
1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
51 Chemical compounds 2.4 1.0 2.4 1.1 0.9 0.0 1.9 -0.4 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 
58Plastic 3.3 2.4 1.6 0.6 3.4 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.3 0.6 
59Chemicals, other 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 -0.9 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.5 
61Leather 1.7 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.6 
63W ood, cork 0.1 -2.5 0.4 -2.1 0.7 -3.7 23.4 2.0 4.0 -5.1 0.8 -2.9 
64Paper 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.9 3.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.1 
65Textiles 12.0 -2.0 1.8 -1.8 9.5 -0.6 12.1 -4.4 1.9 -4.6 5.0 -13.5 
66Non-metal mineral 0.7 -2.0 0.6 -0.7 1.3 -0.9 1.6 -2.0 1.3 0.1 5.0 -5.5 
67Iron, steel 5.4 -5.1 0.9 -1.1 1.6 -0.3 1.5 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.8 -1.9 
69Metal other 2.7 -2.1 1.3 -0.7 5.6 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 -0.5 1.9 -1.1 
71Non-electrical mach. 9.6 7.3 35.2 24.1 24.7 19.4 2.3 -11.3 15.7 11.5 16.6 15.1 
72Electrical machinery 27.4 15.2 33.9 4.0 21.5 3.5 6.9 0.7 44.1 -7.9 21.2 2.7 
73Transport 13.3 5.9 2.6 -5.4 4.2 0.6 2.2 0.1 5.1 0.9 4.3 3.5 
82Furniture 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.3 2.6 0.9 3.8 0.2 1.8 1.1 2.2 0.5 
84Clothing 6.4 -12.4 1.9 -2.2 4.1 -9.8 15.8 8.7 4.8 -1.3 13.7 -1.3 
85Footwear 1.8 -3.8 0.1 -0.2 1.2 -6.9 8.9 0.3 0.3 -1.4 4.5 3.5 
86Instruments, watches 1.5 -0.4 3.4 1.0 2.6 0.3 1.0 7.1 2.2 -0.3 3.0 1.8 
Notes: Includes the ten manufactured exports with highest shares in each country in 1994. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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These changes in shares do not show all the changes in export structures in the 
EA6. The data fail to indicate shifts in production techniques within industries such as 
clothing and textiles in Korea and Taiwan. In 1980-94 the skill and skill/capital intensity 
of production in a range of exports grew rapidly for Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and, to 
some extent, for Malaysia, reflecting increased skill levels. Unskilled labour-intensive 
production of a broadening range of exports expanded with rising exports in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia in the 1980s. In Thailand and Indonesia, unskilled labour-
intensive exports are still the mainstay, though as skills and wages rise, some production 
is moving to South Asia and other countries with smaller skills bases. 
Difficulties in the Krause classification are illustrated in several industries. In 
electronics, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea began by importing components and 
assembling them. Products included radios, televisions, office machines and 
telecommunications products. As levels of skill grew, firms were able to diversify into 
the production of components. Assembly activities shifted increasingly to Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan moved to the production of 
electronic producer goods which require more sophisticated skills and more complex 
technology. These included office and media communications equipment and optical 
instruments. Malaysia has also moved into producing components. The decline in 
skill/capital-intensive exports accounted for by a decrease in electrical machinery 
records the decrease in unskilled labour-intensive assembly production, as Malaysia 
diversified its products and techniques. By 1989 Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were 
ranked among the top ten exporters of electronics in the world (OECD 1992). The more 
advanced EA6 have also made forays into establishing international brandnames 
(OECD 1991). Korea has developed "Samsung" electronics and consumer durables and 
"Hyundai" cars, while Taiwan produces "Acer" computers. 
Korea has become a major ship builder, as indicated by the increase in the share 
of "transport equipment" at the 2 digit level. The production of chemicals has also 
increased in sophistication in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
Clothing is an interesting example of progression in export production. Korea 
and Taiwan (together with Hong Kong) began in the 1960s by producing very simple 
clothing in which they achieved rapid export growth. The share of clothing in exports 
has fallen. The remaining products have moved upmarket with sophisticated design and 
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quality control. Not only has technology increased in production but also in distribution 
techniques; advances in "logistics" enable orders from the United States or Europe to be 
filled so swiftly that the turnaround from the sale of a dress in New York or Amsterdam 
to its replacement on the store rack can take only a week. Unskilled labour-intensive 
clothing has moved to Indonesia. Labour-intensive footwear production has fallen in 
Korea and Taiwan but risen in Indonesia and Thailand. Some trade diversion from East 
Asia has been generated through NAFT A, leading to a rise in Mexican exports to the 
United States and Canada. 
Taiwan and Korea were dominant exporters of labour-intensive textiles in the 
1960s and 1970s. They still had large export shares in world textiles markets in 1994. 
Multifibre Arrangement rents and technological advances have been used to maintain 
market shares. At the margin there has been a growth of differentiated products, 
competing on quality. Labour-intensive textile production moved to Thailand and 
Indonesia. 
Manufactured imports into the EA6 grew rapidly in 1980-93 (Table 4.2), with 
import penetration rising faster than in OECD countries (Hill and Phillips 1993). The 
rising share of manufactures in merchandise imports reflects the rising share of 
manufactures in consumption (along with services) as incomes grow. Demand also 
increased for capital equipment and components for production, while the rapidly 
growing middle-classes increased imports of consumer goods. Broad-based expansion is 
shown by the relative lack of change in shares of imports in both the factor intensity and 
SITC2 digit level breakdown, compared with the change in export shares (Tables 4.5 
and4.6). 
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Table 4.5 Share of EA6 imports in different input intensity categories 1980 and 1994 (per cent) 
agriculture mineral unskilled semi-skilled skill/capital 
labour labour 
EA6 
1980 1 2 12 23 62 
1994 1 1 10 19 69 
Indonesia 
1980 0 2 7 33 59 
1994 2 1 10 22 66 
Korea 
1980 3 1 13 15 68 
1994 3 1 13 13 71 
Malaysia 
1980 0 1 9 28 61 
1994 0 1 9 16 73 
Singapore 
1980 1 3 17 25 55 
1994 1 1 10 20 68 
Thailand 
1980 0 3 7 24 66 
1994 1 3 8 24 64 
Taiwan 
1980 1 1 12 17 69 
1994 2 1 9 20 67 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The only notable change was in the categories "electrical machinery" and "non-
electrical machinery" which mainly consist of inputs into exports, particularly in 
Singapore. 
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Table 4.6 Share of imports at 2 digit SITC level in 1994, and change from 1980, for the EA6 (per cent) 
Korea Change Singapore Change Taiwan Change Indonesia Change Malaysia Change Thailand Change 
from from from from from from 
1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
51 Chemical compounds 6.7 -4.7 1.8 -0.8 7.0 -3.2 8.8 1.5 2.1 -1.2 4.4 -2.3 
53Dyes 1.2 -0.3 0.6 -0.3 1.2 -0.1 1.8 0.4 0.6 0.0 1.1 -0.6 
57Pyrotechnic 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 
58Plastic 2.4 -0.3 1.7 -0.6 3.0 0.1 4.8 0.4 2.5 -0.1 2.9 -0.2 
59Chemicals, other 2.2 0.6 2.1 0.8 1.9 -0.3 2.6 0.7 0.9 -LO 1.5 -1.5 
61Leather 1.5 -1.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.0 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.7 
64Paper 1.0 0.3 1.1 -0.7 1.8 1.0 1.1 -1.4 1.8 -0.9 1.3 -0.6 
65Textiles 4.9 0.6 2.4 -4.0 2.9 0.1 4.9 1.8 2.7 -1.4 3.1 -0.1 
66Non-metal mineral 1.6 0.3 1.8 -1.4 1.9 0.8 1.4 -0.4 1.7 -0.3 3.0 0.3 
67Iron, steel 6.7 -3.6 2.6 -4.0 5.5 -5.5 7.0 -6.7 4.8 -3.7 8.5 -1.1 
69Metal other 1.8 -0.4 2.0 -1.7 1.4 -0.2 2.7 -1.8 2.3 -1.4 3.4 0.4 
71Non-electrical mach. 25.7 1.6 23.1 4.3 18.3 -1.8 30.6 4.3 19.6 -0.1 23.3 5.1 
72Electrical machinery 21.5 4.8 35.1 13.3 26.8 5.7 12.2 1.6 38.3 15.0 21.8 9.3 
73Transport 7.7 -3.2 5.9 -6.5 10.9 -1.4 12.9 -1.7 10.2 -4.7 11.8 -0.7 
86Instruments, watches 5.7 1.9 4.9 0.7 4.2 0.2 2.3 0.4 3.0 0.6 2.8 0.6 
Notes: Includes the ten manufactured imports with the highest shares in each country in 1994. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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The composition of EU trade 
In 1980-93, total EU exports of manufactures to non-members ("external exports") 
grew at a slower pace than "internal" exports (Table 4.6). Export growth rates vary 
among EU countries. For example, Ireland's external exports grew rapidly while those 
of Greece grew slowly. 
Table 4.7 Real average annual growth of trade in manufactures 1980-1994 for the EU countries 
(per cent) 
Imports Exports 
Internal External Internal External 
EU 8.4 9.7 7.5 5.1 
Bel-Lux 7.7 8.0 6.7 5.9 
Denmark 7.0 7.2 8.6 6.8 
France 7.4 9.5 7.6 4.2 
Germany 8.6 10.9 6.7 5.6 
Greece 9.2 7.9 6.8 1.9 
Ireland 6.5 10.9 10.2 11.7 
Italy 8.7 10.5 7.9 5.1 
Netherlands 6.8 9.9 6.2 7.9 
Portugal 14.1 9.2 13.9 6.5 
Spain 15.9 13.4 13.1 4.0 
United Kingdom 7.9 8.0 8.0 3.3 
Austria 8.8 10.9 9.4 5.0 
Finland 5.7 5.7 8.5 2.9 
Sweden 6.2 6.4 6.3 3.8 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The share of manufactures in total exports to non-members has risen 
somewhat between 1980-1994. Exports of manufactures dominated exports of all EU 
countries, except Greece (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 Share of manufactures in external merchandise trade 1980 and 1994 for the EU countries 
(per cent) 
Imports Exports 
1980 1994 1980 1994 
EU 40 71 81 87 
Bel-Lux 42 75 77 87 
Denmark 51 72 67 73 
France 34 70 78 85 
Germany 46 76 90 92 
Greece 43 58 46 44 
Ireland 59 86 58 80 
Italy 26 60 84 90 
Netherlands 31 64 62 77 
Portugal 26 48 73 76 
Spain 20 55 76 80 
United Kingdom 55 78 81 85 
Austria 43 73 87 89 
Finland 42 66 77 84 
Sweden 51 73 86 90 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
During 1980-94, shares of exports of different factor intensity categories have 
been more or less constant for the EU as a whole and for the "North" and "South", 
where "North" is Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and "South" is Greece, Portugal and Spain 
(Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9 Share of EU external trade in different intensity categories 1980 and 1994 (per cent) 
agriculture mineral unskilled semi- skill/capital 
labour skilled 
EU 
Exports 
1980 1 5 13 35 45 
1994 1 3 14 32 48 
Imports 
1980 2 6 19 28 41 
1994 2 3 20 28 45 
North EU 
Exports 
1980 1 5 12 35 46 
1994 1 3 13 31 48 
Imports 
1980 2 7 19 28 41 
1994 2 3 20 27 45 
South EU 
Exports 
1980 3 9 22 42 24 
1994 3 6 23 37 29 
Imports 
1980 1 2 23 29 45 
1994 3 1 19 33 44 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
No notable shifts in the shares of exports at the two digit SITC level occurred 
during 1980-94 (Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10 Share of trade to non-members in 1994 and change from 1980 for the EU, North EU and South EU (per cent) 
Imports Exports 
EU North EU South EU EU North EU South EU 
1994 Change 1994 Change 1994 Change 1994 Change 1994 Change 1994 Change 
from 1980 form 1980 from 1980 from 1980 from 1980 from 1980 
51 Chemical comp. 3.8 -1.8 3.7 -1.7 5.5 -3.1 4.1 -0.5 4.1 -0.5 3.4 -0.6 
54 medicinal products 2.2 0.9 2.1 0.8 3.6 0.9 3.3 1.3 3.3 1.3 2.4 0.7 
64 paper products 3.5 -1.0 3.5 -1.1 4.6 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.5 0.6 1.8 -0.6 
65 Textiles 3.4 -1.7 3.3 -1.8 4.7 0.9 3.4 -0.3 3.4 -0.2 4.6 -2.4 
66 Nonmetal mineral 3.4 -3.5 3.5 -3.6 1.4 -1.0 4.1 -1.6 3.9 -1.5 7.4 -3.1 
67 Iron and Steel 2.7 -1.8 2.7 -1.7 2.4 -3.5 3.6 -3.2 3.4 -3.0 7.2 -8.8 
69 Metal manuf. 2.5 -0.1 2.5 -0.1 2.1 0.2 2.8 -1.5 2.8 -1.4 3.6 -2.5 
71 Non-electric mach. 19.1 4.1 19.2 4.3 17.8 0.3 22.1 -0.2 22.5 -0.4 12.8 2.8 
72 Electric machinery 14.7 3.9 14.8 4.0 13.6 2.7 11.7 2.0 11.8 1.9 9.6 4.2 
73 Transport 9.7 -1.7 9.3 -1.4 15.7 -8.4 14.8 -0.5 14.8 -0.8 15.6 6.8 
84 Clothing 8.0 1.8 8.2 1.8 4.4 3.3 2.6 0.6 2.5 0.6 5.4 1.5 
85 Footwear 1.2 0.3 1.2 0.2 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 4.5 1.2 
86 Instruments 4.8 0.1 4.8 0.2 5.0 -1.0 3.4 0.7 3.5 0.7 1.4 0.6 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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The exception was a rise in the share of exports of transport equipment for the 
"South EU", mainly accounted for by a rise in Spain's exports of transport equipment. 
The South EU countries, predictably, have a larger share of clothing, footwear and 
textiles than the North EU. The North EU countries have a larger share of non-electric 
and electrical machinery than the South EU. The data confirm Neven's conclusions 
(1990) that there is a strong degree of specialisation between "South" and "North" EU 
in labour and skill/capital-intensive goods respectively. Greece and Portugal have 
specialised in clothing, footwear and ceramics. These products are not competitive 
with imports from the EA6, partly because of higher labour costs (wages plus social 
security payments) and partly because of the higher productivity of EA6 firms. Spain 
does not have a specialisation in unskilled labour-intensive products as its abundance 
of labour would suggest, probably accounting for its high unemployment. Germany 
and France have specialisations in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mechanical machinery, 
electrical machinery, transport equipment medical and optical instruments. (Neven 
1990). 
The view that the products in the North EU are more sophisticated and more 
diversified than EA6 products (Lindlar 1996) has to be treated with caution. Certainly 
German, French and other EU producers have a sophistication and range of products 
such as engineering goods not yet broadly reached in the EA6. France and Italy still 
excel in fashion goods. At the margin, however, leading EA6 producers (Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and even Malaysia) are becoming competitive in a range of skill 
and skill/capital-intensive goods with EU producers. 
During 1980-94, the EU' s total external imports have grown over a wide range 
of products. There have not been major changes in the shares of categories by factor 
intensity or at the SITC 2 digit level categories (Tables 4.9 and 4.10). Imports from 
EU members and non-members have grown at approximately the same pace. The 
EU's preferential arrangements have played a role in this composition of imports (see 
below). 
87 
Intra-industry trade 
The Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in manufactures was calculated for the 
EA6 and the EU at the 3 digit SITC level for 1980 and 1994. The individual industry 
Grubel Lloyd index between countries i and j for product k is given by: 
IITii. k = [1- Xii. k- Mii. k ] * 100 
(Xii. k- Mii. k) 
xij' k is exports of product k between the two countries 
and M ij, k is imports of product k between two countries. 
The aggregate Grubel-Lloyd index can then be calculated as 
L Xij,k-Mij,k 
IITii = [1- k ] * 100 L Xij,k-Mij,k 
k 
This is weighted average of the individual indices, where the weights are the shares of 
industries in total trade. It has been pointed out that the Grubel-Lloyd index can record 
an increase even when intra-industry trade contributes less than inter-industry trade to 
the growth in total trade (Menon and Dixon 1995). Moreover an increase in the 
Grubel-Lloyd index over time is also compatible with a decrease in intra-industry 
trade (if total trade is declining). The Grubel Lloyd index therefore needs to be treated 
with caution. 
The data suggest that the EA6 have experienced a notable rise of intra-industry 
trade with all their main trading partners (Table 4.11 ). To some extent this indicates 
location according to factor intensity. Such intra-industry trade is based on differing 
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labour and capital endowments. Subsidiaries of Japanese, United States and EA6 
TNCs import and export components (Fukusaku 1992). 
It also indicates a growing sophistication in manufacturing using high-tech 
methods and economies of scale the production of differentiated products (Noland 
1990). Korea, Taiwan Singapore have both types of intra-industry trade. But because 
Singapore is a very small economy, its range of production is necessarily limited. 
Much of its trade will remain inter-industry trade. 
Indonesia and Thailand's low intra-industry trade in manufactures with Japan 
reflects the importance of resource-based manufactures imports for Japan. 
Table 4.11 Grubel and Lloyd Intra-industry trade indices for EA6 manufactures trade with 
different regions (per cent) 
1980 
Developing EU Japan USA Wld 
Asia1 
Indonesia 4.7 4.7 4.5 1.5 11.6 
Korea 26.6 26.6 35.5 27.7 39.8 
Malaysia 19.7 19.7 9.9 53.9 36.6 
Singapore 36.6 36.6 10.5 43.6 63.6 
Thailand 10.9 10.9 9.5 16.8 27.7 
Taiwan 20.6 20.6 19.6 20.5 34.4 
1994 
Developing EU Japan USA Wld 
Asia1 
Indonesia 39.7 12.3 10.9 16.5 25.6 
Korea 39.5 35.8 41.6 48.8 55.6 
Malaysia 71.9 41.0 33.0 52.9 59.8 
Singapore 81.6 38.5 36.0 48.3 77.3 
Thailand 72.2 34.1 27.4 43.5 52.1 
Taiwan 54.4 34.9 37.7 37.5 54.9 
Note: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The Grubel-Lloyd indices show that the EU has maintained very high intra-
industry trade in manufactures among member countries from 1980 to 1994. This is 
mainly trade among the North EU countries. The EU also has high intra-industry trade 
with EFTA countries and the US (Table 4.12). 
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Table 4.12 Intra-industry trade indices for manufactures in 1980 and 1994, for the EU's 
principal partners 
1980 1994 
EU 97.6 95.1 
Developing Asia1 29.9 39.7 
Centrally planned economies2 36.4 48.6 
EA6 31.l 42.0 
JAPAN 33.0 41.3 
USA 55.4 68.4 
Other West Europe3 70.4 74.6 
World 84.3 87.9 
Notes: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam. 
2 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia in 1980, and Czech and Slovak Republics in 1994, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union in 1980, and the former Soviet 
Union countries in 1994. 
30ther West Europe includes Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Andorra, Gibraltar, 
Malta, Yugoslavia prior to 1992 ex-Yugoslavia states, post 1992. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
The importance of specific markets 
The direction of EA6 manufactured exports and imports changed markedly from 1980 
to 1994, with the EU losing shares. 
Exports to the EU fell, particularly from Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (Table 
4.13). The share of manufactured exports going to developing Asia rose, except for 
exports from Indonesia and Thailand, hence, developing Asia was the largest market 
for EA6 exports. The share of Korea's and Taiwan's exports going to developing Asia 
rose most rapidly, mainly because of increased exports to China, (Drysdale and 
Garnaut l 994a). Trade has also increased among the EA6. The share of exports to 
Japan rose somewhat for Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. Expansion is 
associated with non-discriminatory reductions in trade barriers in most Asia-Pacific 
countries (except Hong Kong and Singapore which already had negligible trade 
barriers in 1980). Trade among East Asian countries has also been encouraged by 
foreign direct investment flows and the globalisation of production (Robertson 
forthcoming (b)). Indonesia's share of exports to developing Asia fell after petroleum 
prices fell. 
90 
Table 4.13 Main markets for the EA6 manufactured exports in 1980 and 1994 (percentage of 
manufactured exports to the world) 
Developing EU Japan us 
Asia1 
1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 
Indonesia 61 34 15 19 8 14 7 19 
Korea 14 32 16 12 14 12 28 23 
Malaysia 31 41 22 15 6 9 32 27 
Singapore 36 47 16 15 8 6 19 22 
Thailand 34 34 23 15 8 13 18 23 
Taiwan 17 32 15 15 7 8 38 32 
EA6 22 37 16 14 9 10 29 25 
Note: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National Universit~. 
Shares of exports to the United States rose for Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand and fell for Korea and Taiwan with realignments of exchange rates by Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. The United States nevertheless took a considerably larger share of 
EA6 exports in 1994 than the EU. Exports to developing countries outside developing 
Asia fell except for Indonesia. 
The EU declined slightly as a source of manufactured imports for the EA6, 
although Indonesia and Korea increased their imports from the EU (Table 4.14). 
Imports from developing Asia rose strongly for the EA6. Imports from China and the 
EA6 themselves are the source of most of this expansion. Japan, by far the largest 
source of imports, saw its share fall. The share of imports from the United States also 
decreased for the EA6. Only Korea recorded a rise. 
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Table 4.14 Principal sources ofEA6 manufactured imports (share of manufactured imports from 
the world) 
Developing EU 
Asia1 
Japan us 
1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 
Indonesia 14 25 20 22 45 31 14 
Korea 3 14 15 17 55 35 21 
Malaysia 19 31 21 14 33 30 20 
Singapore 20 39 18 13 31 26 23 
Thailand 12 24 19 15 34 36 24 
Taiwan 5 20 15 15 47 37 27 
EA6 12 26 18 15 41 34 22 
Note: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, 
Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, Vietnam. 
Source : International Economic Databank, Australian National Universit~. 
11 
24 
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The EU has been losing market shares in EA6 markets in skill/capital-
intensive products (Table 4.15). The fall has been particularly pronounced for 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The EU has increased its share of agriculture and 
mineral-intensive imports at the expense of Japan and the United States, partly as a 
result of subsidies given for agricultural production under the EU's CAP. 
Table 4.15 Share of principal markets in EA6 imports by different intensity categories in 
1980 and 1994 (per cent) I 
agriculture mineral unskilled labour semi-skilled skill/capit 
labour al 
Developing Asia1 
1980 32 27 31 11 89 
1994 59 26 47 24 24 
EU 
1980 10 22 16 18 20 
1994 19 28 16 17 15 
Japan 
1980 37 33 36 50 35 
1994 3 27 19 38 33 
USA 
1980 15 6 8 12 31 
1994 10 7 10 13 23 
Note: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri 
Lanka, Vietnam. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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The EU' s main external export markets changed between 1980 and 1994 
(Table 4.16). Shares of EU exports to EA6 markets doubled but from a small base. 
Export shares to the United States and formerly centrally planned countries also rose, 
but by a smaller proportion. 
Table 4.16 Principal markets for EU manufactured exports and imports 1980 and 1994 (per cent) 
Export shares Import shares 
1980 1994 1980 1994 
EU 52 55 64 58 
External trade 48 45 37 42 
of which the share of: 
Developing Asia1 8 16 12 21 
Centrally Planned Economies2 8 9 6 7 
EA6 4 8 6 11 
Japan 2 5 12 14 
us 13 18 27 21 
Other West Europe3 27 24 31 25 
Notes: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Phillipines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam. 
2 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia in 1980, and Czech and Slovak Republics in 1994, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union in 1980, and the former Soviet 
Union countries in 1994. 
3 Other West Europe includes Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Andorra, Gibraltar, 
Malta, Yugoslavia prior to 1992 ex-Yugoslavian states, post 1992. 
Source : International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Even though the EU share of EA6 exports declined from 1980 to 1994, the 
share of the EA6 as a source of EU imports rose, albeit from a very small base. Shares 
changed little for other regions, except other Asian countries. In 1994, 58 per cent of 
EU imports came from EU partners. The rest of West Europe provided 25 per cent of 
trade from non-members. EA6 exports were 8 per cent of EU external imports. 
The EA6 led in the increased share of skill/capital-intensive labour imports 
into the EU. The EA6 share of these exports to the EU rose from 1 to 6 per cent from 
1980 to 1994. The increase of imports came mainly from Singapore, Taiwan and 
Korea. A rise in the share of labour-intensive imports came mainly from Indonesia 
and Thailand offsetting a fall in the share of other EA6 countries. 
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While the data show that the shares of EU and EA6 trade are small relative to 
the United States, a more accurate picture of rises or falls in the regionalisation of 
trade is given by the trade intensity index or the trade bias index. The size of the 
countries' total trade needs to be considered in an assessment of the "weakness" of 
trade links between two countries; if a country's total trade is low, then low trade in a 
particular bilateral relationship is not necessarily an indication of "weakness" in that 
relationship. 
The trade bias index (Drysdale 1967), a refinement of the trade intensity index 
(Kojima 1964), aims to measure the average effect of differential resistances on the 
intensity in bilateral trade. It abstracts from the size of both countries' total trade 
which of course influence the shares of trade. For example, the larger country j's total 
exports, the more likely it is to have a larger share of country i's total imports. 
The trade bias index also abstracts from the effect of the trade composition of 
both countries. Countries trade more or less intensively with each other because of the 
particular commodity composition of their trade in relation to world trade. That is, if 
country A's exports match country B's demand better than they match overall world 
demand, the chances are that country A will export more intensely to B. The 
assumption that the commodity composition of each country's global trade is 
independent of influences affecting bilateral trade is a strong one. It is arguable that 
changes in a tariff structure or the structure of transport costs would have effects on 
export specialisation. Thus the measure must be treated with caution. 
The index of country bias in trade for each commodity is 
k k 
k V .. Al] 
Bij = -k-1 M k k 
Xi Mw-Mi 
k 
where Xii is country i's exports of commodity k to country j, 
k 
Xi is country i's exports of commodity k, 
k 
Mis country j's imports of commodity k, 
k 
Mw is world imports of commodity k, and 
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k 
Mi is country i's imports of k. 
A weighted average of indexes of country bias for all manufacturing commodities k 
yields an index of country bias in i's aggregate export trade with j. 
( - k) k x .. B .. -~ B··-'1 I) - £..J I) -
k x ij 
k k 
where X ij is the hypothetical value of Xij obtaining when Bij equal unity, and 
k 
X ij is the hypothetical value of Xii obtaining when all Bij equal unity. 
An index of less than one suggests that a country has a "negative" bias towards 
a partner: it trades less with it than would be expected given the size and trade 
composition of both countries. 
Bias indices were calculated for EA6 and EU trade with their main trading 
partners for 1980 and 1994 (Tables 4.17 and 4.18). The disaggregated industries were 
at the SITC 3 digit level. Estimates of the bias of trade show that the EU' s trade with 
the EA6 as a group is well below unity ("negatively biased"). Of the EA6's four major 
markets, the EU is the only one where the trade bias is less than one for each of the 
EA6. In 1994, Singapore had the largest negative bias of 0.3 for imports from the EU 
and 0.4 for exports to the EU. This means that imports from the EU are only three-
tenths as big as they would be if there were no bias, given the size of Singapore's and 
the EU's total trade. Exports to the EU are four-tenths the level expected. The EA6's 
trade with its other trading partners has considerably fewer resistances. 
The negative bias of trade between the EA6 and the EU has changed little 
overall but for some EA6 countries the bias with the EU has become more negative. 
In other words, the level of resistances between the EA6 countries and the EU has 
largely remained constant but in some cases it has increased. The trade bias index 
cannot, however, distinguish between the relative strength of different resistances. As 
resistances tend to change over time, a stable degree of net resistances can imply the 
increase of some and the decrease of others. The degree of complementarity of trade 
in manufactures between the EU and the EA6 has remained approximately constant 
from 1980 to 1994. Thus the changes in the shares of trade between the EU and the 
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EA6 which were described earlier can be to a large extent ascribed to changes in the 
size of total trade of the EA6 and the EU relative to changes in the size of world trade; 
the relatively slow growth in income in the EU and the associated slow growth in EU 
trade has led to a fall in the EU' s share in EA6 exports. 
The EA6 have high positive trade biases with Japan and developing Asia, 
although these have fallen over the period. This suggests that despite the large 
increase in trade between the EA6 countries and other Asian countries, there is no 
evidence of pro-regional policy biases in Asia. This partly reflects the non-
discriminatory nature of trade liberalisation in the Asian region. 
Table 4.17 Bias indices for EA6 trade in manufactures with principal trading partners 1980 and 
1994 
1980 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
from to from to from to from to 
Developing Asia 1 EU Japan United States 
Indonesia 3.2 6.2 0.5 0.6 3.4 1.8 0.9 0.7 
Korea 0.5 1.5 0.3 0.4 3.8 4.6 1.2 2.3 
Malaysia 5.8 2.6 0.4 0.6 2.1 1.4 0.9 2.5 
Singapore 2.2 3.3 0.4 0.4 2.1 2.4 1.2 1.5 
Thailand 2.9 3.7 0.4 0.6 3.2 2.5 0.9 1.5 
Taiwan 0.8 2.2 0.2 0.4 3.1 2.4 1.7 2.6 
1994 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Import Exports Imports Exports 
from to from to s from to from to 
Developing EU Japan us 
Asia1 
Indonesia 1.8 1.7 0.4 0.6 2.2 1.5 0.6 1.1 
Korea 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.4 2.3 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Malaysia 2.5 1.6 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.9 0.7 1.4 
Singapore 1.7 1.9 0.3 0.4 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.1 
Thailand 1.8 1.7 0.4 0.5 2.3 2.4 0.6 1.2 
Taiwan 1.0 1.4 0.4 0.5 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.8 
Note: 1 Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam. 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
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EU trade is highly biased towards the EU itself and surrounding countries, 
including the formerly centrally planned economies (Table 4.18). From 1980 to 1994, 
the EU' s bias toward European countries increased; with the formerly centrally 
planned economies it has doubled While proximity has played a large role in this bias, 
the reduction of trade barriers among 12 EU countries in this study has increased 
intra-EU trade (Hine 1985; Markheim 1994). There is empirical support that the 
impact on non-member countries was uneven with some experiencing trade diversion 
(Balassa 1975). At a sectoral level there were also differences in trade creation and 
trade diversion (EFTA Secretariat 1972). The EU' s discriminatory approach to trade 
policy with other countries has also enhanced the bias (see chapter 5). 
Table 4.18 Bias Indices for EU1 trade with principal partners 1980 and 1994 
Bias 1980 Bias 1994 
EU imports from EU exports to EU imports from EU exports to 
EU 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 
Developing Asia2 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Centrally planned economies3 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.4 
Japan 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 
us 0.6 1.5 0.5 0.5 
Other West Europe4 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 
Notes: 1 EU trade includes intra-EU trade. 
2Developing Asia includes the EA6, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, 
China, Hong Kong, India, Laos, Philippines, Mongolia, Macau, Nepal, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, Vietnam. 
3 Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia in 1980, and Czech and Slovak Republics in 1994, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union in 1980, and the former Soviet 
Union countries in 1994. 
40ther West Europe includes Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Andorra, Gibraltar, 
Malta, Yugoslavia prior to 1992 ex-Yugoslavian states, post 1992. 
Source : International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Distance is often given as a major resistance to trade (Losch 1954; Deardorff 
1989) and it is argued that the further the distance the higher transport costs will be. 
Empirical studies have shown the geographical distance and transport cost variables to 
be statistically significant (Bryan 1974; Geraci and Prewo 1977). Transport and 
communication costs have fallen as share of the total costs of production and 
distribution of goods in industrial countries (Grant et al. 1993). This would be 
expected to lessen the importance of distance as a determinant of trade. 
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It can be argued that because the distance between the EA6 and the EU is 
further than between the EA6 and the United States, trade must be weaker. But the 
effect of geographical distance on trade is not the only major factor in lower trade 
intensity. There are differences in the trade bias between the EA6 countries and 
individual EU countries. For example, Korea exports one fifth as much as it would to 
France if there were no bias, but three fifths as much to Germany if there were no bias. 
This suggests that other factors are involved in the weakness of trade links (Table 
4.19). 
Table 4.19 The trade bias index in the manufactured exports from the EA6 to selected EU 
member countries in 1994 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand Taiwan 
Belgium- 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.6 
Luxembourg 
France 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Germany 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 
Ireland 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.4 
Italy 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Netherlands 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Portugal 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Spain 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 
United Kingdom 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Source: International Economic Databank, Australian National University. 
Distance as a variable that influences trade intensity has more than one 
dimension. Historical, cultural and political distances are seen as important (Drysdale 
and Garnaut 1994a). Such distances change the relative costs of setting up in another 
country's market, but are hard to quantify and appear to change rapidly. Historical, 
political and cultural proximity between the US and the EA6 have been regarded as 
promoting trade between them in contrast to EA6 trade with the EU. Political links 
between Korea, Taiwan and Thailand the United States became important after World 
War II. Korea and Taiwan and to a lesser extent Thailand in the 1960s were large 
recipients of military and civilian aid. This does not, however, explain the greater 
attraction of the US market than the EU market for the other EA6. 
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Malaysia and Indonesia have had historically stronger connections with the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands because of their colonial experience. This may 
be reflected in the higher bias of Malaysia's exports to the United Kingdom 
Indonesia's exports to the Netherlands compared with their exports to other EU 
countries. Nevertheless, Malaysia's export bias with the United States is substantially 
higher than with the United Kingdom and Indonesia's bias with Japan is higher than 
with the Netherlands which indicates the importance of other factors in trade links. 
Common know ledge of English has been seen as facilitating trade between the 
EA6 and the United States. Initially, however, Korean, Indonesian, Taiwanese and 
Thai entreprenuers did not speak English well and yet found the US market easier to 
penetrate than European markets. 
It can be argued that a large market provides opportunities for economies of 
scale and to reduces the costs of all kinds of distance because a large shipment of 
goods can reduce unit transport cost and the cost of setting up distribution in a new 
location (Brada and Mendez 1985). Thus while the United States and the EU are 
comparable in terms of size, the EU did not offer a unified market until the SEM; the 
smaller market sizes of EU countries deterred EA6 exporters by not providing 
economies of scale. This argument cannot explain why all of the EA6 countries have 
lower trade biases in their exports to France and Italy than to the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Belgium given that the United Kingdom is a market of similar size to 
France and Italy, while the Netherlands and Belgium, are much smaller. This pattern 
points to factors other than the effect of distance/economies of scale. 
Another suggested resistance to trade is lack of information about others' 
markets (Johnson 1968; Amelung 1994). The single European market project of 1992 
may have shifted perceptions and increased information by focussing attention on 
trade opportunities with the EU. Information exchange on mutual opportunities was a 
key aspect of the ASEM which involved the EA6 and the EU (see chapter 1) The link 
between trade and information, however, appears to go two ways: the more trade, the 
better the information flows; the less trade, the poorer the information flows. 
99 
Drysdale and Garnaut ( 1994a) suggest a difference between differential 
reductions in official trade barriers and differential reductions in other resistances to 
trade. Reductions in other resistances tend to result from independent firms' search for 
lower cost and more profitable patterns of trade, thus it is less likely to divert trade 
from lower cost to higher cost source and destinations. 
It has been argued that bilateral trade links are enhanced by foreign investment 
(Fukusaku 1992; Petri 1994 ). Globalisation of production leads to the export of inputs 
into labour-intensive production processes which are then re-exported back to the 
home country. Trade barriers can be evaded to some degree by trade at less than arms 
length distorted transfer pricing within TN Cs. It follows that the intensity of the EU-
EA6 link is weak partly because the foreign investment link is weak; EU and EA6 
companies have not invested in each others' regions as much as they have elsewhere. 
Whether globalisation of production leads to exports back to the home country 
depends on the position of a subsidiary firm in the parent firm's global strategy. If a 
subsidiary firm is engaged in the final process of production (assembling and 
packaging), the output is likely to be shipped to diverse markets, not only back to the 
home country as in the case of export platforms in Singapore. If the subsidiary is 
engaged in a process in the middle of the chain of production the product may be 
shipped back to the parent firm's location for final processing, increasing bilateral 
trading links. Urata (1994) has shown that Japanese firms in the EA6 have contributed 
to exports back to Japan from the EA6 countries. The effect of foreign direct 
investment on a host country's total trade may be distributed differentially across 
bilateral trading relationships. Foreign investment can thus be complementary to, or 
substitutable for, trade; it is an empirical issue whether investment leads the 
strengthening of bilateral trade links in a particular case. 
While other resistances to trade have been important, this study suggests that 
official barriers to trade have contributed to the weakness of the EU and EA6 trade 
relationship. Moreover, all aspects of the distance variable, the costs of transport and 
communications and the intensity of political and cultural ties have declined over time 
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(Kleiman 1976; Hill and Phillips 1993). These resistances and their rates of decline do 
not explain the differences in the rate of reduction of resistances across bilateral flows. 
The EU' s preferential agreements and its use of discriminatory protection are a major 
source of differential shifts in the extent of resistances across its bilateral trading 
relationships. Trade barriers in the EU (in contrast to the United States until recently) 
have selectively targeted countries (including the EA6), while giving preferences to 
other countries (Wolf 1989a). The EA6, except for Singapore, have had high trade 
barriers till the 1980s (chapter 2) but unlike the EU's barriers, these barriers have been 
non-discriminatory. The EU' s trade policies are the subject of the next chapter. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Table A4.1 Manufactures classified according to their factor-intensity 
Commodity SITC 
Code 
Commodity SITC Code 
Agricultural resource-intensive 
Leather, dressed fur, etc 
Wood, cork manufactures 
Mineral resource-intensive 
Non-metal mineral manufactures 
Pearl, precious and semi-precious 
stones 
Unskilled labour-intensive 
Textile yarn, fabric etc 
Glass 
Ships and boats 
Plumbing, heating, lighting 
equipment 
Furniture 
Travel goods, handbags 
Clothing 
Footwear 
Articles of plastic 
Toys, sporting goods, etc 
Office supplies nes 
Other manufactured goods 
war, firearms, ammunition 
Semi-skilled labour-intensive 
Dyes, tanning, colour products 
Perfume, cleaning, etc products 
Rubber manufactures nes 
Paper, paperboard manufactures 
Iron and steel products 
Metal manufactures 
Machine parts, accessories nes 
Telecommunications equipment 
except 7249 
61 
63 
661-663 
667 
65 
664-666 
735 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
893 
894 
895 
899 
951 
53 
55 
62 
64 
67 
69 
7199 
724 
Notes: "nes" is not elsewhere specified. 
Domestic electric equipment 
Automotive electric equipment 
Railway vehicles 
Road motor vehicles 
Road vehicle non-motor 
Watches and clocks 
Sound recorders, producers 
Printed matter 
Works of art etc 
Gold, silverware, jewellery 
Skill/Capital-intensive 
Chemical elements, compounds 
Coal, petroleum etc chemicals 
Medicinal etc products 
Fertilisers manufactured 
Explosives, pyrotechnical 
Plastic materials etc 
Chemicals nes 
Machinery non-electric 
except 7199 
Electric power machinery, switchgear 
Electric distributing machinery 
Electro-medical, X-ray equipment 
Electrical machinery nes 
except 7294 
Aircraft 
Instruments, apparatus 
Photo, cinema supplies 
Developed cinema film 
Source: Krause, L.B., 1982. US Economic Policy Toward the Association of SouthEast Asian 
Nations-Meeting the Japanese Challenge, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
725 
7294 
731 
732 
733 
864 
891 
892 
896 
897 
51 
52 
54 
56 
57 
58 
59 
71 
722 
723 
726 
729 
734 
861 
862 
863 
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5 Trade Policies in the European Union 
The EC-EU was a member of GATT and a founding member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), established on 1January1995, which followed GATT as the 
institutional framework for the administration of the multilateral trading system. 
Membership of the WTO entails accepting the Agreements reached in the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, except for four optional agreements set out 
in Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Declaration of 1994. The Uruguay Round Agreement 
comprises GATT (1994), covering merchandise trade, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement relating to Trade in Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs), the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the 
undertaking on dispute settlement. The Agreement on Government Procurement 
(which is to be superseded by a new Agreement), the Civil Aircraft Agreement (where 
negotiations on a new Agreement have taken place) and the Arrangements on Dairy 
and Bovine Meat will retain their plurilateral status from the Tokyo Round 
Agreements. The discussion here relates to merchandise trade covered by the GATT 
(1994). 
In 1958 EC members set out to merge their national trade policies within an 
external trade policy, called the "Common Commercial Policy", but they were only 
partially successful until the SEM. Tariffs and quotas on intra-EC trade were 
abolished, with the adoption of a Common External Tariff in 1968. Some trade 
practices, including the treatment of countervailing and anti-dumping duties were 
harmonised over time. Common policies were introduced for agriculture, and coal and 
steel. The EC negotiated as a group in the preferential trade agreements struck with 
other countries and in GATT multilateral trade negotiations. But the EC did not 
eliminate non-tariff barriers among member-states. It did not establish a uniform 
approach to the use of import quotas against non-members. It failed to make safeguard 
measures EC-wide. Voluntary export restraints were also administered by member 
state governments. Hence the customs union was in effect only a tariff union 
(Pelkmans and Carzaniga 1996). 
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The restrictions of individual member-states' on non-members' products were 
evident in the number of Article 115 cases that were allowed under the EC Treaty. 
Under Article 115, member-states were allowed to check trade at their borders with 
other EU members to prevent the entry of non-members' products which they had 
restricted. Without the checks at their internal borders, imports could have entered the 
market of a more restrictive member through the market of a less restrictive member. 
Authorisations for restrictions under Article 115 were limited to one year but could be 
renewed. In 1991 83 per cent of restrictions imposed under Article 115 were directed 
at suppliers in East Asia (Table 5.1). Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were among the 
countries most targeted. As the product composition of EA6 exports changed (see 
chapter 4), Article 115 restrictions spread to emerging products such as consumer 
electronics. At the start of 1993, 6417 Article 115 restrictions were still in force, 
including 4700 restrictions on Chinese products. 
Table 5.1 Geographical distribution of Article 115 cases, 1981-85, 1986-81 (per cent and number) 
1981-85 1986-88 
East Asia 58.2 64.6 
China 9.2 12.8 
Taiwan 11.8 14 
Hong Kong 17.5 18.3 
Japan 7.7 12.1 
Korea 10 10.6 
ASEAN 6.3 7.9 
Thailand 2 5.8 
Philippines 2.5 3.3 
South Asia 8.4 10.4 
Other 27.1 13.6 
Total 100 100 
Total number 491 530 
Note: 1Percentage of 4 digit product groups affected by Article 115 cases 
Source: Langhammer, R., 1990. 'Fuelling a new engine of growth or separating Europe from non-
Europe', Special Issue of Journal of Common Market Studies. 
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Internal customs posts were eliminated on 1 January 1993 under the SEM 
program, so Article 115 restrictions could not be enforced. Most national quotas were 
abolished without substitution at the EU level. New community-wide restrictions, 
however, were introduced for some clothing and textile products originating in China, 
some food items (bananas, canned tuna, sardines) and some steel supplies from the 
Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan. 
The EU's preferential trade agreements 
The EU uses trade agreements extensively with little regard for the GATT' s MFN 
principle. In addition, many of its trade policies are considered to be discriminatory 
and opaque (Langhammer 1990). The EU's reciprocal and non-reciprocal preferential 
policies have many sources. When the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland joined 
the EU in 1973, a free trade arrangement was negotiated with their former EFTA 
partners. By invoking a "European" status for all European countries provided for in 
the Treaty of Rome, Mediterranean countries have won special arrangements. More 
recently, Central and East European countries have claimed the same privileges. The 
origins of the Yaounde-Lome Convention derive from the colonial and geopolitical 
ties of the EC countries with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This 
multi-layered system which involves separate trade agreements with countries that do 
not conclude arrangements with each other has come to be known as a "hub and 
spoke" system (y.I onnacott 1996). Because of the proliferation of agreements in 
Europe, Europe is now a complex web of hubs and spokes. As these agreements 
widen and deepen, they tend to disadvantage the EA6 and some other non-member 
countries. Access under the Generalised System of Preferences, of which the EA6 
(except Taiwan) were members, has been less favourable than the access of preferred 
countries. Korea and Singapore have been graduated from the GSP to the most 
favoured nation status. The key EU trade agreements are discussed next. 
105 
The European Economic Area 
The highest level of EU preferences apply to EFTA members. In 1973, EFTA 
consisted of Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Denmark joined the EU in 1976. Twenty years later the remaining five countries, 
which had a high proportion of trade with the EU, were spurred by the SEM to apply 
for EU membership; they feared that they would otherwise be marginalised by the 
EU's policies. After Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, the 
remaining EFTA members were Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
The EFT A countries concluded bilateral free trade agreements with the EC in 
industrial products in 1972, with a separate agreement covering coal and steel 
products. The Agreements did not cover agriculture and fish, but in annexed letters to 
the Agreements preferential arrangements were made for some agricultural products. 
The implementation of the free trade arrangements was accompanied by a 
considerable expansion of trade between EC and EFT A countries. There was also 
trade diversion from the rest of the world's exports (Aitken 1973; Hine 1985). For 
some non-members, for example, Japan, rising competitiveness mitigated the loss of 
their export market shares in the EC. 
Despite the fact that trade between the EFT A countries and the EC was free of 
tariffs and quotas from 1975, there is general agreement, supported by large price 
differences for many commodities, that EFT A and EU markets remained fragmented 
(Wieser 1989; Abrams et al. 1990). Trade between the two regions was still subject to 
customs controls, technical barriers and government procurement practices (such as 
existed in intra-EU trade prior to the SEM). 
EC and EFT A countries signed the Luxembourg Declaration in 1984, creating 
the basis for closer integration. Formal negotiations to establish a common European 
Economic Area (BEA) commenced in 1990. The EBA Agreement was signed on 2 
May 1992. Switzerland rejected the EBA by referendum in 1992. The entry into force 
of the Agreement was delayed until 1994 to allow renegotiation of certain elements. 
The objective of the EBA was to form a homogeneous economic area that 
embraced the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital throughout the 
EBA territories. Thus the Agreement essentially extended the SEM provisions to the 
EFT A countries. Four hundred provisions covered areas such as technical 
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harmonisation, safety standards, environmental and sanitary standards and recognition 
of professional qualifications. The new mutual recognition approach to standards and 
the EU' s global approach on conformity testing also applied to EEA countries 
(Woolcock 1996b). With respect to trade in goods, the EEA Agreement reduced the 
list of excluded industrial products to casein, dextrin and certain albumins. Anti-
dumping actions, countervailing actions and measures against illicit commercial 
practices were prohibited for products covered in the EEA. EFTA states joined the EU 
Patents Agreement and adjusted to EU levels regarding protection of intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property rights. 
European Economic Area rules corresponded to the existing body of EU law, 
the acquis communitaire, including government procurement, competition policy and 
state aid as well as company law, statistics, and relevant social and environmental 
legislation. The EU acquis also applied in various service sectors, including banking, 
insurance, transport and telecommunications. After the entry into force of the EEA 
Agreement, procedures ensured that new EU legislation would be automatically 
introduced throughout the EEA. 
The Agreement also facilitated closer cooperation in many areas, such as 
research and development, education, consumer protection, small and medium 
enterprises and elements of environmental and social policy. 
The EEA did not cover agriculture directly. It introduced progressive 
liberalisation of agricultural trade. Price compensation arrangements for agricultural 
raw materials included in processed products have been reviewed, resulting in their 
abolition for certain products. Trade in fishery products has also been liberalised. 
The Agreement provided safeguard measures in the event of serious economic, 
societal or environmental difficulties and for balance of payment problems. Measures 
were to be non-discriminatory. 
Unlike EU membership, the EEA did not involve entry into a customs union. 
The EFTA countries retained their own treaty-making power and remained 
autonomous in their relations with non-members. On the other hand, the free 
circulation of goods imported from third countries was not extended to the EEA area. 
Border controls remained between the two blocs. Since the EEA countries retained 
their trade regimes vis a vis non-members, preferential trade between the two blocs 
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continued to require determination of origin. Discriminatory rules of origin are, 
however, a new and contentious issue in the WTO. 
The effects of the EBA Agreement were expected to be similar to the effects of 
the SEM outlined in chapter 3. The implementation of the Agreement was to lead to 
trade creation but also to trade diversion. It was hoped that it would lead to dynamic 
effects and efficiency gains through increased competition and economies of scale. 
The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU in 1995 reduced the 
importance of the European Economic Area Agreement. With Switzerland opting out, 
only Iceland and Norway remain in the European Economic Area. 
From the point of view of the EA6, one of the key benefits of accession of the 
three new members to the EU is that their exports will be able to enter the markets of 
the three new members without having to cross three sets of individual trade barriers. 
The accession has, however, lead to the adoption of the more restrictive trade policies 
compared to the previous policies of these new members. The EU' s average tariffs are 
higher in most categories, except in clothing, textiles and rubber. Higher tariffs apply 
to cars, metals, chemicals, telecom products, pulp and paper. While tariffs are lower in 
clothing and textiles, integration into the EU' s regime under the Multifibre 
Arrangement will increase effective protection in these products. Anti-dumping 
measures will be introduced. Adoption of the EU Generalised System of Preferences 
by the three new members will lead to greater restrictiveness. Agricultural regulations 
will become more complex (WTO 1995b). The recent enlargement of the EU market 
for the EA6 and other non-members has to be weighed against the rise in trade 
barriers. The EU has indicated that it is prepared to offer compensation for this 
increase in restrictiveness. The United States and Norway reached interim 
arrangements with the EU in 1995. On some items, these arrangements provided for 
tariff-free or low tariff quotas based on previous years' imports. Some restrictions 
against China were lessened to offset the accession of the three new members. In anti-
dumping legislation, the EC Commission has indicated that is prepared to examine 
contentions that the accession has affected some suppliers. 
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"Europe Agreements" with Central and East European countries 
The industrial countries responded to centrally planned Central and East Europe's 
price distortions by subjecting imports from these countries to relatively high tariff 
and non-tariff trade barriers (Mastropasqua and Rolli 1994 ). The most commonly used 
NTBs were quantitative restrictions, minimum prices and anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties. Restrictions were concentrated on unskilled labour-intensive 
industries. In 1990, EU NTBs on imports from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
most-intensively targeted clothing and textiles under the Multifibre Arrangement; 90 
per cent of imports were affected by NTBs. Non-tariff barriers in agriculture covered 
over 60 per cent of imports from the four countries. 
Since 1990, the Central and East European countries have progressively 
abandoned their centrally planned systems, liberalised prices and foreign trade, 
dismantling licensing systems and multiple currency exchange regimes and introduced 
total or limited currency convertibility. Regional integration with the EU was 
emphasised over integration with the world economy (Kierzkowski 1996). European 
Union membership became the main object of the diplomacy of these countries. For 
most of these countries, the transition to a market economy is taking time, so 
membership of the EU remains in the future (Enders and Wonnacott 1996). But the 
Czech Republic, at least, has moved fully to a market economy; reasons other than 
those of economic structure appear to be important in the EU' s decision to deny 
membership to these countries. Competition from low-cost manufactures concerns the 
EU. The extension of the CAP to these countries would place unmanageable pressures 
on the EU budget. An increase in membership seems daunting in terms of decision-
making and administration. 
Following the political and economic changes in Central and East European 
countries, industrial countries have, however, been relaxing trade barriers towards 
them. In 1990 and 1991, the EC extended preferential tariff schemes under the GSP to 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The EC lowered tariff protection against these 
countries although tariffs levels in agricultural imports remained high (10-13 per 
cent). The GSP tariff scheme is, however, limited in the range of products it covers 
and the duration of its tariffs (a maximum of five years). Thus granting GSP 
preferences is not likely to have led to large effects (Mastropasqua and Rolli 1994). 
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Between 1991-1993, "Europe Agreements" were concluded with Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania ("Europe Agreement" countries) and 
the Baltic countries. To enter into force the Europe Agreements had to be ratified by 
the national parliaments of each member state of the EU, the European Parliament and 
the parliament of the associated country. In the intervening period, interim 
Agreements applied which contained the essential trade-related aspects. Interim 
Agreements with the Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland entered into force on 1 
March 1992. The interim Agreement with Czechoslovakia was subsequently replaced 
by individual interim Agreements with the Czech and Slovak Republics when they 
were formed in 1993. The interim Agreement with Romania entered into force on 1 
May 1993 and that with Bulgaria, on 31December1993. The Essen Council of 
December 1994 decided to align tariff liberalisation schedules for Bulgaria and 
Romania with those of the other Europe Agreement countries. 
The Europe Agreements envisage progressive reciprocal liberalisation of trade 
in manufactures and some agricultural products. As a result of the acceleration of the 
liberalisation schedule, agreed at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, the 
EU had lifted almost all tariffs and quantitative restrictions on industrial imports from 
CEA countries by 1January1995. The only exceptions were steel products and some 
clothing and textiles products. For steel products, the EU immediately abolished all 
quantitative restrictions on imports from the Europe Agreement countries and tariffs 
were phased out at the end of 1995. For clothing and textiles products, the Europe 
Agreement countries' quotas have been doubled; tariffs were scheduled to be phased 
out by the end of 1996. Quantitative measures in clothing and textiles should be 
eliminated by 1998, well before the Uruguay Round deadline of 2005 (Rollo and Stem 
1993). The Europe Agreement countries trade barriers in manufactures towards the 
EU will be eliminated by 2000 in most products. Anti-dumping duties, countervailing 
duties and safeguards are still permitted and rules of origin apply. The EU 
harmonisation of standards and testing, using mutual recognition, is to be extended 
progressively to the Europe Agreement countries and the Baltic Republics. There is 
cumulation in origin in the Europe Agreements; for example, Polish manufacturers 
can claim origin status for products with parts originating in Hungary. In agriculture, 
Interim Agreements provide for either partial or full liberalisation of bilateral trade in 
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some agricultural products. The Agreements include steps towards the progressive 
liberalisation of cross-border supplies of services. These include the granting of 
national treatment for rights of establishment of services and some general 
exemptions. The extent of liberalisation in trade in services in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics has not exceeded MFN concessions granted so far (WTO 1996a and WTO 
1996b). 
Enders and Wonnacott (1996) point out that trade creation and trade diversion 
in the bilateral Europe Agreements are likely to be smaller in the Europe Agreement 
countries and the EU than would be the case in a free trade agreement between them, 
because not as many trade barriers will be removed in the "hub and spoke" 
agreements. Spoke firms will still face distortions in each others' markets. This leaves 
less opportunity for gains from the exploitation of comparative advantage, increased 
competition and economies of scale. But because preference margins for members are 
lower, the extent of trade diversion is also expected to be lower than in a free trade 
area. The net impact on income is, of course, an empirical issue. 
Barriers between "spoke" countries have been reduced by other regional 
initiatives. The Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) is a free trade area 
created in 1993 between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic. Bilateral rules of origin in the CEFTA Agreement, however, would restrict 
opportunities for specialisation (Enders and Wonnacott 1996). 
Are the Europe Agreement countries capable of exploiting their 
preferences? Early in the 1990s most of these countries had a legacy of 
inappropriate, energy and capital-intensive, but technologically outdated 
industries. Infrastructure was inadequate and costly (Hiemenz 1991; Mayes 
1993). Nevertheless, key exporters emerged quickly in several countries so 
that Europe Agreement country exports to the EU grew very rapidly compared 
to other sources of EU imports between 1990 to 1994, even while industrial 
output was falling. The collapse of trading partners in the former Soviet 
Union is part of the explanation. With incomes falling, mutual trade 
opportunities were not considerable. As output levels began to recover in the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak 
Republic, prospects for trade improved. Studies differ on the trade potential of 
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the Europe Agreement countries (Collins and Rodrik 1991; Hamilton and 
Winters 1991; Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'lnformations Intemationales, 
1992; Rollo and Stern 1992). This is partly the result of poor statistics on 
GDP in these countries. The standard system of National Accounts is only 
now being established in these countries. The "shadow economy" not covered 
by the Material Product statistics is still large. Economic recovery may be 
underestimated in some countries. The EU Commission concluded that a 
realistic though optimistic range for growth in the volume of Europe 
Agreement exports to the EU would be between 8 and 12 per cent per annum 
for the short term (Commission of the European Communities 1994b). 
Yaounde-Lome Convention 
The Lome Convention is near the apex of the EU's pyramid of preferential treatment. 
In principle, access is guaranteed in the EU market for all beneficiaries over an 
extended period of time for a broad range of products. 
Most of France's colonies attained independence shortly after the Treaty of 
Rome was signed. The new relationship was defined in the Yaounde Convention 
(1963). When the United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973, British Commonwealth 
developing countries were divided into two groups namely "associable" and "non-
associable". The first group joined the Yaounde Convention and became part of the 
Lome Convention, which developed from it in 1975. The non-associable group 
consists mainly of larger and more developed countries in South and South-east Asia, 
hence including Singapore and Malaysia. These countries received GSP trade 
preferences from the United Kingdom and its new European partners which were less 
favourable than the Lome regime. 
The Lome Convention is a non-reciprocal, contractual Agreement between the 
EU and some 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Lome IV, signed in 
1989, is to run for ten years. The Lome Conventions trade provisions entitle ACP 
countries to duty-free access in the EU market for qualifying products. Virtually all 
manufactured and many agricultural products qualify. 
Agricultural products that fall under the CAP are entitled to preferential 
treatment, although not unlimited access. They enjoy substantial reductions in import 
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duties. Special protocols apply to some products including bananas, rum, sugar, beef 
and veal. The highly preferential nature of these protocols was to enable ACP 
countries to enjoy EU levels of protection for the products concerned. Access has, 
however, been subject to rules of origin. These allowed for cumulation within Lome 
countries but were strongly weighted toward European raw materials and components. 
The development of labour-intensive industries such as clothing and footwear has thus 
been inhibited by the inability to purchase inputs in low cost markets. To qualify for 
fish imports, the captains of the fishing vessels had to be of the exporting country or 
of EC origin. 
There is evidence the EC preferences had some effect on ACP exports 
in the 1970s. Moss (1982) examined changes in the share of non-oil exports 
from the ACP countries and other developing countries which were directed 
to the EC(9) during the 1970s. Data show that the proportion of ACP exports 
going to the EC remained unchanged between the early 1970s and the period 
of the first Lome Convention (1975-79). In contrast, the exports of all 
developing countries to the EC experienced a 10 per cent decline during the 
same period. It is likely that part of the reason for this pattern is the Lome 
preferences. 
During the 1970s, the EC countries' share of imports into developing 
countries as a whole declined while they held onto their shares of imports in 
ACP markets. The exports of the EC to Lome countries may have been 
assisted by the Lome Convention even though EC countries were not given 
trade preferences in the Agreement. Rules of origin may have encouraged 
ACP producers to import from the EC. Aid to ACP countries under the 
European Development Fund was tied to EC products. 
More recent studies agree that with the minor exceptions of Lesotho 
and Mauritius, however, Lome countries appear to have not taken full 
advantage of their access to the EU market (Pohl and Sorsa 1992; Kappel 
1996). Since the 1990s though, Zimbabwe and other African countries have 
started to export small amounts of textiles to the EC. 
Policy biases against exports in the ACP countries are compounded by 
high production costs, inadequate knowledge of markets, poorly developed 
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product ranges and low quality (Tovias 1990). Writing of the African 
countries', Davenport refers to the "unimportance of being preferred" 
(Davenport 1992: 233). Only by changing their domestic policy frameworks 
would the ACP countries be able to take advantage of the Lome preferences. 
Lome preferences may have, ironically, hampered exports, by waiving 
reciprocal liberalisation. The ACP states were allowed to continue to shelter 
behind import substitution policies. 
Mediterranean countries 
In the 1970s, under the "Global Mediterranean Policy", the EC gave free access to the 
EC market for imports of manufactures from Greece, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Algeria, Portugal, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Malta. Yugoslavia 
received similar preferences in 1980. Spain did not negotiate in the same framework, 
preferring to focus on achieving EC membership. It did, however, receive a 60 per 
cent reduction of tariffs in industrial exports. 
Greece, Spain and Portugal were increasingly successful in the EC market. In 
clothing and textiles, their import penetration of the EC market was much higher than 
in other markets (Hine 1985). Overall manufactured and semi-manufactured exports 
to the EC were 58 per cent higher in 1977-79 than might have been expected on the 
basis of their performance in other industrial countries' markets. Turkey and Morocco 
appear to have benefited from EC preferences in textiles and clothing as a result of the 
implementation of domestic reforms (Pohl and Sorsa 1992). Mahgreb (Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia) and Mashreq (Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia 
Syria) countries' exports have started to grow rapidly albeit from a small base. Their 
performance in the EC market has been superior to their performance in other 
markets, again especially in textiles and clothing, which may indicate the effect of EC 
trade preferences. But domestic policy frameworks prevent them from being able to 
take full advantage of the EU' s preferential treatment (Hoekman and Djankov 1996). 
The EU's Mediterranean policy has been extended since 1994. The EU 
Commission adopted guidelines in 1994 to complete a customs union with Turkey. 
Cyprus and Malta are to be included in the next phase of EU enlargement. In the 
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interim, both countries are moving to a custom union with the EU. The first "Euro-
Med" Agreement, with Tunisia, was signed in July 1995. A "Euro-Med" Agreement 
with Morocco followed in October 1995. Such agreements are to follow for Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Algeria. 
The Euro-Med agreements are of unlimited duration and to be implemented 
over the medium term. Their aim is to achieve reciprocal free trade in most 
manufactures and preferential reciprocal access in agriculture; to establish conditions 
for gradual liberalisation of trade in services and of capital flows; and to encourage the 
economic integration of Mediterranean countries into the EU. Anti-dumping 
measures, countervailing duties and safeguards provisions may continue to be used. 
The Euro-Med agreements allow for "cumulation" of origin for products produced in 
other Euro-Med countries. 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
A 1989 agreement with the former Soviet Union was replaced by separate cooperation 
agreements with the component states. A 1993 agreement among the former Soviet 
Union countries attempted to liberalise trade between Russia, the Ukraine and most of 
the other former USSR states. An EU Agreement was signed with Russia in 1994 but 
was suspended over developments in Chechnya. The Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus signed agreements in 1994 and 1995. Some of these include 
an evolutionary clause which offers the prospect of a free trade area with the EU in the 
medium term, if conditions permit. 
Despite large preferences, there may be little effect in a regional free trade 
arrangement or preference agreement if supply-side constraints remain as considerable 
as they now are. The former Soviet Union countries are not yet in a position to 
compete in the EU market (Assaf and Henley 1995). Output is still contracting in 
several of these countries. The share of former Soviet Union's trade with the EU has 
fallen markedly and is not yet showing signs of revival. 
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Generalised System of Preferences 
The EC's GSP scheme was introduced in 1971, following UNCTAD initiatives to 
give developing countries preferential access to industrial country markets. The 
United States, Japan and other industrial countries also adopted generalised 
preferences from the late 1960s for imports from developing countries. Although the 
EA6 nominally benefited from the GSP scheme, the EU does not automatically grant 
duty-free entry to qualifying products. Its GSP is severely limited by product, country 
of origin and destination quotas on "sensitive" products. 
A revised GSP scheme for industrial products took effect on 1 January 1995. 
A new non-reciprocal general regime and a special incentive regime were introduced. 
In addition to tariff modulation, a graduation mechanism was introduced. Quotas 
under the GSP and ceilings again took the "sensitivity" of the product into account. 
Products were divided into four categories according to the degree of sensitivity, with 
tariff reductions rising from 15 per cent to 100 per cent. Tariff quotas were abolished. 
Graduation provided for exclusion of specific country and sector combinations based 
on the exporting country's overall level of development and its level of export 
specialisation in the product category in question. Countries with a relatively high 
level of development were excluded from the GSP at low levels of export 
specialisation and vice versa. Preferences have been reduced for the EA6. A special 
incentives scheme attempted to use EU trade policy to intervene in trading partners' 
domestic policies. Supplementary preferential margins, up to 30 per cent, could be 
granted to countries that met certain ILO labour and environmental standards. 
The EU is also attempting to spread the process of regionalism. Rules of origin 
have been modified to allow regional cumulation for ASEAN and Andean Pact 
countries. Inputs into exports from the EU (as in Lome) can be considered as coming 
from the beneficiary country. The stated purpose is to encourage joint ventures with 
EU firms. 
Some EU quotas have been so small that firms had to keep their year's 
supplies in a bonded store at the beginning of the quota year to benefit from 
GSP preferences. Administrative rules which cover the monitoring and 
control of tariff quotas, ceilings, origin rules and direct shipping certificates 
have reduced the effectiveness of the EU' s GSP scheme (Langhammer and 
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Sapir 1987). The rules reflect the underlying philosophy that successful 
exporting countries should give way to less developed countries. The EU 
scheme has a further element of uncertainty and unattractiveness in that the 
administrative rules are published so late in the year that the exporting 
country cannot adjust to changes which are made in the ensuing year. 
Most Favoured Nation 
The GATT-WTO principle, the foundation of the multilateral trading system, is only 
applied to EU trade with a handful of countries. Of these, Japan and the United States 
account for 35 per cent of imports from external sources in 1994 (see chapter 4). The 
bulk of the rest of external imports was subject to preferences. 
Trends in the instruments of protection 
Tariffs 
Tariffs are the most transparent trade instrument. The EC-EU's common external 
tariffs, like those of most other industrial countries, have been reduced dramatically by 
successive GATT multilateral negotiations. In 1947, average tariffs on manufactured 
goods were more than 40 per cent in industrial countries. After the Uruguay Round is 
implemented, the average tariff in industrial countries will be 3.9 per cent and the 
average EU tariff will be 3.7 per cent. 
In 1988, EU manufactured imports had a weighted average tariff of 4.7 per 
cent (Sampson forthcoming). Average tariffs ranged from 0.2 per cent for raw 
materials to 5.6 per cent for manufactured goods. For "sensitive" products such as 
clothing and footwear, tariffs still averaged around 13 per cent. Almost all EU tariffs 
were bound, that is the EU had committed itself not to raise the tariff above given 
boundary levels (GATT Article II). Goods could be imported at a lower than 
maximum level, providing this treatment was extended to all sources of imports. This 
added to certainty in trade. The use of bindings above existing tariffs was limited; 
sensitive products are the exception. 
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The EU's Uruguay Round commitments were to reduce tariffs by 38 per cent 
by the year 2000, leading to an average fall of approximately 1 percentage point. 
Some tariffs of interest to the EA6 are to be eliminated. These include tariffs on 
pharmaceuticals, most steel items, paper, furniture, some toys, soaps and detergents. 
Unfortunately, there was no commitment to apply the tariff cuts uniformly, so the 
peak tariff categories saw less reduction. These categories include clothing, textiles, 
footwear, leather goods, rubber products, travel goods and cars. In general, tariff 
reductions were to be reduced in five equal steps. The first reduction was on the date 
of entry into force of the WTO on 1 January 1995. Subsequent reductions were to be 
on 1 January of successive years. The final rate will become effective on 1 January 
2000. 
Non-tariff barriers 
The dismantling of tariffs has frequently been accompanied by rising non-tariff 
barriers. The principal instruments often used for protectionist purposes are safeguards 
under Article XIX of GATT, voluntary export restraints, countervailing measures, 
anti-dumping measures, rules of origin, technical standards and government 
procurement practices. Several studies have concluded that in the 1970s and 1980s the 
EC-EU played a leading role in the rise of non-tariff barriers (UNCTAD 1987; Laird 
and Yeats; 1988; Nogues et al. 1986; Sassoon 1990). Laird and Yeats constructed a 
frequency index showing the proportion of 4 digit SITC tariff lines affected by NTBs, 
for the EU, the United States and Japan (Table 5.2). Their definition of NTBS 
included quotas, licences, anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties, voluntary 
export restraints, orderly market arrangements, customs clearance costs, and technical 
barriers. 
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Table 5.2 Rise in non-tariff barriers in manufactures, 1966-86 (percentage of tariff lines) 
1966 1986 
EC1 10 56 
Belgium-Luxembourg 21 69 
Denmark 1 46 
France 6 61 
West Germany 12 59 
GrECe 47 
Ireland 2 41 
Italy 9 66 
Netherlands 8 58 
United Kingdom 9 44 
Japan 48 50 
United States 39 71 
Notes: 1 GrECe and Ireland are excluded due to incomplete information 
Source: Laird, S. and Yeats, A., 1988. 'Trends in non-tariff barriers 1966-86', Working Paper 137. 
International Economics Department, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Safeguards 
"Safeguards" are permitted in special circumstances under Article XIX of the GATT. 
This permits a country to protect a specific sector against import "surges", that is, 
unforeseen increases of imports. The rationale is not only economic: it is believed that 
governments will not commit themselves to liberalisation unless they are assured that 
they can avoid political and social disruption costs (Hindley 1980). 
During 1978-87, the EC resorted to safeguards under Article XIX for only a 
handful of manufactures (preserved mushrooms, frozen cod fillets, some synthetic 
fibre yarns, some tableware, some electronic quartz watches and some steel products). 
By January 1995 no safeguards in manufactures remained (WTO 1996a). 
The use of Article XIX was limited because the restriction had to be non-
discriminatory and countries were to be compensated for restricted products. 
Safeguards under Article XIX were transparent. Unlike voluntary export restraints, 
they did not create rents (see below). They were also a tacit admission that a domestic 
industry was unable to compete (Low and Yeats 1995). 
The Uruguay Round incorporates new safeguard provisions. Their use has 
been eased in some ways. The affected exporting country cannot retaliate for the first 
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three years and the importing country is not required to provide compensation to the 
targeted country. Safeguards can also be applied selectively if import increases are 
mainly from one or a few suppliers. Some safeguard rules have been tightened in 
response to concerns raised by the EA6 and other developing countries. Safeguards 
can only be applied for a limited period (4 years, renewable for another four). They 
must also be progressively liberalised and are subject to surveillance and review. 
Safeguards can no longer be applied to developing country exporters who account for 
a small portion of total imports. The most significant feature of the new safeguards 
provisions was the commitment to eliminate all voluntary export restraints. 
Voluntary export restraints 
Voluntary export restraints were introduced by industrial countries mainly to limit 
imports from developing countries. The responsibility was placed on exporters, often 
with exporting country support (Schott 1990). Exporters acquiesced because they 
could acquire a measure of control. Efficient producers earned economic rents by 
limiting their output and raising prices. The rent was viewed by importers as a 
premium for the exporters' acquiescence to protectionist arrangements (Hindley 
1980). These measures are clearly discriminatory and at variance with the principle of 
non-discrimination in Article I of GATT (Jackson 1988). The support of importers 
and exporters, however, meant that no complaints were made to the GATT and the 
use of these instruments increased. 
While tariffs and safeguard restrictions are implemented through visible 
administrative channels and require legislative scrutiny, voluntary export restraints are 
negotiated without publicity. Some voluntary export restraints may not even be known 
to governments. For example, Taiwan continued to restrict its footwear exports to the 
United Kingdom by agreement with the British Footwear Manufacturers Association, 
while the government believed the voluntary export restraint had expired when 
agreement was not formally reached in 1986 (Davenport and Page 1991). Hence, the 
danger of retaliation from trading partners is smaller (Tumlir 1985; Low and Yeats 
1995). It has also been argued that the non-transparency of voluntary export restraints 
is useful to a pro-trade bureaucracy (Bhagwati 1988, Baldwin 1982). Policymakers 
can disingenuously placate protectionists while ensuring that the porosity of the 
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voluntary export restraints caused by non-transparency and discrimination renders 
them less restrictive than they appear to be. 
Bhagwati (1988) nevertheless acknowledges the danger of discriminatory trade 
restraints. De Melo et al. (1990) have shown that voluntary export restraints result in 
significant costs to importing and exporting countries and for the latter despite the 
transfer of rents. Bark and de Melo ( 1988) have presented evidence of the contraction 
of the rate of growth of footwear exports from Korea and Taiwan into the industrial 
countries due to the implementation of voluntary export restraints. Brenton and 
Winters (1990) have estimated a substantial reduction of some types of footwear 
exports from Taiwan to the United Kingdom in 1982 due to voluntary export 
restraints. In addition, de Melo and Winters (1989) found that there has not always 
been recourse to "quality upgrading" in an attempt to lessen the restrictiveness of 
volume quotas as described by Falvey (1979). As importing countries continue to 
build up NTBs, the gaps for evasion necessarily diminish, resource allocations 
become distorted and production uncertainties rise under increasing new protection. 
The EU sectors most prone to voluntary export restraints were agriculture, 
steel, clothing and textiles (Kostecki 1987). The first EU-level voluntary export 
restraint outside these traditional areas was introduced on video cassette recorders 
from Japan in 1983, in the so-called Tokyo Agreement (Hindley 1986). The EU went 
on to introduce more voluntary export restraints in consumer electronics and transport 
equipment (cars, motorcycles and forklifts) by 1987. In the late 1980s, these new areas 
made the EA6, especially Korea, targets for voluntary export restraints (Koopmann 
and Scharrer 1989). In 1991 a voluntary export restraint was negotiated with Japan for 
cars. The arrangement was unusual because it places limits not only on Japanese 
imports to the EU as a whole but on five individual EU markets. It is also one of the 
first major arrangements between advanced countries which apparently restricts both 
exports and foreign investment (Mason 1994). 
The Uruguay Round Agreement prohibits voluntary export restraints and 
requires all existing voluntary export restraints to be eliminated according to fixed 
timetables by 1 January 1999 for OECD countries. Each country can choose to retain 
one voluntary export restraint until the end of 1999. The EU has advised that it intends 
to eliminate 8 out of 9 remaining voluntary export restraints. The bilateral 
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"consensus" with Japan for monitoring Japanese car exports is to expire at the end of 
1999. Voluntary export restraints on non-WTO members remain. 
The MF A is a special set of voluntary export restraints that is bound by its own 
agreement in the Uruguay Round. The MF A restricts exports of clothing and textiles 
from developing countries to the EU and other industrial countries. Restrictions on 
clothing and textiles have a long history dating back to pre-World War II US and UK 
restrictions on Japanese exports (Keesing and Wolf 1980; Hamilton 1990). Clothing 
and textiles voluntary export restraints were, of course, triggered by import volumes. 
The MF A, which took these sectors outside the GA TT system, was introduced in 
1974. It has been renegotiated 4 times. The most recent MFA was put in place in 
1993. As EA6 countries led clothing and textiles exports from the 1960s, they became 
the most subject to trade restrictions (Raffaelli 1990). 
Voluntary export restraints on clothing and textiles in the EC-EU, were 
originally instituted at the individual country level. The next phase was a two track 
system with voluntary export restraints at both the individual and EC-EU level. In 
1994, they were moved entirely to the EU level. The MF A covers products in detail, 
although there are some general quotas. The restrictions are specified mainly in terms 
of volume and growth rates of volume. 
The promise to phase out the MFA was a key achievement of the Uruguay 
Round. Trade in clothing and textiles is to return to GATT's MFN rules by 2005. The 
promise to phase out the MF A was to compensate developing countries for 
liberalisation in services, intellectual property and investment policies (Cline 1995). 
Whether the 2005 target will be achieved remains in some doubt. 
The Uruguay Round agreement envisages a ten year phase-out of 
quotas from 1995. In 1995, at least 16 per cent of clothing and textiles 
imports at 1990 levels was to be integrated. On 1 January 1998, no less than a 
further 17 per cent of 1990 level imports is to be integrated. On 1 January 
2000, no less than a further 18 per cent of 1990 imports is to be integrated. 
All remaining products are to be integrated by 1 January 2005, the end of the 
transition period. Participants have scope to determine the product mix at 
each stage of the phase-out, although some items have to be chosen from all 
three broad categories that constitute the sector. Not all clothing and textiles 
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products are restricted by the MF A, therefore the requirement that only 51 per 
cent be free of restrictions by 2000, implies that less than half the restrictions 
need be eliminated. The phase-out of voluntary export restraints is likely to be 
"endloaded", that is, more quotas will be eliminated towards the end of the 
interim period. The delay in implementation can be increased through 
concentration on the least used quotas in the earlier stages. Quotas are likely 
to be phased out in the EU with the aim of protecting the interests of the 
Southern members of the EU, Mediterranean and Central and East European 
countries. Products of interest to them are thus not likely to be phased out 
until it is nearly 2005. 
During the transition, phase quota limits are to rise. Quota growth in the 
interim period is not sufficiently generous to speed import growth much beyond the 
constant total protection baseline (Cline 1995). The WTO Agreement provides for a 
transitional safeguards system, yet to be defined, to apply to products which are to be 
integrated into the GATT. Moreover, the agreement has tightened up procedures for 
dealing with the evasion of protection to enhance the effectiveness of the MFA in the 
interim period. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement requires that all "non-conforming restrictions" 
on clothing and textiles outside the MFA be eliminated by 2006. Nevertheless the 
EA6 cannot assume that after this date that there will be no protection in this sector. It 
is possible that protectionist pressures at the end of the decade (which may be strong 
because of endloading) will be accommodated within GATT based restrictions such as 
safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Already there are several anti-
dumping agreements on products that are restricted under the MF A (Hamilton and 
Whalley 1995). These include sweaters, cotton blouses and shirts from Korea. In 
addition, these new restrictions do not have the advantage of giving rents to exporters. 
Countervailing duties 
Countervailing measures have been rarely used in the EU in contrast to the United 
States. The EU initiated 4 countervailing investigations between 1985 and 1992 
compared with 158 by the United States (GATT 1994). This probably reflects the 
EU' s internal subsidy regimes, which give some member states greater capacity to 
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subsidise than their US counterparts (Pelkmans and Carzaniga 1996). A recent change 
in EU legislation makes countervailing duties easier to use. Decision-making 
procedures for countervailing actions were "streamlined" in March 1994 by being 
reduced to a simple majority vote in the EU Council. This decision was based on the 
Council's finding that the qualified majority requirement could delay and sometimes 
impede efficient action. 
Other changes have made conditions for the use of countervailing measures 
even more strict. In December 1994, the EU introduced new regulations for 
countervailing measures which incorporate WTO provisions, with some 
modifications. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
measures is intended to build on the Tokyo Round Codes of Conduct. Only specific 
subsidies are subject to discipline. Subsidies for research and development, 
environmental adaptations and regional equity are excluded. Disciplines are set out for 
the calculation of the subsidy and of the injury. The time of investigations has been 
limited to 1 year for most cases. If OECD exporters use subsidies of less than 1 per 
cent of value-added, countervailing measures cannot be applied. Provisions are less 
onerous for developing and transitional economies and hence for the EA6. Subsidies 
are allowed if they are not more than 2 per cent of the value-added of a product. 
Subsidies are exempted from countervailing measures if the market penetration ratio 
of the product is less than 4 per cent. The EU' s definition of negligible import 
volumes follows its anti-dumping regulation definitions (see below) where this does 
not conflict with WTO agreements. The export subsidy prohibition will take effect 
from 1 January 2003. 
Anti-dumping 
The anti-dumping code of the EU is based, in principle, on Article VI of the GATT 
which was elaborated in the GATT "anti-dumping code" in the Kennedy Round of 
GATT (1968), renegotiated during the Tokyo Round (1980) and further amended in 
the Uruguay Round. Article VI of the GATT introduces the concept of dumping and 
delineates the permitted response. The Anti-dumping Agreement in the Uruguay 
Round clarifies determination and penalties. Exports are dumped when their price is 
less than the "normal price" of that product. "Normal price" is defined as the price of 
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the firm's product in the exporter's home market. In the absence of domestic sales, the 
normal price is the highest export price to any other export market or the "full cost" of 
production. "Full cost" includes selling costs and a "reasonable" profit. If dumping by 
an exporter causes or threatens material injury to an established domestic industry, a 
country can levy a tariff or enforce a price undertaking on the dumped product. 
Material injury to firms is assessed using various indicators in the alleged dumping 
period, such as percentage change in sales, the ratio of profits to sale and the 
percentage by which the domestic producer price differs from the import price 
(Herander and Schwartz 1984). The tariff must be no greater than the discovered 
dumping margin. 
Anti-dumping measures have several advantages over safeguards for 
protectionist purposes. The GATT and EU Codes are vague in terms of motives for 
dumping, and in calculation of injury and dumping margins. The injury test for anti-
dumping actions is less strict than for safeguards. It is generally agreed that 'serious 
injury' for safeguards requires more injury than 'material injury' for anti-dumping. The 
causation test is less strict than for safeguards. The anti-dumping code sets wider 
limits for the level of emergency protection. Until the Uruguay Round, safeguards 
could not be used selectively or without the right of the exporting country to obtain 
compensation or retaliate, while anti-dumping actions were allowed to be selective 
and had no compensation provisions attached to them since the targeted firms were 
"guilty" of "unfair" trade. 
Motives for dumping 
The rationale behind GATT actions against dumping (Article VI) is that when an 
export price is lower than the domestic price, predatory pricing is taking place. 
Predatory pricing seeks to reduce competition. It is assumed that once a dominant 
position is established, the predator is able to raise prices and reap monopolistic 
profits. Short-term benefits from cheaper imports have to be weighed against long-
term monopolistic costs. Article VI does not allow this comparison. Most national 
anti-dumping rules are concerned only with producer interests. 
The predatory pricing motive is often exaggerated in an international context. 
To engage in predatory pricing, a firm has to be either the only or the main 
international competitor. But as monopolistic rents emerge, the entry of new 
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international competitors is likely to emerge. A dumping strategy, therefore, is 
unlikely to recoup the costs of predatory pricing (Selten 1978). 
Anti-dumping actions encounter problems because there are several reasons 
why a price in the export market may be less than the domestic price in the exporting 
country. Elasticities of demand are different between home and export markets. When 
the elasticity of demand is higher in the home than in the import market, optimal 
pricing would suggest that a firm set a lower price in the export market than in the 
home market. Some firms are monopolists in their home market, but price-takers in 
export markets; thus a monopoly price in the home market may be higher than in 
exports (Deardorff 1989). Ethier (1982) points out that when there is an unexpected 
downturn in the economy, a firm may wish to retain workers even though the value of 
their marginal product is exceeded by their wage. But this is an ambiguous situation. 
If it persists, it could be regarded as "exporting unemployment". An unanticipated 
depreciation in a home currency leads to unanticipated lower prices in export markets. 
In the early 1980s, as the US exchange rate became overvalued, it seemed that all 
imports were being "dumped". If a firm is attempting to establish a market position, 
its low price may augment competition instead of decreasing it. A differentiated 
product may temporarily be sold at below average cost to establish a new brand name. 
If start-up costs are high, a firm may sell below initial average costs to obtain a market 
share that justifies expansion of production. This could appear as dumping to 
importers. 
The GATT Code does not require that the international circumstances or 
actions of the firm be investigated to establish predatory pricing. Evidence of 
predatory pricing is negligible (Lloyd 1977, Caine 1981, Isaac and Smith 1985, 
Hindley 1990) The considerable rise of anti-dumping cases as tariffs fell has hence 
been regarded as prima facie evidence of the use of anti-dumping actions as protection 
against foreign imports. 
EU anti-dumping actions 
As GATT rules have little to say on how countries should calculate alleged "unfair 
trade" transgressions, the EU has devised its own practices. These have been 
sufficient to allow protectionist abuses while satisfying the European Court of Justice 
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that they conform to the EU code which in turn conforms to the GATT anti-dumping 
codes (Norall 1986, Hindley 1988, Bellis et al. 1989, Rowat 1990, Van Bael 1990). 
For example, if a price varies (it may vary over time because of exchange rate 
fluctuations or because importers in importing countries charge different prices), EU 
procedures regard the "normal" price as being the average of all home market prices. 
However in calculating the price of the same product in an export market, no export 
price can be above the calculated "normal" price. This means a positive dumping 
margin will be found even though the mean and variance of the price is the same in 
both the domestic and export markets. Norall (1986) and Nicolaides (1991) have 
documented less than convincing cases of "dumping", including one regarding ball 
bearings from Singapore. 
Discretion given to the EU Commission was reinforced by the secrecy of 
investigations and the absence of internal checks and balances (Murphy 1990). The 
full evidence against exporters was not revealed because it was considered 
'commercially sensitive'. The Council of Ministers has rarely overturned EU 
Commission findings on voluntary export restraints and price undertakings which 
were largely outside its scrutiny. The European Court of Justice did not review the 
economic evidence used as a basis for the EU Commission decision. It only 
adjudicated on matters of principle and it was restricted to deciding whether the EU 
Commission's actions stood up to the Treaty of Rome and Council decisions, not to 
GATT obligations. The Court's recent decisions suggest that it is not an unbiased 
adjudicator and favours the reasoning of the EU Council and the EU Commission 
(Hindley 1988). 
Other procedures used by the EU Commission lend themselves to bias against 
the exporter. Calculations of injury become more complex with highly differentiated 
products, which provide the Commission with greater scope for biases. While EU 
regulations do require a causal link between dumping and injury, they assume that the 
entire fall in domestic consumption has been caused by dumping. They ignore changes 
in relative quality and genuine price advantage of the import (Davenport 1990). A 
simple correlation between an upsurge of imports and a decline in domestic 
production is considered as an adequate material injury test (Messerlin 1988). 
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When the EU Commission is not able to investigate all firms individually, the 
uninvestigated firms of the targeted country also become subject to a declared anti-
dumping duty. The onus is on a firm to show that it is not dumping. European Union 
laws allow exporters to make some undumped sales in the EU and then apply for a 
review of their position. But EU technical regulations virtually prohibit this avenue of 
action. Suppose imports of a product from country X are sold at price P*. The 
Commission investigates this price and finds there is a dumping margin of T per cent, 
that is, the calculated normal price was P*(l+T). But now the penalty is applied like a 
tariff to all exporters from that country. For a new exporter to make an "undumped" 
sale it has to sell at the "normal" price and add the T per cent penalty on top, that is, 
P*( 1+T)(1 + T). If a sale can be achieved at this price then the duty will be lifted. With 
the size of dumping margins calculated in the EU, there is little chance a sale could be 
made at the EU "normal" price. 
An EU Commission investigation may not lead to anti-dumping duties or price 
undertakings, if it is found that this would not be in the EU' s interest, or that it is has 
not harmed the domestic industry. Between 1981 and 1990, however, the lack of proof 
of damage led to the waiving of countermeasures in less than 18 per cent of cases. 
Conversely, anti-dumping measures were taken in almost all cases in which producers 
were found to be injured by the imports (Grossman 1993). 
The EU introduced anti-circumvention provisions in 1987. These allowed 
duties to be imposed on imported components and parts for assembly operations 
which have started up following the opening of an anti-dumping investigation. The 
value of the parts originating in the country subject to the anti-dumping duty had to be 
at least 60 per cent. Not only do these provisions provide for an extension of anti-
dumping rules but they provide an incentive for foreign investors to source inputs 
locally. The EC's anti-circumvention rules were the subject of a complaint in GATT 
by Japan. The 1990 panel ruling was that the EU measures were incompatible with the 
GATT. 
Quantification of the EU's anti-dumping actions 
The Commission pursued 547 anti-dumping actions between 1981and1995 (Table 
5.3). 
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Table 5.3 Number of anti-dumping investigations initiated by the EU, by source of import 
1990-95 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
EFTA 1 1 n.a n.a. 
USA 1 
Japan 3 5 1 2 
Former centrally planned 2 6 13 5 11 8 
economies 
Mediterranean 9 1 3 2 
Latin American 6 l 1 l 
South East Asia 17 7 19 11 24 27 
Other 4 1 2 
Total 43 20 39 21 42 37 
Source: Moebius, U., 1996. 'European Union anti-dumping policies', Economic Bulletin, German 
Institute for Economic Research, 33(5): 29-36. 
Anti-dumping measures have resulted in much higher levels of protection than 
tariffs. Over the period 1980-89 Messerlin and Reed (1995) found that the average 
anti-dumping duties applied in the EU was nearly 18 per cent. Such high duties can be 
expected to reduce export sales. Messerlin (1988) found that over the period 1980-85 
EC anti-dumping measures reduced import quantities by 18 per cent after the first year 
of the initiation of an investigation and by 50 per cent of initial sales after 5 years. 
The value of trade subject to such action has been rising sharply. The 1988 
case against Japanese and East Asian imports of photocopiers involved US$ 1 billion 
of trade and the case concerning imports of dot matrix printers involved US$1.3 
billion. In 1994, EU imports valued at 9 billion ECU were affected by dumping 
actions. While this was equivalent to 2.2 per cent of all manufactured imports from 
non-members, they were of greater concern to targeted exporting countries 
particularly because there appears to be a bias in the countries exposed to anti-
dumping actions. That the EA6 countries appear to have become the EU's favourite 
targets has been noted by several commentators (Hindley 1988; Messerlin 1988; 
Koopman and Scharrer 1989; Moebius 1996). Between 1992 and 1994, Korea was the 
third most targeted country after the United States and China. The other EA6 were 
among the top fifteen countries targeted. In 1994, ECU 4.5 billion of imports that 
were subject to anti-dumping duties came from Japan. This was followed by South 
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Korea at ECU 1.5 billion. If the incidence of anti-dumping is measured against total 
manufactured goods exports of the country in question, that is, import coverage ratios, 
almost 20 per cent of Korea's exports were affected by anti-dumping actions in 1994. 
It was one of the two hardest hit countries, the other being Pakistan (Table 5.4). 
Table 5 .4 Anti-dumping actions as a share of total EU imports of industrial goods from sources 
subject to anti-dumping measure, 1992, 1993 and 1994 (per cent) 
1992 1993 1994 
Indonesia 0.6 0.4 4.5 
Malaysia 7.6 2.6 1.6 
Korea 9.7 15.7 18.3 
Singapore 6.1 1.7 0.4 
Thailand 6.4 6 5.3 
Taiwan 1.2 0.6 0.6 
Total of all countries facing 3.3 3.2 3.5 
anti-dumping 
Source: Moebius, U., 1996. European Union anti-dumping policies', Economic Bulletin, German 
Institute for Economic Research, 33(5): 29-36. 
These figures do not capture the voluntary export restraints or "voluntary" 
price undertakings to which threats of anti-dumping can lead (Messerlin 1988). The 
first EU voluntary export restraint outside textiles, clothing and steel was applied to 
video cassette recorders from Japan and was triggered by an anti-dumping suit 
brought in December 1982 by the Association of Firms with a Common Interest in 
Video 2000 (Wolf 1989b, Herander and Schwartz 1984). The fear of an anti-dumping 
action may cause a foreign supplier to avoid an aggressive pricing policy designed to 
increase foreign sales (Grimwade 1995). 
An investigation can lead to substantial costs for exporters in providing 
detailed information about export and domestic sales, along with the legal costs of 
fighting an action. Increasing lengths of time of anti-dumping investigations constitute 
a barrier. Of the 363 investigations between 1980 and 1988, 200 were terminated 
within one year. Of the 40 investigations launched between mid-1987 and mid-1988, 
only two were terminated within a year. 
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The subject of anti-dumping measures has changed over time with the 
composition of exports (Table 5.5). Traditionally they affected products such as 
chemicals, iron and steel, but the most prominent items in the recent past have been 
consumer electronics or office machinery products such as computer printers and 
copiers. Recently anti-dumping actions have been initiated against Thailand and 
Indonesian textiles imports which were already restricted by the MFA. 
Table 5 .5 Anti-dumping actions in the EU, by selected commodity group (value of imports and 
percentage of lines affected) 
Commodity group 1994 Import coverage ratio1 
imports 
$million 1992 1993 1994 
chemicals nes 3.1 2.0 4.6 
paper 13691 5.3 3.9 3.2 
textiles 11606 4.3 4.0 19.6 
footwear 5410 2.6 3.5 4.5 
articles of stone and plaster 1099 0.2 0.1 0.1 
iron and steel 9251 3.8 5.3 5.1 
other base metals 916 2.6 2.7 6.1 
machinery and metal appliances 70643 5.1 3.5 2.7 
electrical machinery, electronics 56488 10.7 11.3 10.1 
road vehicles 24648 0.2 0.4 
optical and measuring instruments 17370 3.8 2.8 2.7 
clocks and watches 3026 0.4 0.2 
miscellaneous manufactures 1368 3.0 3.1 3.5 
all industrial goods 413698 3.3 3.2 3.5 
Notes: 1 Countries subjected to anti-dumping actions. 
Source: Moebius, U., 1996. European Union anti-dumping policies', Economic Bulletin, German 
Institute for Economic Research, 33(5): 29-36. 
The Uruguay Round agreement on anti-dumping has established clearer and 
more detailed rules for the determination of dumping. There are requirements that 
allowances be made for the high start-up costs of new products in the early stages of 
production. New provisions address some aspects of procedures to establish the 
"normal price". New measures aim to ensure that "exchange rate dumping" is not 
subject to anti-dumping measures. The Agreement introduces a de minimus 
requirement providing for the termination of an investigation where the margin of 
dumping, the volume of dumped imports, or the injury is negligible. There are stricter 
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procedures for reimbursing exporters who pay an anti-dumping duty which turns out 
to be greater than the estimated margin of dumping. Exporters from a country subject 
to anti-dumping measures who seek to enter the foreign market will no longer 
automatically pay the highest rate of anti-dumping duty applying to those exports. A 
key issue was the issue of anti-circumvention rules. The matter was not resolved in the 
Uruguay Round and has been referred to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices. 
In the meanwhile countries are free to apply such measures, although the EU' s 1987 
measures are subject to the 1990 panel ruling (see earlier). 
Although the Uruguay Round agreement has led to improvements in some 
areas, some of the worst biases in past practices have not been adequately addressed 
(Grimwade 1996). These include the method of calculating the dumping margin with 
its upward biases and the weakness of the injury clause. The Agreement also limited 
the task of the disputes panel to determining whether or not the facts in an anti-
dumping action were established in an unbiased and objective manner. This will make 
it difficult for an exporting country to secure a favourable panel ruling unless the 
importing country has acted in a way that is clearly inconsistent with the GATT 
(Schott 1994). 
The EU has made further changes to its voting rules in 1994, which will make 
recourse to anti-dumping measures easier. The threshold for anti-dumping duties has 
been reduced to a simple majority vote. This decision was based on the Council's 
finding that the qualified majority requirement could delay and sometimes impede 
efficient action. According to Koopman (1995), however, this was the price for 
France's agreement to the agricultural package in the Uruguay Round. 
New provisions allow for the suspension of anti-dumping measures if the 
injury is not likely to resume as a result of suspension of duties. If the countries' 
individual market penetration ratio is less than 1 per cent, then measures will not be 
initiated unless the collective market share of such countries represents more than 3 
per cent. This is lower than the respective Uruguay Round Agreement limits of 3 and 
7 per cent. 
New EU regulations also address issues not regulated in the Uruguay 
Agreement such as absorption and circumvention. Circumvention is defined as a 
change in trade patterns due to a practice, process or work for which there is 
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insufficient cause or economic justification, apart from the imposition of the duty. 
They allow for duties to be extended to imports of like products and parts, if existing 
measures are circumvented. The substantive criteria governing the extension of duties 
require that the parts imported constitute at least 60 per cent of the total value of parts 
and that the value added in the EU is not more than 25 per cent of manufacturing cost. 
Where the usual most favoured nation duties have to be paid on the imported 
components, the effective rate of duty on the assembled product will often be 
considerably higher than the nominal anti-dumping duty. 
Rules of Origin 
The original purpose of rules of origin was to defend the preferences given to 
members of preferential agreements, where each of the members retained their own 
trade policies vis a vis non-members (in contrast to customs unions). Non-members 
had an incentive to practice "trade deflection", that is, to export to more restrictive 
members through less restrictive members. The EU has strict rules of origin in its 
preferential agreements. 
Non-preferential rules of origin are now also applied in the EU customs union 
in the context of specific trade measures which may be circumvented by assembly 
plants in the EU. For example, if an anti-dumping action has been introduced against a 
product from a specified source and the product is then produced within the EU, it is 
necessary to determine whether the product comes from the targeted source and is 
subject to the duty. 
If all inputs into a product come from one country, there is no difficulty in 
determining a product's origin. When a product incorporates inputs from other 
countries, then one or more of three tests may be used to determine its "origin", The 
"change in tariff heading" rule provides that a product is considered to have originated 
in a country where it undergoes a change of tariff heading. An example would be 
conversion of yarn to fabric. The "value-added system" involves setting up a 
minimum value-added content, often 40 to 60 per cent, to confer origin from that 
country. The "specific process" criterion means that a product is considered to 
originate in that country where a list of specified operations were carried out. 
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The EEA rules of origin illustrate the baroque nature of EU rules (Woolcock 
1996a). The Agreement used both change of tariff heading and value-added criteria. 
The four-digit harmonised system of tariff headings was used for changes in tariff 
headings. The additional value-added criteria applied to chemicals, where a number of 
products required 50 per cent value-added, and for a wide range of investment goods 
and industrial products, where 60 per cent value-added was often required. For 
example, electronic goods, non-electrical machinery and automobiles all required that 
60 per cent of value was added in an EEA country. For some products, the exporter 
could choose between a combination of change in tariff heading and lower value-
added criterion, or a higher value-added criterion. The Agreement used the EU's "roll-
up" system. Once a product was determined as coming from the EEA, its value as an 
input into another product in the EEA was 100 per cent EBA, regardless of its actual 
EEA content. Article 5 of the EEA Agreement included a list of practices that were 
not sufficient to contribute to origin. These included packaging or simple assembly. 
The practical definition of "simple assembly" was screwing or glueing items together. 
There was no exemption even for very low-value products for which "screwdriver" 
processes might have represented a large part of value-added. Items that underwent 
some processes outside the EEA and were then reimported were considered as EEA as 
long as the outward-process was no more than 10 per cent of value-added. These 
outward processing provisions did not, however, apply to clothing and textiles. 
Though the basic purpose of these rules of origin was to prevent trade 
deflection, Woolcock (1996a) argues that the considerable discretion in the 
application of all three types of rules of origin provide substantial scope for capture by 
protectionist interests. Preferential rules of origin have thus been recognised as being 
more susceptible than other, more transparent measures, to influence by domestic 
protectionist interests (Palmeter 1993). To a considerable extent this happened in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (Young 1994). 
It can be argued that the degree of automaticity in the change of tariff heading 
rule adds clarity and reduces the discretionary power of the authority compared with 
the other rules so that it provides less scope for the use of rules of origin as an 
instrument of protection. The harmonised system of tariffs used in all major OECD 
countries has enhanced the usefulness of this rule. The difficulties lie in the level of 
134 
tariff category in which the change should occur (2, 4, 6 or even 8 digit). It would be 
arbitrary to choose one level for all products because there are substantial differences 
in product content between tariff headings at one level. These change as production 
processes develop. The need for flexibility provides leeway for protectionist pressures 
(yY oolcock 1996). 
In value-added rules, the minimum level chosen is arbitrary and can change 
because of exchange rate changes and the volatile price of such inputs as raw 
materials. The minimum level may be very high. For example the rules of origin in the 
1973 EU-EFTA Agreements were said to have unnecessarily high requirements of 
value originating within EFT A. In some cases the rules disqualified goods with value 
as high as 96 per cent originating within the EU-EFT A. The arbitrary nature of the 
value-added criteria may lead to trade diversion in the intermediate goods used in the 
product (Lloyd 1993; Krishna and Krueger 1995). 
The specific process method is transparent compared to the other methods. 
Once the processes that are important have been designated, it is only a matter of 
confirming that the process was carried out in a country. But changes in production 
technique create problems, particularly because the tendency is to pick an expensive 
process that is subject to cost-cutting technological developments. The choice of "the 
significant process" also represents an opportunity for the domestic industry to 
introduce an element of protection. Deciding this question for every product is also 
extremely laborious. 
Administrative costs for all types of rules of origin can impose additional 
transaction costs on traders seeking to document that they satisfy rules of origin. The 
value-added rule can be particularly costly because of the accounting work needed to 
assess value-added. One study found that the costs associated with testing and 
documentation were so high for goods moving from EFT A to the EU that exporters 
paid the MFN tariff on one quarter of exports rather than satisfy the input 
requirements and do the paperwork necessary for duty-free entry (Herin 1986). 
The EU's non-preferential rules of origin were set out in 1968 in Commission 
Regulation 802/68/EC. When member states could not agree, the decision on a 
product's origin was made by the Commission. In contrast to anti-dumping cases, no 
effective review procedure is available to the exporter. Woolcock (1996a) argues that 
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the discretionary power of the Commission has made non-preferential rules of origin 
into a potential instrument of protection. Although the regulation has only been used 
13 times between 1968 and 1990, the dormant power of this rule is seen in the highly 
visible integrated circuits case in 1989/90. In this case the EU used the specific 
processes approach. In its decision, the Commission ruled that the diffusion process in 
the manufacture of the integrated circuit chip had to be carried out in the EU to qualify 
for EU origin. The alternative of specifying a value-added criterion was not used. This 
was seen by exporters and consumers of the chip within the EU as a change in practice 
to enable the rules of origin to be used as a protectionist device. The ensuing debate 
contributed to the inclusion of the rules of origin in the Uruguay Round. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement aimed at long-term harmonisation of rules of 
origin and at ensuring that they do not create unnecessary obstacles to trade. Rules are 
to be made objective, understandable and predictable. Information is to be provided 
on the rules and any modifications of them. Positive standards are to be used, that is, 
rules should indicate what defines origin, not what does not. It was thought that this 
was less open to abuse than negative rules. Countries should provide a means by 
which potential exporters can assess origin before they start exporting. Assessments 
should be carried out within 150 days. These changes may curtail the discretionary 
powers of the Commission somewhat. 
The Agreement also requires that each member should provide for an 
independent review of decisions for exporters. This would be an innovation for the 
EU. The general WTO dispute settlement procedure is to apply to rules of origin. 
The Agreement sets up a harmonisation programme on non-preferential rules 
of origin to be completed within three years of initiation. In the interim period, a set of 
principles on transparency, and impartial and reasonable application are expected to 
be followed. Once the harmonised rules are developed it will be necessary to apply 
them so that the EU would have to abandon its rules of origin covering anti-dumping 
and public procurement. 
A major weakness in the rules of origin Agreement was the exclusion of 
preferential trading rules. In non-preferential trading rules, the key issue is whether 
harmonised rules can be developed. Given existing differences in the use of rules of 
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origin it is likely that some discretion will remain. There will, for example, continue 
to be leeway with regard to the application of rules of origin. 
Technical barriers 
Technical regulations laid down by national or sub-national regulatory authorities are 
mandatory. They take the form of minimum levels of protection for health and safety. 
An example is the fitting of a driver's side airbag in cars. In more recent times there 
has been an increase in the use of technical regulation associated with environmental 
policies. Suppliers have to modify their products to fit the requirements of national 
markets. Such regulations may not necessarily be protectionist in intention if they are 
imposed on valid health, safety and environmental grounds. 
Technical standards are voluntary norms or codes approved by a legitimate 
authority such as an industry institution. Standards are targetted at promoting 
compatibility of equipment and the quality of a product or process. Standard marks are 
used to distinguish products that meet a standard. An Australian example is the 
stickers put on fruits and vegetables that comply with organic farming processes 
according to one of three standard-making bodies: the Biological Farmers' 
Association, the Bio-dynamic Research Institute and the National Australian 
Standards for Sustainable Agriculture. Conforming to a standard may be one way of 
complying with a technical regulation. Customers discriminate against products which 
do not bear such marks. In some cases, insurance companies lower premiums when a 
product passes a standard. Thus, as Woolcock argues, although standards are 
voluntary, it is likely to be necessary to conform to them to obtain market access 
(Woolcock 1996b). 
Technical barriers can substitute for other non-tariff barriers in several ways. 
Technical barriers can be a barrier to trade if they are non-transparent or if producers 
in non-member countries are not given early access to the information on the new 
standards (Shams 1995). Standards can be drafted in such a way that only national 
suppliers can satisfy them in the short run (Greenaway 1991). Regulation aimed at 
protecting environment and health can encompass unnecessary requirements so that 
suppliers who produce goods with adequate, but lower safety standards, are excluded 
from a market. If testing to determine whether products comply with a technical 
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regulation or standard is onerous or inequitable, it can be used as a barrier to trade. 
Several perceived technical trade barriers maintained by EU members have been 
reported to the GATT by non-members. 
In 1988, some 100,000 different standards were operating in the EU (Emerson 
et al. 1988). They were rated by EU businessmen to be more important than customs 
and administrative costs and government procurement restrictions in hindering intra-
EU trade (Emerson et al. 1988). Technical barriers are found to be particularly 
important in capital and skill-intensive sectors. New standards legislation reflects the 
growing importance of environmental concerns with regard to trade and production. 
Core elements of a 1994 directive on the environment are to be implemented through 
new regulations. The EU requires eco-labelling on all leather imports, including 
highly processed leather manufactures (Low and Yeats 1995). 
In the 1970s the EC sought to harmonise regulation of member-states. The 
EU' s favoured approach to eliminating the effects of technical barriers on intra-EU 
trade was "harmonisation". This involved developing total and detailed unification of 
product standards. It was a laborious and time-consuming process because it was 
difficult to obtain agreement between countries, with diverse perceptions of risk and 
national industry design standards (Pelkmans 1990). "Mineral water" took 11 years to 
define. Other categories harmonised include cars, motorcycles, tractors, some 
chemicals, some food products and some standards for medicines. A "new approach", 
initiated in 1985, was to involve only essential health and safety objectives and 
encouraged the use of mutual recognition (see chapter 3). The Single European Act 
further endorsed mutual recognition. A common testing and certification system 
("global approach") has gradually been added. 
Non-member imports, if their products are accepted under the local regulations 
of one country are to be accepted throughout the EU. Non-members can choose the 
EU member that has the easiest technical requirements and enter the EU market 
through it. Judicial review has applied mutual recognition to products for which no 
directives exist and which enjoy "equivalent" health and safety protection among 
member states. 
As set down in the "Global Approach to Certification and Testing", adopted in 
December 1989, the EU aims to employ full mutual recognition of testing for non-
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members. In conformity with the 1979 GATT Agreement, national treatment is 
provided for tests of products of non-member countries. The EA6 products which fall 
into sectors where mutual recognition is achieved will have to go through only one set 
of EU tests. The acceptance of a non-EU test is conditional upon mutual recognition 
agreements that have not been signed as yet between the EU and any non-member. 
Given the technological expertise required to match EC testing processes, especially 
in regard to higher technology goods, the potential for drawing up agreements is 
stronger in Singapore, Korea and Taiwan than in the other EA6 countries. 
The 1979 GATT Code on Technical Barriers required countries to treat foreign 
suppliers at least as favourably as national suppliers. In an effort to promote the 
coordination of international standard-making the Uruguay Round Agreement 
contained a code of good practice for standard-making. This is binding for 
government institutions, but remains voluntary for private standard-making bodies. 
The Uruguay Round consolidated notification procedures, thus building on existing 
transparency provisions. It strengthened the requirement to provide least restrictive 
measures by offering a definition of a least restrictive measure. Technical regulations 
should not be more trade-restrictive than was necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking into account the risks non-fulfilment would create. It encourages, without 
requiring its use, mutual recognition. It calls for recognition of test results. 
The EU conforms to the GATT rules but as Woolcock (1993) points out the 
looseness of multilateral rules makes compliance with them relatively easy. He 
suggests that "the EC poses a challenge to the multilateral system in that it represents 
a regional and partial global hegemon in the field of technical barriers to trade" 
(Woolcock 1993:549). 
Government procurement 
Government procurement rules involve products such as telecommunications 
equipment and office machines that are of interest to the EA6. During the 1970s, the 
EU directives sought to enhance transparency and non-preferential bidding for public 
contracts, but had little effect on procurement practices. In 1986, the penetration of 
imports in this sector was much lower than in the private sector, ranging from 1 per 
cent in Italy to 21 per cent in Belgium. The SEM envisaged the strengthening of 
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existing measures and the widening of coverage of services and public service 
utilities. The public services directive does not contain reciprocity conditions, but the 
utilities directive explicitly favours EU over non-member producers. Foreign bids 
have to contain at least 50 per cent local content and a preferential cost margin of 3 
per cent is allowed to EU firms. European Union origin rules apply. Although there is 
explicit discrimination against non-members, it can be argued that the Community 
scheme in public procurement should provide better access to foreign firms than the 
previous national schemes (Hoeller and Louppe 1994). 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, a new Agreement on Government 
Procurement came into force at the beginning of 1996 but it is optional. The new code 
extends the coverage of the old code ten-fold. Services and construction are to be 
covered for the first time. Coverage is to be partially extended to sub-federal 
government levels and government-owned utilities. The cornerstone of the Agreement 
is "national treatment". The bids of another country must receive the same treatment 
as the bids of national companies. The EU and Korea have signed the Agreement. 
Postscript 
While the Uruguay Round represents a commitment by all signatory countries 
to reduce the restrictions on world trade, in the past the EU and other 
countries have reduced tariffs according to multilateral agreements but 
simultaneously increased some NTBs, offsetting the value of tariff reductions. 
Institutional changes agreed upon in the Uruguay Round may promote 
the enforcement of the Agreement better than previous Rounds by the 
formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It will hopefully provide 
a more robust infrastructure for dispute settlement than was previously 
available. Protectionist measures toward individual countries are to be subject 
to greater multilateral disciplines and more transparency in particular. The 
previous rule of adopting panel reports by consensus has been replaced by the 
converse rule that a panel report can only be rejected by consensus. In dispute 
settlements, firm time limits apply to the various stages of the process. The 
agreement also provides for a monitoring body through the trade policy 
review mechanism. 
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Backsliding into protectionism occurs because of the nature of the 
political process. Those who stand to lose from adjustment are usually well-
organised and vocal; their arguments which focus on the immediate and 
visible cost of adjustment are politically persuasive. Hence, costs are easier to 
shift onto politically weaker groups such as consumers (Banks 1984; Hansen 
1990). The difficulties that governments face in resisting protectionist 
pressures and addressing the economy-wide implications of liberalisation also 
stem in part from the fragmented nature of the bureaucracy. In most industrial 
countries, governmental arrangements for dealing with industry and trade 
policy matters tend to involve many institutions. Each advice-giving 
institution tends to focus reactively on industry-specific issues prompted by 
representations made by "client" industries experiencing competitive 
pressures. In this situation, the focus of policy attention is the visible short-
term adjustment problems of specific industries and there is not much 
consideration of the wider domestic consequences of specific trade initiatives 
under consideration (Messerlin 1981; Carmichael and Rattigan 1996). 
It has been suggested that the EU Commission is less vulnerable to 
these internal pressures than a national government and that now that it 
controls trade policy (with the formation of the SEM), the EU will be more 
open (Nedergaard 1991). As guardian of the EC Treaties, it is the EU 
Commission's duty to see that trade policy is liberal. Article 110 of the Treaty 
declares that "by establishing a customs union between themselves the 
Member States intend to contribute, in conformity with the common interest, 
to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international exchange and the lowering of customs barriers". 
In addition, internal liberalisation has been spearheaded by the EU 
Commission, which could be a sign of a more favourable attitude towards 
external liberalisation. The evidence does not support this view of the 
Commission thus far. Its stance on areas outside manufactures, notably the 
Common Agricultural Policy, is also an example par excellence of the 
tenacity and influence of protectionist views in the Commission. The EC's 
obstinacy over agricultural protection caused considerable delays in the 
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Uruguay Round of trade talks, suggesting weak support for generally freer 
trade. The coal and steel sector is also highly protected. 
The transfer of all trade policy to the EU level in 1992 could have 
more protectionist effects, in that, EU policy tends to be drawn towards the 
lowest common denominator. In the 1980s there was a tendency for the EU 
Commission to respond to the growing trade actions of the most protectionist 
members of the Community (Hine 1985). For example there were many 
voluntary export restraints and other barriers between EC member states and 
Japan on videocassette recorders in the early 1980s. France, in particular, 
required customs clearance of all video cassette recorders through a small 
post in the inland town of Poitiers. The EC negotiated the 1983 Community-
wide voluntary export restraint because it was keen to exert its authority and 
was fearful that it would have to defend these indefensible French measures in 
the GATT, even though it had no responsibility for introducing them (Hindley 
1986; Wolf 1989b). Almost any industry is sensitive in at least one EU 
country and the inevitable results of the "log rolling" are that these 
sensitivities are reflected in EU trade policy. Not only are there member 
country pressures, but EU-wide bodies ("Euro-groups") lobby the EU 
Commission for particular industries (McLaughlin et al. 1993). 
The Uruguay Round agreements of the EU and other major trading 
countries are, hence, not afait accompli. The scope for replacing barriers that 
have been integrated into the GA TT is endless. For example, the US justified 
its recent unilateral action against Japan on motor vehicles on the ground that 
many of the Japanese barriers in question were beyond the authority of the 
WTO. 
While there is an understanding that any new protectionist measures and the 
abuse of contingent measures will be brought into the next round of trade talks, 
today's non-tariff barriers are only caught up with in tomorrow's negotiations. 
Since the signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement in Marrakesh, participants 
in the WTO have met in Singapore in December 9-13, 1996. While several issues 
were not addressed there in an substantive manner , highlights of the discussions held 
there include the endorsement of a proposed Information Technology Agreement by 
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key WTO members. This augurs well for the future of the WTO as it shows the ability 
of members to compromise on a key issue. Another success of this meeting was the 
ability of the Asian countries to maintain their stand on excluding non-trade issues in 
the WTO in the face of pressure from developed countries. In particular with regard to 
labour standards the meeting adopted a consensus declaration that the International 
Labour Organisation is the appropriate forum for this issue, that labour standards 
should not be used for protectionist purposes, that the comparative advantage of low 
wage countries should not be put into question, and the meeting did not endorse 
inscribing a relationship between trade and labour issues onto the WTO agenda. 
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6 Modelling EU and EA6 trade policy 
interactions 
A multi-country computable general equilibrium model, Computed Analysis of 
Trade Options (CATO), was designed to evaluate the costs and benefits to the 
EA6 and the EU of taking different paths in trade policy. As analytical theorems 
show the costs and benefits of preferential agreements to be indeterminate, an 
empirical investigation is necessary to indicate the directions and magnitudes of 
likely costs and benefits. 
The computable general equilibrium approach has several advantages 
over a partial equilibrium approach. A partial equilibrium analysis would look at 
supply, demand and market equilibrium in only one commodity or factor market 
at a time. This study is concerned with changes in trade patterns in all 
manufacturing sectors. 
Most often, partial equilibrium approaches are unable to provide 
economy-wide implications, or if they do, the impact on the whole economy is 
estimated by aggregating the results from each market. They ignore the 
interdependencies between markets. These spillover effects between markets are 
the essence of general equilibrium models. Computable general equilibrium 
models capture different degrees of economy-wide flexibility in different 
countries in their representation of inter-sectoral connections. In preferential 
trade agreements, the effect on non-member countries' trade centres on the 
relative strengths of trade creation, trade diversion and income effects. One of 
the key disadvantages of a partial equilibrium approach is that there is no 
systemic link between these effects. Income changes are usually inserted ad hoc 
so that the impact on trade flows tends to depend crucially on the chosen value 
of the income effect (Pohl and Sorsa 1992). A general equilibrium approach 
captures the missing links because all the effects come from one source: the 
initial policy shock. 
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"Macroeconomic" models in contrast to the partial equilibrium approach 
model all sectors and activities in an economy. A change in any sector feeds into 
the rest of the economy through relationships between variables in the model. 
All sectors of the economy adjust and a new equilibrium is attained. But the 
level of aggregation in most macroeconomic models is too broad for trade policy 
analysis of the kind contemplated here. Macroeconomic models usually model 
all goods by one representative good where as trade policy differs by industry 
thus the resource allocation effects across sectors would not be captured in a 
macroeconomic model. 
Most CGE models that analyse the implications of changes in the global 
economy and trade policies on a single country have modelled only that country. 
To incorporate foreign competition in the EU and EA6 markets, the CATO 
model is multi-country. The CATO model also captures the indirect effects of 
policy changes in the EU and EA6 through the effects on third countries. Since 
the EA6 and the EU have much larger trade flows with other regions than with 
each other, having other countries in the model is important. For example, the 
model can show the impact on Taiwan of an increase in EU trade barriers 
towards China. Taiwan both competes with China in the EU market and has a 
strong trade relationship with China . These links work in different ways on 
Taiwanese welfare: Taiwan may gain market shares from China in the EU 
market, but the adverse effect of the EU' s greater restrictiveness towards China 
may affect Taiwan's trade with China negatively. Multi-country models also 
allow comparisons between the effects of shocks on principal countries and 
other countries which may give valuable insights. 
Although debate continues on the appropriateness of model 
specifications, parameter choices and the representation of policy measures, 
multi-country CGE models have become widely used to assess the impacts of 
changes in external trade policies. Multi-country models include a global model 
by Whalley ( 1985), the V aruna model of the World Bank (Mercenier and 
Waelbroeck 1986), the Walras model of OECD countries (Bumiaux et al. 1988), 
the model of Asian developing economies (Vincent et al. 1991), the Salter 
model of the global economy (Zeitsch et al. 1991) and the GT AP model (Hertel 
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et al. 1995). The CATO model is a world trade model incorporating several 
separately modelled countries. Its structure is based on the Banks et al. (1990) 
and Vincent et al. (1991) models. The diaggregation of the regions and 
industries in the Vincent model was not appropriate for this study so an entirely 
new database was built. In addition, the model incorporates updating equations 
which allows the use of a more sophisticated solution procedure than the 
Johansen method (see further). 
Basic concepts 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are descendants of linear 
programming models. Linear programming models, based on input-output data, 
provide a consistent, economy-wide, sectoral picture that captures the major 
elements of interdependence between real flows of goods and services. Subject 
to various technological and physical constraints, these models were used by 
central planners to regulate quantity variables in a system. Such models have 
limited value for market economies, where many agents maximise their welfare 
functions independently and jointly and thus establish a market equilibrium. In 
market economies policymakers use market-based prices, including taxes and 
tariffs, to influence resource allocation. Linear programming models cannot 
explicitly represent policies because they do not contain price variables. 
Although computable general equililbrium models are built around 
input-output interdependencies between sectors, they represent the operation of 
a market economy. The model solution is a set of prices and associated 
quantities which makes the individual optimisations mutually consistent and 
clears all factor and product markets. Computable general equilibrium models 
capture interdependence of decision-making throughout the economy. The 
structure of production, consumption, government revenue and expenditure, and 
foreign trade, are modelled. Computable general equilibrium models emphasise 
the optimising behaviour of individual economic agents, not that of a central 
planner. Whenever the government intervenes or an exogenous shock occurs, 
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resources are reallocated across all markets of the economy, with efficiency and 
distributional consequences. 
Another limitation of linear programming models was that solutions 
were characterised by extreme specialisation in production and consumption. 
Computable general equilibrium models, using non-linear equations, avoid these 
corner solutions. A useful analogy is the difference between the well-known 
Ricardo trade model with its corner solutions and the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
model with its specialisations. 
In their original form CGE models incorporate neoclassical assumptions. 
The behavioural assumptions of the model involve cost minimisation by 
households and firms and the assumption that there is sufficient competition for 
unit profits (at market prices) to be driven to zero. Certain key aspects of an 
economy have been only partially integrated into the Walrasian theory of general 
equilibrium. Full integration would involve the incorporation of these aspects 
into the rational behaviour of individual agents. Examples of these include 
unemployment, the government, a money illusion and imperfect competition. 
These aspects must be inserted exogenously if they are important to the problem 
being analysed. Typically the government sector is incorporated because most 
models are used to assess government policies. Both the pre-shock and post-
shock equilibria are second best because they include the distortions of 
government policies. The model can also incorporate equilibria that include 
unemployment. But although exogenous features may improve the model's 
empirical validity, the results become more difficult to interpret. 
Methods for solving CGE models 
To date, CGE models fall into two groups according to the way in which they 
are solved: those that are solved in levels and those that are solved in 
logarithmic differentials or percentage changes. The first type is used widely by 
the World Bank (Dervis et al. 1982). The second type was pioneered by 
Johansen in his model of the Norwegian economy (Johansen 1960). 
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Johansen transformed the model equations into log-linear form and 
solved them by matrix inversion. The advantage of the Johansen approximation 
is that computational techniques for solving linear systems do not place 
restrictions on the size of the model and its modifications. The mechanisms 
underlying the results are easier to understand and explain in policy terms. When 
several policy changes are being studied, the separate effects of each can be 
decomposed additively. The disadvantage of the Johansen method was that it 
produced only approximate solutions and gave no information on the size of the 
approximation errors. This problem becomes more acute as the size of a shock 
increases. It has been argued that the experience of the ORANI model suggests 
that approximation errors, even for large shocks, were not so big as to merit the 
additional resources needed to correct them (Dixon et al. 1982). 
New methods have, however, evolved to deal with this problem. The 
Gragg multi-step method is accordingly used to solve the CATO model 
(Harrison and Pearson 1994). Essentially this breaks up a shock into several 
segments and applies one segment at a time, calculating the impact to the 
economy after each segment. This captures the curvature of equations and leads 
to smaller errors in estimation. 
Multi-step solutions are obtained by solving these equations several 
times while Johansen solutions are calculated by solving the linearised equations 
of the model once. As explained by Harrison and Pearson (1994:2-29), the 
system of linearised equations in the model can be written in the form 
Cz = 0 (1) 
where 
C is the n x m matrix of coefficients of the equations, known as the 
Equations Matrix. 
z is them x 1 vector of all the variables (usually in percentage change 
form) of the model, 
n is the total number of equations, 
m is the total number of variables 
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Generally n is less than min the set of equations in (1), so that for a solution (m-
n) variables must be specified as exogenous and the remaining variables as 
endogenous. Because the equations are usually non-linear, the results of 
Johansen calculation are only approximations to the corresponding solution of 
the levels equations of the model. 
After the choice of the exogenous/endogenous split, the system of 
equations 
Cz 
A.zl 
= 
= 
0, becomes 
-D.z2 (2) 
where z 1 and z2 are respectively the column vectors of endogenous and 
exogenous variables, A is n x n and D is n x (m-n). The columns of the matrices 
A and D are just the columns of C corresponding to the endogenous and 
exogenous variables respectively. The shocks are values to use for z2. Once 
these are known, the system 
A.zl = b (3) 
is to be solved (where bis an n x 1 vector). It is the solution zl of this matrix 
equation (3) which is the Johansen solution of the simulation. 
The multi-step simulation breaks the shock into several smaller parts. In 
each step the equations are solved for each of these parts of the original shock. 
After each step the equilibrium position of the economy is recalculated,that is 
the dataset, shares and elasticities are adjusted to take into account the changes 
from the previous step. In general, the results gain in accuracy as the number of 
steps is increased. 
This can be illustrated in Figure 6.1 which is adapted from Harrison and 
Pearson (1994:5-2). The exogenous variable is X and the endogenous variable is 
Y. These variables are constrained to stay on the curve g(X,Y)=O. The variables 
start from their initial values at point A that is XO and YO. Suppose X is shocked 
from XO to Xl. The exact solution is on the curve g at point B where X=Xl and 
Y=Yl. In a the solution calculated by the Johansen method (1-step) the point 
reached is on the straight line Abj which is tangent to the curve at point A. The 
solution is at Bj where X=Xl and Y=Yj. In the solution calculated using the 
Euler method (2-step) the first step calculations are represented by going along 
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the tangent to the curve at point A till we get to point C. In the second step we 
follow line CBg which is parallel to the tangent to curve g at the point directly 
underneath point C. The Euler method allows us to reach point Bg after step 2. 
Bg is considerably closer to the curve than Bj. The Gragg method uses the same 
principle but more than tw steps so it gets even closer to the exact solution. 
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Figure 6.1 Multi-step method compared to Johansen method 
y 
Yj Bj 
Yl 
g(X,Y)=O 
YO 
XO Xl x 
Components of CATO 
The CA TO model is an economy-wide, multi-country, comparative-static 
computable general equilibrium model. 
The model includes all sectors of economic activity although many 
aspects of the economy are not modelled in detail. Outcomes at the 
macroeconomic level are based on outcomes at the microeconomic level. For 
example, the total exports of a region is the sum of the exports from each 
industry. 
Eight countries or groups of countries (which are called "countries") are 
modelled (Table 6.1 ). They represent the EU and the EA6 and their main trading 
partners as described in chapter 4. In 1992, the base year of the model, they 
comprised 87.5 per cent of world GDP. These countries are: Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan, Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, other developing Asia ("developing 
Asia"), Japan, United States-Canada, the EU, EFTA and the Europe Agreement 
countries. Although the EA6 differ from each other in many aspects, the division 
into only two categories was necessary to reduce the model to a reasonable size. 
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The particular division into Korea-Singapore-Taiwan on the one hand and 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand on the other was made on the basis that the former 
group's exports are more skill and capital abundant than the latter group's 
exports (see chapter 4). Other countries are not explicitly modelled but are 
included in the rest of the world (ROW) aggregate. 
Table 6.1 Regions in CATO 
Regions 
Developing Asia 
EFTA 
Europe Agreement Countries 
European Union 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
Japan 
Korea-Singapore-Taiwan 
United States-Canada 
Countries 
China, India, Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal 
Austria, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland 
and Switzerland 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic · 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
as given 
as given 
as given 
as given 
Rest of the world is treated as a trading bloc, that imports from and 
exports to the other 8 regions in the model. Rest of the world does not include 
equations to describe producer and consumer behaviour. Instead, this 
information is condensed in a set of trade elasticities which describe how trade 
in the ROW responds to movements in its trade prices relative to those of its 
partners. The demand functions of the ROW hold fixed the level of demand for 
each good. The function captures the substitution effect between products when 
their prices change. For example, if Thailand becomes more competitive in 
machines, then Thailand will receive an increased share of the ROW market for 
machines, at the expense of other suppliers. 
To model the effects of trade policy in manufactures, the industry 
classification emphasises the manufacturing sectors. The 11 sectors are 
agriculture, natural resources, processed food, textiles, clothing, chemicals, 
machinery, transport, basic manufactures, other manufactures, and services. 
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Basic manufactures includes lumber, pulp paper, petroleum and coal products, 
non-metallic mineral products and metal products. Other manufactures include 
plumbing, heating, lighting equipment, furniture, travel goods, footwear, 
precision instruments, sound recorders, printed matter, toys and sporting goods, 
works of art, jewellery and other manufactures not specified elsewhere. 
The model has three primary inputs into production: labour, capital and 
natural resources ("land"). The first two are mobile across sectors; land stocks 
are fixed. The outputs of the eleven industries are used as intermediate inputs 
into production. An additional category of inputs accounts for the costs of 
holding inventories, liquidity and miscellaneous production costs ("other 
costs"). 
The CATO model is comparative-static. In the base year 1992 the model 
is in equilibrium. An exogenous shock will disturb this equilibrium and all the 
modelled regions will adjust to attain a new model equilibrium in the solution 
year. The solution year varies depending on whether we are looking at medium-
run or longer run analyses. The CATO model solution shows the deviation from 
the values of the variables that would have been reached in the solution year had 
there been no shock. 
In Figure 6.2, XOXl shows the underlying time path of a particular 
variable. An example would be the exports of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. At 
time T 0 a shock is introduced, for example, a 10 per cent reduction in the trade 
barriers oflndonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. At time T1, after full adjustment in all 
the regions, the GDP of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand reach X2. The difference 
in value between X2 and Xl is the focus of the solution values. The CATO 
model provides almost all results in terms of percentage increases or decreases 
from point X 1. The only exception is the balance of trade, which is computed as 
a change in levels. 
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Figure 6.2 What are comparative static solutions about? 
Exports of 1-M-T 
x2 
xl 
xO 
Time 
The interactions between various economic agents in the model give rise 
to commodity flows and income transfers that are a function of each region's 
characteristics. These characteristics are based on different endowments, 
production technologies, consumer tastes, and government and investors' 
preferences which are captured in the input-output data used. 
In contrast, the equations describing agents' actions are the same for all 
regions. By standardising the equations representing individual agents' 
optimisation, the model incorporates the basic neoclassical assumption that 
economic agents behave in fundamentally similar ways despite disparate unique 
features of their economy and culture. The key economic actors in the eight 
regions are producers and consumers. It is assumed that producers maximise 
profits, subject to technological constraints and that consumers maximise utility, 
subject to income constraints. The equations are non-stochastic and structural, 
capturing market mechanisms, that is, price signals. They describe the first-order 
conditions for profit and utility maximisation. They represent the responses of 
producers and consumers in each country to changes in relative prices of 
commodities produced in different countries. The degree of responsiveness is 
determined by the relevant substitution elasticities. The model structure 
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highlights the determination of trade flows at the sectoral level between 
countries and with the rest of the world. 
Imperfect elasticity of substitution 
The eight regions and the ROW are linked through commodity flows. Following 
Armington (1969), domestic and imported commodities are assumed to be 
imperfect substitutes. Substitution elasticities describe the responsiveness of an 
agent to changes in price signals. The elasticity of substitution is defined 
rigorously along an indifference curve (or isoquant) as the percentage change in 
relative quantities demanded, divided by the percentage change in relative 
prices. 
When two commodities are perfect complements and are bought in fixed 
proportions, the substitution elasticity is zero and no change occurs in the 
proportion in which the two goods are purchased, despite any change in their 
relative price. Right and left shoes are an example. When the two commodities 
are perfect substitutes, the substitution elasticity is negative infinity when their 
prices are equal, which suggests that for an infinitesimal differentiation in their 
price, consumers will purchase the lower priced item alone. When the 
commodities are imperfect substitutes, the substitution elasticity will be between 
zero and negative infinity. 
When goods are disaggregated by commodity and country of origin, the 
number of potential competitors for imports of i from country j increases 
dramatically. The number of import substitution elasticities required can be 
crippling to empirical work. A systematic method for specifying import 
substitution elasticities reducing the number of elasticities required was 
suggested by Armington (1969). It has been used in most world trade models 
(Samuelson 1973; Hickman and Lau 1973; Deppler and Ripley 1978; Geraci and 
Prewo 1980; Bumiaux et al. 1988). 
The Armington approach assumes all commodities are distinguished by 
type and place of production. Types of commodities are called "goods". Each 
good is further differentiated by place of production and goods from different 
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sources are called "products". For example, shoes from China and Korea are the 
same good, but different products. Import demands from all users are assumed 
to be determined in two steps (the "separability assumption"). In step one, the 
user determines demand for the good on the basis of the price of the good 
relative to other goods' prices and a scale variable such as activity level (for 
producers) or expenditure level (for consumers). In step two, demand is 
determined for a product from a given source on the basis of demand for the 
corresponding good and the price of the product relative to the prices of other 
products in that category of good. 
A suggested mathematical function for the allocative function in step two 
is the constant elasticity of substitution (CBS) function. Armington showed that 
this characterisation embodies two assumptions about the elasticity of 
substitution. First, it is assumed that the elasticities of substitution between all 
pairs of products in one category of good are identical. For example, in the EU, 
the substitution elasticity between shoes made in Italy and Korea, is the same as 
the substitution elasticity between shoes made in France and Korea. It assumes 
that the elasticity of substitution is dependent only on the relative quantities of 
the goods, not on the absolute value of the goods. Only changes in relative 
prices will alter the proportion in which goods or products are purchased. 
Constant elasticity of substitution functions embody constant returns to scale, 
that is, the demand for goods or products will, ceteris paribus, move 
proportionately with changes in output (by the firm) or expenditure (by the 
consumer). Where there are increasing returns to scale, the assumption of 
constant returns to scale technology leads to an underestimation of the costs of 
protection (Harris 1985). 
A more complex function for substitution possibilities could be chosen, 
but the CBS function dramatically reduces the number of required elasticities. 
There is a trade-off, determined by the level of aggregation of goods chosen, 
between the validity of the separability assumption and the assumptions 
governing the elasticity of substitution. The broader the level of aggregation, the 
stronger the elasticity assumptions and the weaker the elasticity of substitution 
assumptions. Many analysts judge the CBS function to be empirically reasonable 
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for the level of aggregation and time horizons considered in models such as 
CATO (Dervis et al. 1982). 
One of the key assumptions in the CATO model is that products are 
imperfect substitutes for one another. If products were perfect substitutes, under 
constant returns to scale, either the cheapest product would swallow up the 
whole market, or all products in the market would have the same price. A trade 
barrier that raised the price of imports fractionally would be prohibitive. If 
products were perfect complements, then the market would not respond to 
changes in relative prices between sources; trade barriers would have no effect at 
all. These are unrealistic depictions of most markets and government policy and 
not relevant here. 
The imperfect substitution assumption accommodates the phenomenon 
that products associated with one good co-exist in a market at different prices. A 
large number of empirical studies have shown that even at the most 
disaggregated level for which comparable data can be obtained, there are 
significant, non-transitory price differences for products in different countries 
(lsard 1977; Kreinin and Officer 1978; Kravis and Lipsey 1978). Some goods 
may be closer substitutes than prices suggest because of international differences 
in the methodology of constructing price statistics, weighting patterns, survey 
methods and index number formulae. All these can lead to observed 
international price differences for a given good. But the weight of the evidence 
suggests the law of one price for traded products does not seem to hold across 
countries or even within countries, except perhaps for standardised primary 
commodities that are sold through international commodity exchanges, such as 
wheat or copper (McCloskey and Zecher 1976). 
Imperfect substitution between products means that they are 
differentiated. A proper definition of the differentiation of a product would take 
into account not only differences in quality of products but the time when a 
product is available (an apple produced in May is slightly different from an 
apple produced in September). It would also take into account the location from 
which the product is imported. The imperfect substitution assumption captures 
the common phenomenon of 'cross-hauling': a country importing and exporting 
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the 'same' good (Rhomberg 1973) also known as intra-industry trade (see chapter 
4). 
Characterisation of the economic actors 
The model consists of a set of modelled countries linked together through trade. 
Each country is modelled by equations that have a similar structure to the ADB 
model and the explanation of the equations follows closely the exposition in 
Vincent et al (1991). The seven explanatory categories used in the model are: 
• industry inputs; 
• commodity supplies; 
• final demands; 
• zero pure profits; 
• market-clearing; 
• trade balance; and 
• miscellaneous. 
A list of the model equations, variables and parameters is presented in 
Appendices 9, 10 and 11 to the thesis. 
Industry inputs demand functions 
A firm's challenge is to produce an optimum quantity of one good and produce it 
as cheaply as possible. The industry input demand functions are given by 
equations (1) to (4). They are obtained by minimising production costs subject to 
a "two-level" constant returns to scale production functions. This is illustrated in 
Figure 6.3. At the first level the firm chooses the mix of inputs of intermediate 
goods on the one hand and primary inputs on the other. In the choice of 
intermediate goods there is a Leontief assumption of no substitution between 
intermediate inputs or between them and primary factors and other input costs. It 
seems reasonable to employ the assumption of fixed coefficients between these 
aggregate bundles since several studies (Sevaldson 1976) have failed to establish 
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that relative prices are major determinants of changes in the input-output 
coefficients at this level. This follows the practice of many other CGE models, 
for example, the SALTER and ADB models. 
At the second level are CES functions which determine the degree of 
substitution between all sources of each intermediate input and between all 
primary factors. The degree of substitution is controlled by the values assigned 
to the substitution elasticities, which are crucial determinants of changes in trade 
patterns in response to economic shocks. In chapter 7 sensitivity analysis is 
carried out on the values chosen for substitution between sources of a good. 
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Figure 6.3 The structure of production in an industry in CATO 
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Equation ( 1) represents industry demands for intermediate inputs by 
source for current production. If relative prices of good i from different sources 
does not change then industry j's demands for good i from source s will change 
proportionately with industry j's output. This results from the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. If the price of good i from one source relative to its 
price from other sources rises, then industry j will purchase a smaller proportion 
of good i from that source. The extent to which a switch occurs from the 
relatively more expensive source depends on the size of the change in the 
relative price and the degree of substitutability between sources. 
Equations (2) and (3) show the demand functions for capital, labour and 
land by each industry. If relative prices between primary factors remain constant, 
then an industry's demand for primary factors will move proportionately with its 
output. If the price of one factor rises relative to other factors, then there will be 
substitution away from it so that the industry's demand for that factor rises less 
than proportionately with an increase in output or falls more than 
proportionately with a decrease in output. 
Equation (4) represents the demand for "other costs" inputs in each 
industry. This demand changes in proportion to the change in the industry's 
output level which is the Leontief assumption. If the output of the industry falls 
by 20 per cent then the demand for its other costs inputs will fall by 20 per cent. 
Commodity supply functions 
Equation (5) represents the supply equation for each commodity. Production 
activities in each region are structured around the single-output industries. 
Having a single output eliminates the optimisation problem of selecting the 
revenue-maximising combination of different goods. The output of commodity i 
therefore changes proportionately with the output of the industry. A shift term 
allows the incorporation of productivity improvements in the use of intermediate 
inputs or primary factors due to technological or institutional changes. 
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Final demand equations 
Equation ( 6) is the demand equation for goods used as inputs into investment in 
each economy. It is assumed that the producers of investment goods minimise 
costs subject to a production function in which different commodity inputs are 
used in fixed proportions. Alternative sources of supply of an input are chosen 
under a CES constraint. Thus a constant relative prices between different 
sources of supply of a commodity implies that the industry's demand for that 
commodity input from each source is proportional to the amount of investment 
chosen by that industry. If the price from one source of supply rises substitution 
away from that source will occur so that the industry's demand for that 
commodity input will grow at a slower rate than the demand for investment in 
that industry. 
Household demand for commodities are represented in equations (7) to 
(9). These are derived by assuming that households choose their purchases to 
maximise utility subject to an aggregate budget constraint. Households 
substitute between different commodities and also between all the sources of 
each commodity. 
Analogous to the production function, the consumption function 
involves consumers in two levels of decision-making. At the first level, the 
products chosen are explained at the level of the good chosen and the relative 
prices of the products associated with that good. At the second level, the goods 
basket is determined by aggregate household expenditure and the relative prices 
of different goods. The expenditure pattern depends on the expenditure and price 
elasticities of consumption for each commodity. 
Homothetic indifference curves mean that with no change in the relative 
prices among products, the consumer demand for a product is proportional to the 
demand for the good. If relative prices of the commodity from each source 
change, consumers will substitute towards the cheaper source. The degree of 
substitution is determined by the substitution parameters. 
Equation (8) describes how households allocate their consumption 
expenditure among different goods (that is not considering the source of supply). 
The "income effect" is determiend by the income elasticities of consumption for 
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each commodity. The "substitution effect" is determined by own and cross-price 
elasticities of consumption between commodities in each country. With no 
change in the relative price of a good, consumer demand for a good is 
proportional to the total expenditure of the consumer. 
The prices of each commodity to consumers in each country as a 
weighted sum of the price of the product from each source of supply as shown 
by equation (9). 
Equation (10) describes each country's exports to ROW. ROW 
purchasers of the products from the eight countries minimise the cost of their 
purchases by substitution between the nine sources of supply available. Thus if 
relative prices are constant between sources of supply of good I, then the 
demand from each source will change with the change in total demand for the 
good. If the price from one of the sources rises then there will be a substitution 
away from that source and the demand for that good from that source will 
increase at a slower pace than the increase in the total demand for that good. 
Equation ( 11) represents government demand. The government does not 
have an explicit individual or social utility function. The size of government 
demand and its composition can be set exogenously, or set to follow changes in 
aggregate households' expenditure. A shift term in the equation enables an 
exogenous shift in government demand. The contraction of government 
expenditure would be an example. 
Zero pure profits 
The model assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale production 
technology. Perfect competition prevents pure profits in any economic activity. 
It is usually ~ssumed in CGE models because an assumption of imperfect 
competition poses serious difficulties. There is evidence to show that CGE 
models are very sensitive to the assumption regarding the mark-up behaviour of 
imperfectly competitive firms (Harris 1985). 
Equations (12) to (17) represent zero pure profit conditions. Equation 
(12) shows that prices are based on production costs and market imperfections 
from distribution costs and government policy. The input costs are intermediate 
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input costs from each of the nine sources of supply, costs of primary factors and 
"other costs" which can capture any government taxes or subsidies. Equation 
(13) defines a unit of capital in each industry as the sum of the input costs from 
each source of supply used in producing it. 
Equation (14) shows that the domestic selling price of each country's 
imported goods is accounted for by the final price at the border expressed in 
domestic currency and any trade barrier on that import. 
Equation ( 15) defines the border price in each importing country as the 
export price in the country in which the product is produced and the transport 
costs involved. The import price at the border is expressed in the currency of the 
country in which the good has been produced. 
Equation ( 16) relates the export price from each country to the producer 
price in that country plus any export taxes (or less any export subsidies). 
Equation (17) indicates that there are no supernormal profits in exporting to 
ROW. The revenue from exporting to ROW, expressed in the currency of the 
country exporting, is composed of the costs involved, that is the domestic. price 
of production, any subsidies or export taxes and transport costs. 
The price wedge created by ·government policy in the form of export 
taxes and subsidies and import barriers implies that even if the country is small, 
that is, it is unable to influence the foreign currency price of either its exports or 
imports, it can still affect trade volumes, through changing the internal 
profitability of producing or trading. 
Market equilibrium conditions 
A set of equilibrium conditions defined by equations (18) to (22) applies in each 
economy. 
In goods markets, the equilibrium conditions are a set of signals such 
that the decisions of agents jointly clear all markets and the supply of domestic 
goods is equal to the demand for a region's goods by all agents. Equation (18) 
equates the domestic supply of each commodity with all demands for it. The 
demand for the commodity originates from the following sources: as inputs into 
current production in the home country and current production in each of the 
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other regions; as inputs into the production of investment goods, both in the 
home country and in other regions; consumer demands in both the home and 
foreign country and in other regions; government demand in both the home 
country and other regions; and exports to ROW. 
The supply of labour is always assumed to be mobile between industries, 
allowing the model to specify an equilibrium condition for the labour market. 
Equation (19) states that labour demands in each country is satisfied by labour 
supplies in that country. Labour demand may be less than the full employment 
level. There is no explicit aggregate supply for labour. This is common to CGE 
models of low and middle-income economies, in contrast to high-income 
economies which often have elaborate factor supply equations incorporating the 
labour-leisure choice of workers (Robinson 1988). 
Equation (20) defines investment demand as proportional to net 
investment from the previous period, that is, changes in current capital stock, an 
assumption often used in long-run planning models (Vincent et al. 1991). In a 
short run model closure industry capital stocks are held fixed and industry 
investment is thus unchanged over the adjustment period. 
Equation (21) matches industry capital demands with supply of capital. 
in each industry. There is no explicit equation for the aggregate supply of 
capital. By choosing to make the total stock of capital exogenous (fixing the 
degree of flexibility of the economy-wide real return to capital) a particular total 
supply curve for capital is implied. For example, if the real return is held fixed, 
that is, if it is not responsive to changes in aggregate demand for capital, this 
assumes that there is an abundant reserve supply of capital (infinitely elastic 
supply curve). It implies that the initial equilibrium was not characterised by full 
employment in the capital market and the final equilibrium is not either. 
Decreased demand does not lead to a fall in the real return to ensure full 
employment and increased demand can be accommodated at the going real 
return. In contrast, when the elasticity of the supply curve is zero, the real rate of 
return on capital will bear the entire burden of the adjustment to changes in 
demand for capital. The equilibrium demand for capital would remain constant. 
The flexibility of the real rate is chosen by the degree of the nominal return's 
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indexation to the investment price index. Full indexation implies a constant real 
return. 
Equation (22) equates the demand for land with the supply of land. 
Trade balances 
External trade flows and trade balances in each region in the model are shown 
by equations (23) to (30). Equation (23) specifies the total import volumes of 
each commodity by each country from all imported sources. Similarly, Equation 
(24) defines this for exports to each country. Equation (25) shows , for each 
country, the total demand for imports from each source. The sources of this 
demand are demand for use in current production, investment, consumption and 
government demand. 
Equations (26) and (27) define the total foreign currency value or cost of 
imports and exports associated with each country. Equation (28) defines the 
balance of trade for each country. It is measured in constant $ million. The base 
year is 1992. Import and export volumes are defined by Equations (29) and (30) 
respectively. 
Miscellaneous equations 
The 'consumer price index' is defined for each country in equation (31). This is 
calculated as the consumption expenditure weighted by the sum of local prices 
of each of the commodities purchased by consumers in that country. 
Equation (32) permits different closures in labour markets. The nominal 
wage is indexed to the consumer price index. If it is fully indexed, the real wage 
does not change. The resulting horizontal labour supply curve shows that there is 
an abundant supply of workers at the going wage rate and any increase in total 
demand for labour can be accommodated. Any fall in total demand will not lead 
to a decline in real wages. This assumption depends in part on the size of the 
change in employment demand generated by the shock and in part on the time 
frame. If the change is very large, some change in real wage would be expected 
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in the short run. A partial or zero indexation of nominal wage to CPI could 
capture this. 
Equation (33) allows for the exogenous setting of the price of "other 
costs", which are mainly indirect taxes, so that the effects of changes in the rate 
of indirect taxes can be simulated. 
Equation (34) captures macroeconomic equilibrium. Real output in each 
country is equated to real aggregate expenditure, defined as a weighted sum of 
real household consumption expenditure, investment expenditure, government 
expenditure and real net export demand. Due to the endogenous trade balance, 
the model is not constrained to having investment equal savings. The size of the 
external deficit is equal to the excess of domestic absorption over total domestic 
supply. The supply of exports and the demand for imports are the aggregations 
of the independent demands and supplies of all the economic agents. The other 
macroeconomic aggregates can be exogenous, or the model provides rules for 
calculating them. Real government demand is the sum of government demand at 
the sectoral level (Equation 35). Real aggregate consumption is nominal 
consumption deflated by the consumer price index (Equation 36). Equation (37) 
specifies nominal investment as the sum of nominal investment in each industry 
for each country. Equation (38) specifies an investment goods price index for 
each country which is similar to the consumer goods price index, being a 
weighted sum across industries of the costs of investment. Aggregate real 
investment in each country is aggregate nominal investment deflated by the 
investment goods price index as specified in equation (39). 
Equation ( 40) shows that the rate of return in each industry is the ratio of 
the rental price earned by the capital in that industry to its costs of production 
(net of the rate of depreciation). 
Equation (41) describes the aggregate capital stock in each country as the 
economy-wide sum of industry capital stocks in that country. 
Equation ( 42) links absolute and relative rates of return to capital for 
each industry. 
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The nominal GDP for each country is defined in equation (43). Equation 
( 44) defines the aggregate consumption function for each country as 
proportional to nominal GDP in the country. 
Equation (44) calculates GDP abstracting from terms of trade effects, by 
expressing imports and exports as volumes rather than in foreign currency value 
terms. 
In practice a CGE model must determine absolute, as well as relative, 
price levels. A wide variety of price normalisation equations can be used, since 
normalisation around any nominal variable will not affect real variables. The 
numeraire chosen is the nominal exchange rate. 
Model Closures 
The CATO model (specified in Tables A9, AlO and All in the appendices) 
contains (2c2gh+2cgh+5c2g+10cg+12ch+l8c) equations and 
(2c2gh+2cgh+8c2g+ 13cg+ 15ch+2g+23c) variables. Thus for the model to solve 
for a unique solution, (3ch+3c2g+5cg+5c+2g) variables must be set 
exogenously. 
The model does not explain the number of households; thus this variable 
is set as exogenous. The model does not explain economic activities outside the 
modelled regions; thus the commodity demands and prices of goods in ROW are 
fixed. Changes in the demand and supply conditions in ROW can be modelled 
by shocking these variables. The set of bilateral exchange rates between each of 
the regions is held fixed as a numeraire for the model. The allocation of 
commodities is invariant to the numeraire chosen. By fixing nominal exchange 
rates it is assumed that real exchange rates are the relevant price signal for 
agents' decisions. Setting tariffs, domestic taxes, export subsidies and taxes as 
exogenous allows government policy to be activated exogenously. The level of 
transport costs are exogenous. Another set of exogenous variables, shift terms, 
allows the simulation of different shocks regarding fiscal demands, production, 
other costs and technology. 
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The time-frame of the policy analysis is related to how the model 
achieves balance between demand and supply in various markets. The closure 
rules cover a combination of assumptions about the markets for capital, labour 
and land. The short run is defined as 1-2 years and the medium-run is 5-8 years. 
In any time-frame, land usage is always exogenously fixed in each 
industry. Land is assumed to be fixed in each industry, so equilibrium is 
achieved through the adjustment of the real return on land. The model captures 
the scarcity value of natural resources in resource rents. 
The labour market closure is defined by setting the economy-wide wage 
shift variable exogenously. This means that the level of employment in each 
country is endogenous. Industries can obtain as much labour as they require at 
the prevailing wage rate. The nominal wage is assumed to be totally flexible and 
adjusts to changes in the CPI to keep a constant real wage at whatever the 
demand for employment. 
The capital market closure can depict a shorter or longer time-frame for 
the experiment. The conventional neoclassical short run closure holds industry 
capital stocks fixed and allows industry rates of return to capital to be 
determined endogenously. In the short-run time-frame, capital adaptations that 
could be made within a 1-2 year time frame are assumed to be possible. The 
time horizon is too short for new capital to be installed and operating, or for old 
capital to be depreciated, in response to increases or decreases in industry 
profitability. Capital stocks are unable to adjust in order to equalise any 
differences in the rates of return that might be induced by policy changes. If 
capital stocks are held fixed, movements in the profitability of employing capital 
are reflected in movements in its rental price rather than adjustments in industry 
aggregate capital demands. The variation in these rates of return provides the 
price signals to which, over a longer time horizon, capital stocks would adjust. 
Because both land and capital are fixed in the short-run, labour is the 
only primary factor mobile between industries. The reallocation of labour 
between industries becomes one of the critical mechanisms by which economies 
can respond to external shocks. Higher levels of output can only be achieved by 
increasing the employment of labour. This raises the marginal product of capital 
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and its rental. Increased rentals will raise unit costs and output prices. Thus 
increased output is only available at higher output prices. The supply curve of 
each sector is upward-sloping. 
This is a medium-run model, so a longer run closure is chosen. The 
capital market closure is specified by setting the economy-wide capital stock and 
the industry rate of return shift variables exogenously. Thus the relative rates of 
return between industries are assumed to be restored to their initial level by 
capital flows between industries, but the absolute rate of return is allowed to 
change such that there is no overall growth in the capital stock. In the medium-
run environment, the chosen time-frame for these experiments, adaptations over 
a 5-8 year period are assumed to be made by decision-makers. Capital is thus 
mobile among industries. Capital stocks vary endogenously. Industry rates of 
return on capital would be equalised and there is an economy-wide rate of 
return. Total capital stock in the country is still assumed to be fixed. 
The last set of exogenous variables are shift terms for government 
demands, other costs, production and aggregate consumption. The shift term for 
government demands the modelling of exogenously specified changes in 
government demands at the individual country and sector level. Setting the shift 
term for other costs as exogenous allows the modelling of changes in indirect 
taxes. The shift term for production allows for the simulation of productivity 
increases. The shift term for consumption allows household consumption to be 
linked to income via the aggregate consumption function. In the short-run 
consumption can be fixed exogenously suggesting that households do not have 
sufficient time to adjust their aggregate spending to induced changes in national 
income. If consumption is exogenous, government expenditure, which is tied to 
it when partially endogenous, is also fixed. Since investment is tied to changes 
in capital stock for current production, in the shorter-run scenario, when capital 
stocks are fixed, investment is also held fixed. In other words, in the short-run 
scenario, domestic absorption can be fixed, in which case the macroeconomic 
effects of the simulations appear in the trade accounts of each country. Putting 
the trade effects in their starkest relief is useful for expositional purposes. 
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In the medium-run closure, household income is linked to income via the 
aggregate consumption function. If domestic absorption is endogenous, then the 
results for the trade account would be more moderate; for example, in an 
expanding industry, export sales would be smaller if some of the product is 
channelled to increasing domestic demand. Consumers are assumed to vary the 
proportions of their income allocated to consumption and savings. Adjustments 
to a shock are distributed between consumption and the balance of trade. 
Benchmark data set 
The benchmark data set required the following: 
• an intermediate input matrix for domestic use of domestically produced 
commodities, 
• an intermediate input matrix for domestic usage of imports, 
• industry payments to land, labour and capital, 
• final demands for domestically produced commodities from households, 
government, and for investment purposes, 
• final demands for imported commodities by households, government, and for 
investment purposes, 
• indirect taxes 
• trade shares from each source for each region in each commodity 
Estimates of the value of intermediate inputs into production, final demands and 
taxes were extracted from social accounting matrices published by each country. 
Trade flows data were available from the International Economic Databank, 
Australian National University. 
Social accounting matrices were an amalgamation of input-output tables 
and national income accounts. The social accounting matrices used in this model 
were the latest available for each country at the time the model was constructed. 
All data were updated to 1992, using the growth of GDP and factors of 
production, with the updating procedure implying that the structure of the 
economy was the same in the original year of the input-output table, as in the 
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model year. For each region an input-output matrix with eleven sectors was 
constructed using the social accounting matrices. Adjustments were made to 
social accounting matrices to make them suitable for the model's structure. The 
main principle used for missing data was to use the ratios of a like country to 
estimate the aggregates. For example, in some cases, the input-output table had a 
single column for two CATO categories: agriculture and other primary 
commodities. To achieve the CATO aggregation a split of the single column had 
to be made. The ratio used was taken from a country which had a similar 
economic structure. This approach was also used to disaggregate some countries' 
government demand and value-added columns. In some cases only a 
domestic+import matrix was available. The matrix was split into domestic and 
import categories using the information in the total import column or SITC trade 
data. 
Input-output tables for future production are not available. Generally 
investment is found as a column in both domestic and import matrices, that is 
total commodity i is an investment input into all the 11 commodities. To divide 
commodity i into each of the 11 commodities, the model is guided by current 
production data. 
Trade data were used to identify imports by source. Trade data do not 
differentiate between the end usage of any import. The single set of import 
shares obtained were used to estimate intermediate and all user demands of 
imports by source. 
For some regions input-output data were not available. In these cases, the 
database was built using the databases of countries for which the input-output 
tables were available. Similarities in incomes per capita and the structure of 
production are the two main criteria used in the choice of the representative 
country. This follows standard model practice, for example, in the ADB model 
and the GT AP model. The major assumption used is that the average patterns of 
production, consumption, and savings in a country can be approximated by 
patterns observed in one of the countries for which input-output information is 
available. 
The benchmark data set is presented in Appendix A to the thesis. 
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Parameter settings 
Many of the parameters in the model are shares that can be calculated from data 
in the input-output tables, but some key parameters have to be chosen 
independently of the input-output data. These include substitution elasticities 
between products for all end users, substitution between primary factors for 
firms, and income and price elasticities between goods for the consumer. 
Empirical estimates of these parameters for the industries and countries in the 
model are not readily available. Estimation was considered beyond the scope of 
the thesis because the required data involved disaggregated time-series data on 
import volumes and prices. The usual approach is to extract estimates of these 
behavioural parameters from various sources, including other general 
equilibrium analyses. 
Import substitution elasticities 
The most important elasticities in the model concern the substitution between 
products, that is, sources of imports, for intermediate inputs in current 
production, investment, household consumption and for export demand by 
ROW. The available import substitution elasticities are not differentiated by use. 
This implicitly assumes that the share of imports from a particular source in 
each user's demand is similar. 
The CATO model puts the domestic source on the same level as the 
foreign sources, so that the elasticity of substitution between a domestic and a 
foreign source is the same as between two foreign sources. There appears no 
reason why rational users should a priori prefer a domestic source to any of the 
others. 
Most empirical work has been concerned with estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand for imports rather than the elasticity of substitution between 
imports. The two concepts are closely related. The elasticity of substitution 
approaches the elasticity of demand for imports as the source of the imports 
decreases in size relative to all other sources of imports (Leamer and Stern 
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1970). Even as the share of imports rises, the elasticity of demand is considered 
to provide a good approximation to the elasticity of substitution (Industry 
Commission 1990). 
The most frequently used surveys of elasticities are Stern et al. (1976) 
and Goldstein and Khan (1985). Goldstein and Khan suggest that for a time-
frame of 2 years or more, the price elasticity of demand for imports for a typical 
country lies between -0.5 and -1.0. A slightly higher range is suggested by Stern 
et al. between -0.5 and -1.5. 
The econometric estimates of demand elasticities have been shown to be 
underestimates of actual values due to specification, identification and 
aggregation errors (Orcutt 1950; Leamer and Stern 1970; Abbot 1988). Positive 
correlation between the relative price variable and the random deviation is 
frequent because of a missing real income variable. The presence of a positively 
sloped supply relationship means goods with low elasticities have the most price 
variations and therefore undue weight in an aggregate index. 
Some analysts have chosen to go by these econometric estimates but 
most have taken an eclectic approach, combining these estimates with their own 
judgment and previous practice. Burniaux et al. (1988) for the WALRAS model 
specified elasticities ranging from 5 to 7 for long run possibilities. Alaouze et al. 
(1977) estimate substitution elasticities between 32 imported and domestic 
commodities in Australia. Their estimates have been condensed into broad 
commodity groups in the Salter model. Following the eclectic approach, Salter 
analysts also set high values, as do users of GTAP (Yang et al. 1996). This 
approach has also been used in the CATO model. 
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Table 6.2 Medium-run elasticities of substitution between products (goods from different 
sources) for the CATO model 
Agriculture etc 4.0 
Natural resources 4.5 
Processed food 5.0 
Clothing 7.0 
Textiles 5.0 
Basic manufactures 4.0 
Chemicals 3.8 
Machinery 5.0 
Transport 4.0 
Other manufactures 4.0 
Services 3.8 
Substitution between primary factors inputs 
Estimates of substitution between primary factors are found to vary considerably 
(Industry Commission 1991). There are many biases with little known of their 
magnitude or direction. Examples include the level of aggregation, the 
functional form and parameter restrictions imposed and the nature of the data 
(cross-section or time series). In previous modelling practice, Mercenier and 
Waelbrock (1986) view the results of parameter estimation as inconclusive. 
They use subjective estimates formulated by World Bank staff and suggest that 
parameters may be chosen in line with the preferences of the end user of their 
model. 
Caddy's (1976) review of 21 cross-sectional and time series studies 
found that the cross-sectional estimates tend to be larger than the time series 
ones. Cross-sectional studies tend to cover a broader set of economic 
circumstances compared with the data used in time-series studies. Estimates of 
longer run substitution possibilities are more suitably derived from cross-
sectional studies than time series studies. Caddy's time-series elasticities are 
centred on 0.5 and his cross sectional elasticities are centred on 1.0. The 
question is how to define the short-run and the long-run in this case? Caddy 
(1976) and Dixon et al. (1982) suggest that short-run should be two years and 
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the long-run should apply to a much longer adjustment period. SALTER takes 
the long-run to be ten years, assumes that the parameter change is linear scales 
and finds an average five-year value of 0.7 (Industry Commission 1991). 
Rimmer (1990) showed the variation of primary factor elasticities 
between broad industry groups in Australia, with the value being highest in the 
service sector. This is supported by the Whalley synthesis of the Caddy survey 
(Table 6.3). Rimmer's low figure for manufacturing may be accounted for by the 
high degree of aggregation of heterogeneous industries in this sector. The 
SALTER model used values from Rimmer ( 1990) except for manufacturing. 
Values chosen for the CATO model were based on SALTER values. 
Table 6.3 Elasticities of substitution between capital and labour 
Whalley Rimmer 
Agriculture 0.6 0.4 
Mining 0.8 0.8 
Manufacturing 0.6-0.9 0.5 
Services 0.9-1.0 0.9-1.2 
Source: Whalley, J., 1985, Trade Liberalisation Among Major World Trading Areas, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. Rimmer, M., 1990. Primary Factor Substitution and the Real Wage Explosion, 
IMPACT Preliminary Working Paper, No. 0-69, University of Melbourne, Melbourne. 
General equilibrium models typically use the same substitution 
elasticities among primary factors for all countries involved (Whalley 1985). 
This is a strong assumption when the economies modelled are not similar and 
substitution opportunities may differ if significantly different technologies are 
used by high and low income countries, particularly in the agricultural sector 
(Yotopoulos and Nugent 1976). However, there is a lack of reliable estimates of 
the variations in elasticities between different countries thus CATO follows the 
usual practice of imposing a single set on all countries. 
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Table 6.4 Elasticities of substitution in the CA TO model 
Medium-run 
Agriculture etc 0.6 
l"faturalresources 0.6 
Processed food 1.1 
Clothing 1.3 
Textiles 1.3 
Basic manufactures 1.3 
Chemicals 1.3 
Machinery 1.3 
Transport 1.3 
Other manufactures 1.3 
Services 1.3 
Income and price elasticities (between the 11 goods) in household 
consumption 
The elasticities of substitution between different products (goods from different 
sources) for the consumer have been specified. 
Consumer demand systems require a large number of parameters. 
However, the homogeneity and adding-up restrictions of the linear expenditure 
system imply that price and expenditure elasticities in this system are not 
independent. Frisch (1959) showed that price elasticities can be obtained from 
expenditure elasticities using the "Frisch parameter", if preferences are 
independent. In the CATO model, this relationship between expenditure and 
price elasticities reduces dramatically the number of parameters needed. 
Expenditure elasticities are calculated with the marginal budget shares 
and average budget shares. The latter are derived from the database. The former 
are specified by the user. The marginal budget shares chosen for this model are 
guided by the ADB model and the SALTER model values. 
The Frisch parameter needs to be specified. The ORANI model uses a Frisch 
parameter value of -1.82 (Dixon et al. 1982) which was based on values for different 
Australian consumer groups. The parameter did not appear to decrease with income 
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(Selvanathan 1988; Theil 1987). Selvanathan (1988) concluded that for 18 economies, 
the Frisch parameter was around-2 which is close to the ORANI specification. 
Selvanathan's evidence was largely based on the estimation of demand systems using 
data from high income countries. As pointed by the Industry Commission (1991) such 
data might not show sufficient variation to obtain different values, but again, because of 
the paucity of data, CATO follows the format of ORANI in specifying a Frisch 
parameter value of -1.8. 
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7 Current trends in EU and EA6 trade 
policies 
The CATO model was used to indicate the effects of a preferential trade agreement 
between the EU and the Europe Agreement countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic) in the context of a Uruguay Round 
scenario, and of alternative options for EA6 trade policies. A shift in the EU to non-
discriminatory trade policies is also evaluated. The exogenous shocks included were: 
• the implementation of preferences in trade between the EU and Europe Agreement 
countries 
• the global implementation of the Uruguay Round 
• the unilateral global reduction of trade barriers by the EA6 exceeding their Uruguay 
Round commitments and 
• A hypothetical unilateral global reduction of barriers in the EU. 
The experiments focus on the EU' s preferential agreements with the Europe Agreement 
countries. These agreements involve more substantial reductions in barriers than some 
of the other preferential arrangements made by the EU. The Europe Agreement 
countries, moreover, have a stronger capability to expand exports than most countries in 
the Lome Agreement, the Euro-Med Agreements or the former Soviet Union countries. 
If these other groups of countries were to improve their export capacity, the effects 
modelled below would serve as an example of the mechanisms involved in determining 
the effects of their preferential links with the EU. 
The effects of the Europe Agreement preferences are qualitatively similar to the 
effects of customs union outlined in chapter 3. As suggested in chapter 3, the static trade 
and welfare effects of preferential arrangements have to be examined in a second best 
context. The final judgement about economic benefits that might accrue is an empirical 
question. The Vinerian concepts of trade creation and trade diversion (Viner 1950) 
provide a comparative static, partial equilibrium framework within which the 
consequences of removing trade barriers on a preferential basis may be considered. The 
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CATO model extends the examination of trade creation and trade diversion to a general 
equilibrium framework. 
For the economic benefits of a preferential arrangement to be judged as positive 
in this type of analysis, trade creation within a region must exceed trade diversion. Both 
trade creation between members and trade diversion strengthen intra-regional links, but 
the latter does so at the expense of extra-regional links. At the same time, a gain in 
income to the members of a preferential agreement that creates trade diversion can 
increase imports from non-members through the expansion in income. 
The extent of trade creation and trade diversion depends on several 
circumstances as discussed in chapter three. The gains and losses from preferential trade 
liberalisation depend upon: 
• the size of the initial trade barriers in the prospective members 
• the price elasticities of supply and demand curves of member and non-member 
countries 
• the extent of trade between partners prior to the agreement 
The model is designed to capture the interaction between all these circumstances and 
indicate their net effects. 
The Europe Agreement countries' exports started from a small base. Their 
populations totalled 95 million in 1994. In 1994, their share of EU external imports was 
only some 5 per cent, although shares were larger in clothing and textiles. Unless export 
growth reaches the levels attained by the EA6, their market shares are unlikely to 
increase substantially. Trade shifts based on preferences to Europe Agreement 
countries, however, are likely to have some negative effects on some EA6 exports. 
Recent years have seen an intensification of pre-reform specialisation in the Europe 
Agreement, in contrast to the EA6, which have undergone rapid changes in export 
specialisation. In the post-reform period, the Europe Agreement countries have 
specialised further in agriculture and unskilled labour manufacturing (Horne and Huang 
1996). Both the Europe Agreement and the EA6 have relatively large shares of the EU 
market in clothing and textiles so that trade diversion is expected as a result of the 
Europe Agreements. East European workers receive low wages by West European 
standards. They have universal primary and secondary schooling of high quality, though 
it is not neccessarily better than in leading EA6 countries. The Europe Agreement 
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countries have years of poor work practices and incompetent management based on 
central planning to overcome, but many workers and managers are motivated to do so. 
They are likely to be able to catch up quickly with West European practices, that is, 
within a decade or so. They would then be more likely to be able to compete with the 
more advanced firms and countries among the EA6 in intra-industry trade. 
The CATO experiments 
Experiment 1: A preferential agreement between the EU and the Europe 
Agreement countries 
The effect of the preferential agreements between the EU and the Europe Agreement 
countries are examined in the absence of other policy changes. The Europe Agreements 
in manufactures will be represented by a reduction of all tariff barriers by both parties. 
Voluntary export restraints in clothing and textiles towards the Europe Agreement 
countries are also eliminated. Following Hertel et al. (1995) and Dee et al. (1996), a 
voluntary export restraint is seen as equivalent to an export tax. This is because 
exporters must either purchase a scarce export quota before making an export shipment, 
or pass up the opportunity to sell a valuable quota received from the government. 
Export taxes in the Europe Agreement countries are to be eliminated vis a vis clothing 
and textiles exports to the EU. Although agriculture and services are not the focus of the 
study, trade barrier reductions need to be considered in these sectors because of their 
economy-wide effects. While it is difficult to gauge the reduction in agricultural 
protection, the Europe Agreement will be simulated by an elimination of tariffs in 
agriculture. The implicit assumption is that NTBs in agriculture will be reduced to such 
an extent that tariff reductions will be reflected in price reductions. Trade barriers in 
services will be reduced to the extent that they are reduced in Experiment 2 in the 
representation of MFN liberalisation within the Uruguay Round Agreements (see 
below). These reductions in agriculture and services may be too optimistic so that 
sensitivity analysis will be used to see how the results are affected by an assumption of 
no liberalisation in these sectors. 
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The results of Experiment 1 are presented in Tables 7 .1 to 7. 7. For 
reasons of space countries labels in all the tables have been abbreviated as 
follows: 
1. "Dev Asia" is developing Asian countries as defined in chapter 6. It includes 
Bangaldesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and 
Sri Lanka. 
2. "EAC" is the Europe Agreement countries. 
3. "KST" is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
4. "IMT" is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. 
5. "USC" is United States-Canada. 
In Experiment 1, there is considerable expansion of Europe Agreement 
countries' exports of most products to the EU as expected (Table 7 .1 ). 
The largest expansion is in clothing. Exceptionally high expansion of 
clothing was also found by Yang et al. (1996). This is consistent with the 
Europe Agreement's relative labour costs compared to EU countries in the 
medium term. It is also the result of the elimination of a higher tariff in clothing 
than in other sectors. In addition, while textiles had the same tariff prior to the 
implementation of the preferential agreement, the export tax equivalent of 
voluntary export restraints was higher for clothing than textiles, as it is with 
regard to imports into the EU from other sources of clothing and textiles (Hertel 
et al. 1995). A higher elasticity of substitution between products from different 
sources has also been assumed for clothing relative to most other sectors 
including textiles. 
Europe Agreement exports expand rapidly to the EU in clothing and 
textiles. Europe Agreement exports also expand rapidly in transport equipment, 
but exports to the EU in this category were very small before the preferential 
agreement. Part of the reason for the rapid expansion in transport equipment is 
the relatively high elasticity assumed and also the relatively high tariff rate prior 
to the preferential agreement. Natural resource products do not experience the 
same export growth to the EU, which is consistent with the expectation that 
they are not, in international terms, resource abundant countries. 
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Despite the rise in EU income that results from this preferential 
agreement, non-member countries (that is, countries that are not members of the 
EU or Europe Agreement countries) generally do not experience a 
corresponding rise in the EU's demand for their exports; the majority of their 
exports experience contraction. This suggests that Europe Agreement countries' 
products have substituted for non-members' products. Non-member countries 
experience the considerable contraction in their exports of clothing and textiles 
to the EU. The more rapid expansion in Europe Agreement countries' clothing 
exports and the large share of the EU market compared to textiles, prior to the 
preferential arrangement, combine to make other countries' export contraction 
in clothing larger than in textiles. For developing Asia, Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, the percentage falls in clothing and 
textile exports represent larger absolute values of these exports than for the 
other countries, because they provide larger shares of the EU market prior to the 
preferential agreement. EFT A provides a large share of the EU market in 
textiles. Although the elasticities of substitution are assumed in the model to be 
the same between all pairs of products, the decline in EFTA' s share of the EU 
market may be overestimated because it produces differentiated high quality 
textiles that are less substitutable for the Europe Agreement countries' 
standardised products. 
Korea-Singapore-Taiwan have a large market in the EU for "other 
manufactures". Europe Agreement countries exports expand in this area but 
remain too low to lead to a contraction of exports from Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan to the EU. Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand have a large share of the EU 
processed food market. Despite Europe Agreement countries expansion in this 
product they are not greatly affected because the Europe Agreement countries 
had a very small share of the EU market prior to the preferential agreements. 
Any substitution between Europe Agreement countries and Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand products in this area is likely to be an overestimation because the 
goods from the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand reflect tropical products and are 
not as substitutable for Europe Agreement countries products as the elasticties 
suggest. 
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Table 7. 1 Exports to the EU by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 -0.6 0.4 0.0 -12.6 -3.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 1.2 0.2 
Japan 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -13.0 -3.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.3 0.9 -0.1 
EAC1 45.8 -1.9 28.5 420.6 163.3 16.0 17.8 33.5 120.3 18.6 4.0 
IMT1 -0.7 0.3 -0.1 -12.7 -3.7 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -1.1 1.1 0.1 
KST1 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 -12.8 -3.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2 1.0 0.0 
USC1 -0.9 0.1 -0.3 -12.9 -3.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.4 0.9 -0.1 
EFTA -0.8 0.2 -0.2 -11.9 -3.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.2 1.2 0.1 
Row -1.0 -0.1 -0.5 -13.2 -4.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.5 0.8 -0.2 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: ExQeriment 1, CA TO 
Table 7 .2 EU exports to regions by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 0 0 0.2 0.9 2.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0 
Japan 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.9 3.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 
EAC11 37.6 36.3 36.8 79.6 63 29.2 27.1 22 29.1 31.8 30.5 
IMT1 0.1 0 0.3 0.8 2.7 0.3 0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.1 
KST1 0 0.1 0.3 1.2 3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.1 
USC1 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.7 2.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.2 
EFTA 0.2 0.5 0.3 -0.4 -2.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0 
Row 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1, CATO 
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Exports of the EU to the Europe Agreement countries rise rapidly while 
EU exports to other countries change very little, indicating that the Europe 
Agreements do not increase the international competitiveness of EU exports 
(Table 7 .2). Tables 7 .1 and 7 .2 indicate the increasing regionalisation of the 
EU's trade caused by this set of preferential agreements. 
While exports of non-member countries to the Europe Agreement 
countries rise, these rises are from very small initial shares so they do not 
represent substantial gains (Table 7 .3). Exports to the Europe Agreement 
countries from non-members fall the most in machinery and transport while the 
EU takes an increased market share. Hence a distinct contrast is made between 
the sectors that experience the most diversion from non-member exports in the 
EU market and the sectors that experience the most diversion in the Europe 
Agreement country markets. 
Total exports of clothing and textiles in the EA6 countries (that is from 
the two "countries" Korea-Singapore-Taiwan and Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand) fall even though their other trading partners take more of their 
clothing and textiles. Thus the trade diversion they experienced in the EU 
market is not entirely offset by expansion of exports to other markets (Table 
7.4). The EU market is large enough for the EA6 and the Europe Agreement 
countries' expansion is rapid enough for this result. The total exports of 
clothing and textiles of Korea-Singapore-Taiwan fall less than those of 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. This reflects a smaller share of Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan exports of clothing going to the EU than Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
exports. It suggests also that Korea-Singapore-Taiwan are moving out of 
clothing and textiles. The expansion of EA6 clothing and textiles to other 
markets is likely to be underestimated. While the model captures an increase in 
intra-Asian trade between the four Asian regions represented, it does not 
capture trade between the countries in each region. 
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Table 7.3 Exports to the Europe Agreement countries by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 9.9 5.9 3.4 33.4 8.9 0.0 3.8 -6.5 0.0 8.4 7.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.0 8.5 3.2 3.6 -6.7 -10.6 8.2 6.8 
IMT1 9.7 5.8 3.3 33.3 8.8 3.4 3.8 -6.6 -10.4 8.4 0 
KST1 9.7 5.7 3.2 33.2 8.7 3.3 3.7 -6.6 -10.5 8.3 6.9 
use' 9.6 5.5 3.0 33.0 8.5 3.2 3.6 -6.7 -10.6 8.2 6.8 
EU 37.6 36.3 36.8 79.6 63.0 29.2 27.1 22.0 29.1 31.8 30.5 
EFTA 9.6 5.7 3.1 33.8 9.7 3.4 3.8 -6.5 -10.5 8.5 7.0 
Row -0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -2.5 -5.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Ex2eriment 1, CATO 
Table 7.4 Total exports by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 0.2 0.3 0.3 -4.3 -1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.3 
Japan 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -3.1 -1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.4 0.0 
EAC1 19.2 -5.2 9.1 355.3 116.6 7.9 9.8 23.1 48.0 9.8 -1.1 
IMT1 0.0 0.3 0.1 -4.2 -1.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.5 0.1 
KST1 0.0 0.1 0.1 -2.5 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.5 0.1 
use' -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -1.9 -1.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.4 0.0 
EU 1.8 0.5 2.2 2.4 10.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.2 1.0 
EFTA 0.4 0.3 0.2 -8.1 -1.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -1.0 1.3 0.2 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1, CATO 
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Europe Agreement countries' total exports of most commodities expand 
substantially reflecting the expansion into the EU market which is their largest 
market by far for most of its goods. European Union exports of most goods 
expand much less, reflecting the smallness of the Europe Agreement countries 
market from their point of view. Total exports of textiles expand more 
substantially because their growth to the Europe Agreement countries was 
relatively large. 
Because Europe Agreement countries had a relatively sizable share of 
the EU market for clothing and textiles prior to the preferential arrangement, 
structural change for the Europe Agreement countries is large (Table 7 .5). 
Clothing output expands considerably. Some other sectors, including processed 
food, contract as resources are pulled into production of clothing and textiles. 
The degree of specialisation engendered by the preferential agreement may be 
sub-optimal, which may seem unimportant to the Europe Agreement countries 
while preferences are in place, but the eventual erosion of preferences via 
multilateral trade talks could give rise to greater adjustment costs. The EU 
experiences contraction in output in the clothing industry and this is reflected in 
the contraction of demand for labour in that industry (Table 7.6). 
Trade liberalisation by the European Union toward Europe Agreement 
countries results in adjustment in the rest of the world, although this is small, 
reflecting the relatively small size of the Europe Agreement countries in total 
world trade. The principal direction of change for other economies is in the 
contraction of clothing and textiles. 
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Table 7.5 Changes in output by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 -0.02 0.18 0.12 -2.72 -0.72 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.22 0.48 0.05 
Japan 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.17 -0.33 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.20 0.26 0.01 
EAC1 2.62 -2.34 -2.28 196.33 46.63 0.97 2.89 -3.38 2.31 7.70 1.36 
IMT1 0.00 0.18 0.07 -2.38 -1.31 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.31 -0.01 
KST1 -0.02 0.09 0.02 -1.50 -0.93 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 -0.15 0.45 0.02 
usc1 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.65 -0.52 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.14 0.27 0.01 
EU -0.03 0.19 0.29 -7.64 0.10 0.27 0.23 0.63 0.22 1.52 0.14 
EFTA 0.09 0.20 0.08 -5.77 -1.38 0.07 0.04 -0.14 -0.41 0.88 0.05 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Ex2eriment 1, CATO 
Table 7.6 Demand for labour by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 0.0 0.2 0.1 -2.7 -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 
EAC1 4.5 -1.1 0.0 201.2 49.6 3.3 5.6 -1.6 3.7 9.8 3.5 
IMT1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -2.4 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.1 
KST1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.5 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.4 0.0 
usc1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
EU 0.0 0.2 0.3 -7.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.6 0.2 
EFTA 0.1 0.2 0.1 -5.8 -1.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.9 0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1, CATO 
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Total exports of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, Korea-Singapore-Taiwan and 
developing Asia fall (Table 7.7). As noted earlier, the model does not capture 
trade within each of the regions in Asia. For example, it does not capture trade 
between Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, or between China and India. Thus the 
model is likely to underestimate the increase in intra-Asian trade which could 
offset the contraction in their total exports. Developing Asia loses the most as 
India, one of its component countries, is more dependent on EU markets than 
are the EA6 in clothing and textiles. The ability to divert trade more easily is 
also reflected in the smaller overall falls in export volumes in the EA6 than in 
developing Asia. 
Table 7. 7 Overall assessment, Experiment 1 
GDP1 GDP Terms of Trade exports imports 
% change % change 
$millions 
Dev Asia1 -297 -0.04 -0.01 -0.7 -0.2 
Japan 347 0.01 0.00 -0.1 0.0 
EAC1 3438 1.93 -0.16 36.8 20.5 
IMT1 13 0.00 -0.01 -0.2 -0.1 
KST1 -89 -0.02 0.00 -0.2 -0.1 
USC1 -70 0.00 0.00 -0.2 0.1 
EU 5523 0.09 0.00 1.8 2.2 
EFfA 305 0.04 0.01 -0.1 0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1, CATO 
Both the Europe Agreement countries and the EU increase total trade 
and gain in GDP from the preferential arrangement, suggesting that trade 
creation is larger for them than trade diversion, with the Europe Agreement 
countries gaining more in percentage terms (Table 7.7). This confirms the 
conclusions of Home and Huang ( 1996) and partial equilibrium analysis by 
Rollo and Smith (1993). The effect on most other countries' GDP is negligible, 
but the direction of effects on GDP for developing Asia and Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan is negative. 
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Experiment 2: A preferential agreement between the EU and the Europe 
Agreement countries plus the Uruguay Round effects 
It is assumed that the Uruguay Round tariff cuts in manufactures have been 
implemented. Table 7.8 reports weighted averages for the pre-Uruguay Round and post-
Uruguay Round tariffs and percentage reductions for the country groups used in CATO. 
Pre-Uruguay Round tariffs used are either the bound tariff rates, in cases where the tariff 
was bound at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, or the tariff rate applied in 
September 1986 if the tariff rate was not previously bound. In most industrial countries, 
the pre-Uruguay Round bound tariff rate is the same as the applied rate for most 
commodities. In developing countries, by contrast, only around one fifth of industrial 
products were subject to bound tariffs prior to the Uruguay Round so the average tariffs 
reported are based on applied rates. Tariff reductions from the previous seven rounds of 
GATT trade negotiations have reduced tariff barriers in industrial countries to very low 
levels for most products. This is most obvious for mineral products, where tariff rates 
have fallen below 3 per cent in major industrial countries. Nevertheless, some unskilled 
labour-intensive products, notably clothing and textiles, are still subject to relatively 
high tariff rates. Tariffs in Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand and developing Asia tend to be 
much higher than those in industrial countries and their Uruguay Round commitments 
lead to a larger reduction in the level of their tariffs. Agricultural commodities are 
highly protected, most notably in Korea and Taiwan. 
Following Yang (1993) and Yang et al. (1996), NTBs are not explicitly 
considered in the representation of the Uruguay Round liberalisation. There is, however, 
an implicit assumption that NTBs are relaxed to allow tariff reductions to affect import 
prices. It was shown in chapter 5 that the EA6 are among the countries most frequently 
targetted by NTBs. Thus allowing EU tariff cuts to impact on the price of imports from 
all sources implies that more NTBs will have been cut for them than for more preferred 
sources. 
The one exception to the assumed decline of NTBs is the MFA. The MFA 
phase-out is assumed to be endloaded, so that in the medium term little change occurs to 
the EU' s restrictiveness in clothing and textiles trade. The tariff equivalent of MF A 
quotas has been calculated to be considerably higher than the MFN tariff in a number of 
cases. Thus, tariff cuts in clothing and textiles are ineffective. 
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Table 7 .8 Average tariff cuts under Uruguay Round agreements 
Manufactures 
Pre-Uruguay Round Post-Uruguay Round Percentage cut 
Dev Asia1 17.2 10.1 41.3 
Japan 2.9 1.7 57.1 
EAC1 8.2 6.3 23.2 
IMT1 21.1 16.0 21.9 
KST1 7.3 4.1 44.1 
usc1 4.3 2.8 34.9 
EU 6.5 3.9 40.0 
EFfA 5.2 3.3 37.0 
Row 10.6 9.1 14.2 
Note: import weighted average tariffs calculated for the country groups in CATO; 
1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Agriculture 
Percentage cut 
24.0 
37.0 
24.0 
28.0 
28.0 
37.0 
37.0 
37.0 
24.0 
Source: Based on Hertel, T., Martin, W., Yanagishima, K. and B. Dimaranan, 1995. 'Liberalising 
Manufactures Trade in a Changing World Economy', Presented at The Uruguay Round and the 
Developing Countries, A World Bank Conference, January 26-27, World Bank, Washington. Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Council, 1995. Survey of Impediments to Trade and Investment in the APEC 
Region, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
As with Experiment 1, it is necessary to include changes in barriers in 
agricultural and services trade in order to capture their system-wide effects. For 
industrial countries, Uruguay Round commitments require that agricultural tariff 
reductions are over a six-year period from 1995-2001. Developing countries are 
required to reduce tariffs over a ten-year period from 1995 to 2004. The Experiment 
assumes that agricultural tariff commitments have been met by the developed countries 
and have been half completed by developing countries. Non-tariff barriers in agriculture 
have been relaxed to the point where tariff cuts have a full impact. 
The GATS (see chapter 5) covers trade in services in all forms including 
commercial presence and temporary entry. The basic principle is most-favoured nation, 
although measures which are inconsistent with this obligation can be maintained in 
principle for not more than ten years. In addition, transparency applies to domestic 
regulations relevant to trade in services. The GATS provides for the progressive 
liberalisation of trade in services through the scheduling of commitments. Market access 
and national treatment apply to service activities. No service sector was excluded from 
the Agreement but participants were free to specify the services for which they would 
provide market access and national treatment. The schedules of the major industrial 
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countries cover nearly all sectors, though with exceptions, such as maritime transport 
and audiovisual services. Basic telecommunications, on which it was generally agreed 
that commitments would not be made in the Uruguay Round, are also the subject of 
ongoing negotiations. Negotiations are also in progress for maritime transport, financial 
services and the movement of persons. In the experiment it is assumed that services 
trade has been liberalised to some extent; the average tariff cut in manufactures is used 
as a proxy. 
Compared to Experiment 1, Europe Agreement countries' exports to the 
EU expand somewhat less for some commodities, including clothing and 
textiles, but they actually expand more for other commodities (Table 7.9). The 
Uruguay Round's erosion of Europe Agreement countries' preferences in the 
EU market is off set by a much larger rise in EU income, which increases EU 
demand for imports in total. When some recipient countries of GSP and Lome 
preferences complained during the Uruguay Round negotiations about the 
erosion of their preferences (OECD 1995) they failed to take into account the 
income effects of the Uruguay Round reductions. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, exports of clothing and textiles from 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand increased to the EU. This is the result of the 
increase in EU income as preference margins in these sectors for the Europe 
Agreement have not been reduced (the MFA is still in operation) and it is also 
the result of the competitive gains that Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand make 
because of the larger cut in their tariff levels. Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand also 
make gains in other sectors reflecting both the reduction of EU tariff barriers 
and the income effect. 
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Table 7 .9 Exports to the EU by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 44.0 8.7 9.9 7.4 9.0 24.5 17.3 23.7 22.0 36.2 20.9 
Japan 0.0 0.0 6.4 -11.0 0.8 6.9 5.6 4.4 -1.7 22.4 10.6 
EAC1 37.0 16.9 27.7 415.6 162.7 16.5 18.0 28.1 121.5 28.3 4.6 
IMT1 28.4 -2.6 0.7 9.6 11.3 8.4 7.4 16.1 2.5 28.7 10.9 
KST1 33.2 -1.2 2.6 -8.3 -1.8 7.3 8.0 12.5 2.3 24.7 9.9 
USC1 32.3 -0.2 -1.2 -16.0 -6.1 5.8 4.2 3.5 -2.7 20.4 9.3 
EFTA 34.0 0.1 4.8 -9.6 -1.3 7.6 7.3 7.0 2.0 23.7 11.5 
Row 31.8 -1.5 -2.8 -18.9 -8.1 4.2 2.7 1.0 -5.9 18.2 8.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: ExEeriment 2, CA TO 
Table 7.10 EU exports to regions by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 25.2 34.9 20.8 10.7 21.9 32.4 9.7 6.3 9.4 16.1 23.0 
Japan 19.3 2.9 9.5 29.6 7.0 11.0 11.6 17.2 0.9 19.0 5.1 
EAC1 37.8 33.0 37.9 55.9 77.5 28.4 25.8 20.0 26.8 37.7 14.7 
IMT1 13.1 23.6 23.6 101.1 56.2 10.8 3.3 7.1 -1.5 27.1 14.4 
KST1 11.5 6.0 7.1 4.8 13.8 11.8 12.5 10.l 1.1 17.0 12.9 
USC1 15.9 0.9 6.3 0.9 1.4 7.7 6.2 4.5 1.4 17.7 6.5 
EFTA 3.9 4.5 6.5 -1.0 2.9 5.7 4.6 4.6 4.9 13.0 6.6 
Row 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.4 -0.7 -1.3 0.0 -0.7 0.7 -0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 2, CA TO 
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In contrast to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand and developing Asia, Korea-
Singapore-Taiwan exports of clothing and textiles (as with most other regions) 
do not fully overcome the contraction of exports of clothing and textiles arising 
from the preferential agreement with the Europe Agreement countries. This 
highlights the greater competitiveness of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand and 
developing Asia exports of clothing and textiles. It suggests the need for the 
Korea-Singapore-Taiwan to move out of clothing and textiles. Compared to 
Experiment 1, Korea-Singapore-Taiwan make gains in other sectors including 
machinery and "other manufactures". They have much larger shares than 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand in these products, therefore the percentage 
increase of the Korea-Singapore-Taiwan share represents a much larger gain in 
value terms. 
European Union exports increase rapidly to other regions; generally 
though, because of the Europe agreements, they still increase faster to the 
Europe Agreement countries (Table 7.10). With large cuts in tariffs in 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand in clothing and textiles, EU exports of clothing 
and textiles grow rapidly to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand as do other countries' 
exports. 
For most countries total exports of each commodity and output changes, 
are greater in this experiment than in the first (Table 7 .11 and 7 .12). The large 
increase in total clothing and textiles exports of the EA6 is the result of an 
increase in clothing and textiles exports to markets without MF A restrictions. 
Like the EU, Korea-Singapore-Taiwan expand their exports of clothing and 
textiles to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. Structural change in the Europe 
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Table 7 .11 Total exports by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 20.5 8.5 13.3 22.0 15.8 24.6 15.6 24.5 16.2 32.5 18.5 
Japan 10.5 0.8 8.0 3.0 20.7 10.4 7.5 5.2 0.4 19.2 6.5 
EAC1 17.5 -1.5 9.7 351.4 116.7 11.2 11.2 19.9 50.8 19.7 2.8 
IMT1 10.5 2.5 5.0 23.9 21.0 11.3 9.3 17.8 2.9 24.5 8.5 
KST1 10.5 0.5 9.0 8.7 16.6 11.5 9.0 12.9 4.1 21.6 7.0 
use' 12.6 0.8 2.0 -1.5 2.4 6.1 4.9 4.8 -1.1 13.5 8.0 
EU 6.2 2.2 7.3 4.7 14.2 7.7 6.9 6.5 3.9 16.1 6.9 
EFTA 13.1 0.4 6.4 -4.8 3.0 8.0 7.8 7.3 2.7 21.6 10.6 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Ex2eriment 2, CATO D 
Table 7.12 Changes in output by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 1.1 -5.0 1.9 14.9 0.4 -1.8 0.0 2.9 -3.2 22.3 3.7 
Japan -5.3 0.6 0.6 -5.0 1.6 1.2 0.8 1.5 0.3 11.1 0.7 
EAC1 2.4 -2.0 -2.5 192.1 45.4 1.7 2.8 -4.5 2.5 10.5 1.9 
IMT1 1.5 -0.8 0.3 13.2 -3.8 0.9 1.9 5.2 1.1 15.9 0.4 
KST1 0.4 -0.2 0.5 4.4 11.0 2.4 2.2 4.2 1.9 18.4 0.5 
USC 1.9 0.1 0.4 -4.5 -2.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.9 -0.3 6.2 0.2 
EU -2.6 0.8 1.3 -7.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8 10.6 0.5 
EFTA 1.4 0.6 0.9 -8.9 -1.6 2.1 3.2 2.7 -1.1 14.1 1.0 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 2, CATO 
195 
Table 7 .13 Demand for labour by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 2.1 -3.8 5.1 17.4 2.8 1.1 3.4 5.8 -1.5 26.1 6.1 
Japan -7.3 0.9 1.1 -4.7 2.0 1.8 1.5 2.1 0.8 11.7 1.2 
EAC1 4.2 -0.6 0.0 197.4 48.7 4.3 5.9 -2.5 4.0 12.9 4.3 
IMT1 3.1 0.3 2.1 15.2 -1.8 3.0 4.0 7.3 2.7 18.4 2.2 
KST1 1.0 0.6 1.8 5.2 12.5 4.3 3.8 5.5 3.0 19.7 1.8 
USC 2.3 0.2 0.4 -4.5 -2.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.9 -0.3 6.3 0.2 
EU -2.7 1.0 1.5 -7.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.9 10.9 0.8 
EFTA 2.2 1.3 1.7 -8.5 -1.1 2.8 4.0 3.4 -0.6 14.8 1.7 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text.. 
Source: Experiment 2, CATO 
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Agreement countries still centres on clothing and textiles where their 
preferences are largest because there has been no change in the MF A. 
Interestingly, the decline in labour demand in the clothing industry for 
the EU is no larger in this experiment, despite the expansion of exports from 
other countries to the EU in this industry (Table 7.13). 
Total exports and imports of all countries expand (Table 7 .14 ). Europe 
Agreement countries' trade grows fastest as they benefit from the preferential 
arrangement and Uruguay Round cuts. Changes in GDP are, of course, larger 
when the Uruguay Round cuts are implemented. The magnitudes for the USC 
and EU are comparable to the magnitudes attained by Banks et al. (1990) who 
use a model with a similar structure. 
Table 7.14 Overall assessment, Experiment 2 
GDP1 GDP Terms of Trade exports imports 
$million % change % change 
Dev Asia1 21187 2.81 -0.63 19.23 17.15 
Japan 11512 0.36 0.01 5.67 9.39 
EAC1 4170 2.34 -0.18 38.71 21.86 
IMT1 1221 0.44 -0.10 12.08 12.24 
KST1 3347 0.66 -0.17 11.16 10.54 
USC 22490 0.39 0.04 5.20 4.91 
EU 28389 0.46 0.02 6.51 9.25 
EFTA 8292 1.05 -0.02 7.21 5.32 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 2, CATO 
Experiment 3: Preferential agreement between the EU and the Europe 
Agreement, unilateral cut in EA6 tariffs and Uruguay Round cuts in other 
countries. 
As shown in chapter 2, the EA6 are liberalising their trade regimes faster than their 
Uruguay Round commitments. Along with the preferential agreement between the EU 
and the Europe Agreement countries, EA6 tariff barriers to trade are cut by double that 
of their Uruguay Round commitments. Other regions follow their Uruguay Round 
commitments as in Experiment 2. 
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Compared to Experiment 2, unilateral cuts in the Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand lead to a much larger expansion of 
their exports, almost across the board (Table 7.15). Only natural resource 
exports from Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand do not expand, but they show a 
smaller contraction than in Experiment 2. The increase in exports happens even 
though there is no difference in EU trade barriers towards the EA6 between 
Experiments 2 and 3. Other countries' exports expand essentially by the same 
proportion as in Experiment 2. Europe Agreement countries' exports of clothing 
and textiles expand only slightly less than in Experiment 2. This means the EA6 
have gained market shares in the EU without the contraction of other countries' 
exports. European Union income has risen even more than in Experiment 2. 
Thus while the greater competitiveness of the EA6 has led to a substitution of 
EU demand towards their exports away from other countries' products, the 
expansion of demand for total imports has sustained the export growth rates 
from other countries. Unilateral reductions can be a positive sum game even in 
trade flows to a particular market. 
The impact of unilateral reductions by the EA6 sheds light on claims 
that the single European market has not led to trade diversion because trade 
growth by non-members has kept up with trade growth by members in the 
1990s. The model suggests that the EA6' s rapid unilateral liberalisation during 
this period, by greatly increasing efficiency, contributed to overcoming trade 
diversion difficulties. 
Compared to Experiment 2, EU exports to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
and Korea-Singapore-Taiwan rise very rapidly (Table 7.16), as they do for other 
countries' exports to the EA6. The EU does not gain larger market shares in the 
EA6. The growth of European Union exports to other markets is slightly slower. 
In clothing, textiles, processed food and other manufactures, the expansion of 
EU exports to Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand is substantially faster than to the 
Europe Agreement countries. This is partly because of the deeper cut in 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand tariffs than in the Europe Agreement countries. 
While the EU has to compete more with other countries' exports in the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand market than it does in the Europe Agreement 
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market, the Europe Agreement countries' Uruguay Round cuts make their 
preferences to the EU less valuable. 
Compared with Experiment 2, total exports by commodity group, 
increase more for Korea-Singapore-Taiwan and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand 
(Table 7 .17). There was a particularly sharp rise in clothing and textiles for 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand because of the continuing relatively low labour 
costs of Indonesia and Thailand. In Korea-Singapore-Taiwan the rise is more 
evenly spread over transport, textiles, clothing, machinery and other 
manufactures. This is reflected in greater changes in output structure towards 
clothing and textiles in Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand (Table 7 .18). Despite the 
expansion of EA6 exports of clothing and textiles to the EU, the contraction of 
the demand for labour in the clothing industries in the EU is not much larger 
than in Experiments 1 or 2, and the demand for labour in the textiles industry is 
larger than in Experiment 1 (Table 7 .19). 
Compared with Experiment 2, total export and import volumes expand 
for Korea-Singapore-Taiwan and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand (Table 7.20). 
The GDP of all countries except Japan increases more than in Experiment 2. 
The barter terms of trade of EA6 countries fall more but GDP gains are still 
larger. The EU' s income rises considerably more, partly because of the effect of 
cheaper imports from the EA6. 
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Table 7 .15 Exports to the EU by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 44.0 8.8 10.0 7.7 8.9 24.8 17.6 23.3 22.4 37.4 21.1 
Japan 0.0 0.0 6.4 -12.5 -0.1 6.7 5.4 3.2 -2.2 22.9 10.4 
EAC' 37.3 17.3 28.1 409.9 161.2 16.7 18.1 27.2 121.8 29.3 4.9 
IMT' 31.5 -2.5 6.3 65.0 42.3 13.8 13.0 31.7 14.1 41.8 14.9 
KST' 38.3 0.7 9.3 1.8 4.5 11.2 14.0 23.9 11.5 32.7 13.0 
use' 32.1 -0.1 -1.2 -16.9 -6.8 5.8 4.2 2.6 -2.8 21.1 9.3 
EFTA 33.9 0.2 4.8 -10.9 -2.1 7.5 7.2 6.1 1.8 24.4 11.5 
Row 31.5 -1.6 -3.0 -20.6 -9.2 3.9 2.4 -0.3 -6.4 18.6 7.9 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Ex2eriment 3, CATO 
Table 7.16 EU exports to regions by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia' 25.2 35.1 20.7 8.1 18.8 31.9 9.0 4.4 9.0 15.9 23.0 
Japan 19.0 3.1 9.4 28.2 6.5 11.2 11.8 16.6 0.7 19.6 5.3 
EAC1 37.5 32.9 37.7 48.8 76.2 28.3 25.6 19.8 26.6 38.0 14.4 
IMT' 20.7 47.9 44.0 284.0 144.3 19.1 5.5 12.4 -0.7 57.9 29.8 
KST' 17.8 8.1 8.4 1.4 22.9 20.3 22.7 18.5 0.5 30.2 24.3 
use' 16.0 0.9 6.3 -1.7 0.2 7.6 6.1 3.1 1.3 18.3 6.5 
EFTA 3.9 4.6 6.4 -2.5 2.5 5.7 4.6 4.0 4.9 13.4 6.5 
Row 31.5 -1.6 -3.0 -20.6 -9.2 3.9 2.4 -0.3 -6.4 18.6 7.9 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Ex2eriment 3, CATO 
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Table 7.17 Total exports of by commodity 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 22.1 9.2 15.0 22.1 19.2 26.7 16.8 25.9 16.5 34.9 20.1 
Japan 10.7 0.7 8.9 1.5 26.9 12.7 9.9 5.8 0.0 22.2 8.3 
EAC1 17.8 -1.3 9.9 346.2 115.5 11.7 11.2 19.2 51.0 20.5 3.3 
IMT1 14.1 3.1 10.9 84.5 57.7 18.9 17.0 35.7 13.5 40.5 12.7 
KST1 14.5 2.6 17.2 21.3 30.9 16.7 15.1 24.3 12.8 30.9 10.1 
USC 13.2 1.0 2.5 -1.4 4.5 7.1 6.2 5.7 -1.2 16.1 9.4 
EU 6.2 2.3 7.6 3.7 14.7 7.9 7.4 6.4 3.7 17.4 8.0 
EFTA 13.2 0.6 6.5 -6.0 2.9 8.2 7.9 6.8 2.5 22.9 11.3 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST see the text. 
Source: ExEeriment 3, CATO 
Table 7 .18 Changes in output by commodity 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 1.2 -4.8 2.0 14.7 0.2 -1.6 -0.1 2.4 -3.0 23.6 3.9 
Japan -5.4 0.6 0.6 -6.3 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.5 0.1 12.4 0.7 
EAC1 2.4 -1.9 -2.4 187.3 44.5 1.9 2.8 -4.6 2.6 10.6 1.9 
IMT1 2.0 -2.9 1.2 47.2 -1.6 1.1 4.3 10.4 -0.6 27.3 1.1 
KST1 0.2 0.4 1.5 11.4 19.9 3.3 3.4 8.1 7.2 26.5 0.9 
USC 2.1 0.2 0.4 -6.4 -3.6 -0.5 -0.5 -2.4 -0.3 7.2 0.2 
EU -2.5 0.8 1.3 -9.0 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.7 11.4 0.6 
EFTA 1.4 0.7 1.0 -10.2 -1.9 2.2 3.3 2.3 -1.2 14.9 1.0 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 3, CATO 
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Table 7.19 Demand for labour by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 2.3 -3.4 5.4 17.3 2.8 1.5 3.5 5.5 -1.2 27.7 6.5 
Japan -7.4 0.9 1.1 -5.9 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 0.6 13.1 1.3 
EAC1 4.3 -0.5 0.2 192.6 47.7 4.5 5.9 -2.6 4.1 13.1 4.3 
IMT1 4.5 -0.6 5.0 52.5 2.6 5.5 8.7 15.1 2.6 32.9 5.0 
KST1 0.9 1.7 3.7 12.9 22.6 6.5 6.3 10.5 9.1 28.8 3.3 
USC 2.5 0.3 0.5 -6.4 -3.6 -0.5 -0.5 -2.3 -0.3 7.3 0.3 
EU -2.7 1.0 1.6 -8.7 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.8 11.7 0.9 
EFfA 2.3 1.4 1.8 -9.7 -1.3 2.9 4.1 3.0 -0.7 15.7 1.8 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 3, CATO 
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Table 7.20 Overall assessment, Experiment 3 
GDP1 GDP Terms of Trade exports imports 
% change % change 
$millions 
Dev Asia1 22722 3.01 -0.56 20.74 18.21 
Japan 10823 0.34 0.04 6.62 10.70 
EAC1 4211 2.37 -0.17 38.57 21.92 
IMT1 2364 0.85 -0.47 24.84 26.35 
KST1 5959 1.17 -0.66 19.64 19.32 
USC 30676 0.53 0.06 6.08 4.99 
EU 29941 0.48 0.04 6.87 9.87 
EFTA 8604 1.09 0.00 7.29 5.43 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 3, CATO 
Experiment 4: EU reduces its barriers unilaterally, including the 
elimination of the MFA, EA6 reduces its barriers unilaterally, the Uruguay 
Round is implemented for other regions. 
A purely hypothetical question is asked: what if the EU adopted the EA6 
approach to trade liberalisation? This experiment is represented by EU tariff 
barrier cuts of double their Uruguay Round commitments, while the EA6 and 
other countries reduce barriers as in Experiment 3. 
Compared with Experiment 3, exports to the EU from all countries rise 
even more, except for exports from the Europe Agreement countries (Table 
7.21). The expansion of exports from the Europe Agreement countries is less 
even in clothing and textiles. Exports of clothing and textiles from Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand rise much more than the Europe Agreement countries 
exports of these products. Exports of clothing and textiles from developing Asia 
rise on par with exports from Europe Agreement countries. However, the 
increase in absolute terms is larger because developing Asia has a much larger 
share of the EU market in clothing and textiles than any other region. 
These results suggest that while Europe Agreement countries firms are 
more competitive in mass-produced clothing than West European countries, 
they are not competitive with some East and South Asian producers. Thus the 
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Europe Agreements are providing incentives for them to specialise in products 
in which they are not competitive in a global context. 
Compared with Experiment 3, Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand exports of 
other commodities to the EU experience a smaller rise. Korea-Singapore-
Taiwan exports to the EU rise more evenly across commodities. 
Compared with Experiment 3, the rise in exports to the Europe 
Agreement countries are much more evenly spread out across sources. 
Compared with Experiment 3, EU exports grow even faster to all 
markets except the Europe Agreement countries, where it has no preferential 
treatment (Table 7.22). European Union exports to Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand and Korea-Singapore-Taiwan grow faster than US-Canada or Japanese 
exports to these markets. The EU thus gains market shares in the EA6; as with 
the EA6 in Experiment 3, unilateral reductions in the EU increases its 
competitiveness. 
Although the EU has lost preferences in the Europe Agreement 
countries' market, the relatively higher increases in total exports of most 
commodities has in most cases more than offset this (Table 7.23). Total EU 
exports thus rise much more than in Experiment 3. Unilateral reductions in the 
EU therefore expand its total exports much more than the creation of the Europe 
Agreement preferential trading area. 
Some Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand outputs in sectors other than 
clothing and textiles fall often doing worse in this experiment than in 
Experiment 3 (Table 7.24). Resources are pulled more into the clothing and 
textiles sector at the expense of other sectors than in Experiment 3. The rise in 
Korea-Singapore-Taiwan outputs is more even across sectors than for 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand. Compared with previous experiments the 
increased competitiveness of the EU involves much larger adjustments 
including a larger contraction of labour demand in clothing and a reduction of 
labour demand in textiles. 
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Table 7.21 Exports to the EU by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 48.2 7.7 2.2 121.0 50.8 25.7 16.7 24.1 23.0 53.9 25.4 
Japan 0.0 0.0 4.7 -3.0 13.4 11.3 8.2 5.2 7.0 42.8 19.1 
EAC1 38.9 3.1 -4.1 134.5 56.3 10.5 7.9 7.4 8.4 41.2 17.2 
IMT1 38.8 -4.2 0.6 294.1 84.8 14.5 13.2 17.9 34.4 60.4 19.9 
KST' 46.8 3.6 6.1 46.9 21.0 14.6 16.3 18.4 27.4 53.1 20.5 
use' 43.l 4.8 -2.2 -5.2 6.7 10.7 7.4 5.3 6.9 41.3 18.2 
EFTA 43.0 3.6 4.5 0.6 12.0 11.8 10.4 8.0 10.4 44.9 19.9 
Row 42.9 3.0 -4.1 -12.3 3.1 8.5 5.4 0.9 3.6 38.0 16.5 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC, USC see the text. 
Source: ExQeriment 4, CATO 
Table 7 .22 EU exports to each region by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 18.4 43.3 31.5 25.2 48.3 38.4 16.0 15.2 8.2 26.6 30.6 
Japan 7.2 8.2 14.7 24.7 9.2 15.1 15.4 5.1 21.5 23.4 8.0 
EAC1 -1.6 13.3 18.6 0.2 27.8 12.1 10.2 10.0 7.7 18.6 11.8 
IMT1 13.2 59.1 55.0 312.1 236.9 25.4 14.7 5.7 16.6 63.5 35.0 
KST1 10.3 13.9 14.8 -7.3 34.1 25.3 29.4 6.0 23.0 36.1 28.9 
USC1 4.2 4.9 10.8 -12.6 1.0 10.9 8.8 6.1 6.9 22.5 8.9 
EFTA -3.1 7.6 9.3 -11.6 4.8 8.3 6.6 8.7 6.7 16.8 9.5 
Row 1.6 1.8 1.5 2.5 2.4 1.7 0.8 1.0 2.3 2.8 1.0 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 4, CATO 
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Table 7 .23 Total exports by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 19.3 4.7 8.8 106.4 49.5 22.9 13.6 12.1 22.1 36.4 19.3 
Japan 10.3 0.0 8.9 0.7 43.5 13.5 11.8 0.7 6.4 28.8 9.9 
EAC1 20.0 -1.0 -3.3 122.2 45.4 9.1 5.8 4.6 6.0 28.3 11.0 
IMT1 14.9 -1.9 6.8 268.1 89.4 15.7 15.5 13.4 33.0 41.1 13.1 
KST1 13.8 1.2 16.2 41.7 51.0 16.2 16.6 12.9 24.1 36.2 10.8 
USC 16.4 1.5 2.6 -2.2 11.9 8.8 8.4 1.7 7.4 23.7 14.3 
EU 2.2 4.5 10.2 -0.4 14.1 10.4 9.7 7.1 8.9 20.2 10.7 
EFTA 15.1 2.3 6.6 0.6 13.5 11.5 10.3 5.4 9.8 37.0 17.4 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: ExEeriment 4, CATO 
Table 7.24 Output levels by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 1.7 -7.4 -0.1 65.5 13.3 -3.4 -1.0 -8.3 -1.6 22.4 3.9 
Japan -5.1 0.8 0.6 -15.4 0.5 1.5 1.2 0.4 1.8 14.6 0.7 
EAC1 3.1 -0.8 -2.2 58.9 14.5 1.7 1.0 -2.7 -3.0 8.2 1.1 
IMT1 2.5 -6.4 -0.7 147.6 23.2 -0.2 3.9 -3.0 8.2 30.3 2.2 
KST1 0.6 -Q.3 1.2 18.2 33.7 3.0 5.4 6.2 7.4 30.7 0.9 
USC 3.0 0.6 0.6 -19.3 -7.7 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -1.7 9.5 0.4 
EU -3.8 0.6 2.4 -16.6 -2.9 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 17.0 0.9 
EFTA 2.5 1.6 0.8 -14.6 0.9 2.9 4.2 -1.3 3.4 23.2 1.3 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: ExEeriment 4, CATO 
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Table 7 .25 Demand for labour by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 3.1 -5.8 3.9 70.1 16.8 0.3 3.3 -6.2 2.0 27.3 6.9 
Japan -7.0 1.1 1.2 -15.0 0.9 2.2 2.1 0.9 2.5 15.3 1.4 
EAC1 4.8 -0.1 -0.9 60.4 15.8 3.0 2.6 -1.9 -1.9 9.4 2.4 
IMT1 5.9 -3.0 5.3 161.6 31.6 6.6 10.9 1.8 15.5 39.5 8.4 
KST1 1.6 1.2 3.7 20.0 37.0 6.7 8.8 8.3 10.1 33.5 3.6 
USC 3.5 0.6 0.6 -19.3 -7.7 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -1.7 9.6 0.4 
EU -4.0 0.9 2.8 -16.3 -2.6 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.2 17.4 1.4 
EFTA 3.8 2.6 2.0 -14.1 1.7 3.9 5.3 -0.6 4.4 24.4 2.4 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 4, CATO 
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Compared to Experiment 3, total imports and total exports increase for 
most countries except the Europe Agreement countries (Table 7.26). GDP also 
increases more for all countries. GDP gains for the EU are substantially larger 
than in Experiment 3 as the EU is able to get inputs from the cheapest sources, 
increase its competitiveness and gain market shares in most markets. The 
biggest loser is the Europe Agreement group which lose over half of the income 
gain they made in Experiment 3. The experiment suggests that the Europe 
Agreement countries cannot compete with clothing and textiles from Indonesia-
Malaysia-Thailand. Their competitiveness is likely to lie elsewhere. 
Table 7 .26 Overall assessment, Experiment 4 
GDP1 GDP Terms of Trade exports imports 
$millions % change % change 
Dev Asia1 32060 4.25 -0.98 35.61 23.86 
Japan 7801 0.25 0.07 7.90 12.77 
EAC1 1877 1.05 -0.09 17.59 11.45 
IMT1 2544 0.92 -0.60 33.08 32.84 
KST1 7170 1.40 -0.62 22.86 21.40 
USC 40260 0.69 0.10 8.68 6.85 
EU 43277 0.70 -0.02 8.85 16.31 
EFfA 11645 1.47 0.16 11.05 7.31 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC, see the text. 
Source: Experiment 4, CATO 
Modifications of experiments 
In Experiment 1 the choice of reductions in agriculture and services in the 
preferential agreements between the EU and the Europe Agreement countries 
may have been too optimistic. Through feedback effects in the economy the 
optimistic assumptions may have had strong effects on the results of 
Experiment 1. To what extent do economy-wide results change if it is assumed 
that there are no reductions in agriculture and services ? 
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Table 7 .27 Overall assessment for Experiment 1 modified 
GDP1 GDP Terms of Trade exports imports 
$ millions % change % change 
Dev Asia1 -308 -0.04 -0.01 -0.7 -0.2 
Japan 350 0.01 0.00 -0.1 0.0 
EAC1 3723 2.09 -0.18 34.6 17.8 
IMT1 10 0.00 -0.01 -0.2 -0.1 
KST1 -93 -0.02 0.00 -0.2 -0.1 
USC -64 0.00 0.00 -0.2 0.1 
EU 4399 0.07 0.01 1.5 2.0 
EFTA 294 0.04 0.01 -0.1 0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment! modified, CATO 
The overall results show that compared to Experiment 1, there is very little 
effect on the income, trade and terms of trade changes for most regions (Table 
2.27). This is not surprising since the modification is only in one sector and 
between two regions, one being a relatively small region. Compared to 
Experiment 1 the EU gains less but the Europe Agreement countries gain more. 
Compared to Experiment 1, there is predictably much less expansion in 
agriculture trade between the EU and Europe Agreement countries (Table 2.28 
and Table 2.29). In services the difference from Experiment 1 is smaller than in 
agriculture. This is partly because the reduction chosen for services in 
Experiment 1 was less (in agriculture all tariffs were eliminated while in 
services the reduction in trade barriers paralleled the average reduction of tariffs 
in manufactures). 
Compared to Experiment 1, in Experiment 1 (modified), agricultural 
imports by Europe Agreement countries are far less skewed towards EU 
agricultural products (Table 7.30). The ROW has been able to expand its 
exports of agricultural products to the Europe Agreement countries, whereas in 
Experiment 1, they fell. Without a preferential margin in the Europe Agreement 
country markets, EU agricultural products perform much worse. This suggests 
that the expansion of EU agricultural exports to the Europe Agreement 
countries, is trade diversion. 
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Thus in Experiment 1 trade preferences to the EU in the agricultural 
sector reduces the income gains of Europe Agreement countries, but increases 
the income to the partner receiving preferences (in this case the EU). 
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Table 7. 28 Exports to the EU by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 0.0 0.3 0.2 -12.6 -3.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 1.1 0.2 
Japan 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -13.0 -3.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.3 0.9 -0.1 
EAC1 -5.4 -1.4 29.2 423.4 164.3 16.4 18.1 33.9 121.0 19.0 -5.6 
IMT1 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -12.7 -3.7 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -1.1 1.0 0.1 
KST1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -12.8 -3.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2 1.0 0.0 
USC -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -12.9 -3.8 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.4 0.9 -0.1 
EFTA -0.3 0.2 -0.1 -11.9 -3.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.2 1.1 0.1 
Row -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -13.2 -4.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.5 0.8 -0.2 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1 modified, CATO 
Table 7.29 EU exports to regions by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 -0.11 0.04 0.03 2.31 0.83 0.22 0.07 0.27 0.54 0.17 0.01 
Japan 0.16 0.12 0.26 3.12 1.87 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.70 0.19 
EAC1 7.38 35.76 35.77 62.68 79.55 28.80 26.69 21.79 28.81 32.89 7.79 
IMT1 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 2.55 0.70 0.25 -0.03 0.28 0.45 0.53 0.07 
KST1 -0.10 0.10 0.16 2.84 1.10 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.48 0.55 0.12 
USC 0.19 0.14 0.28 2.58 1.64 0.30 0.21 0.26 0.49 0.62 0.20 
EFTA 0.04 0.47 0.17 -2.14 -0.40 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.31 0.63 0.04 
Row 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1 modified, CATO 
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Table 7.30 Exports to the CEA by commodity (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 7.5 5.5 2.8 8.8 33.5 0.0 3.5 -6.6 0.0 9.3 7.8 
Japan 0.0 0.0 2.5 8.4 33.1 3.0 3.3 -6.8 -10.8 9.1 7.6 
IMT1 7.3 5.4 2.7 8.7 33.3 3.1 3.4 -6.7 -10.6 9.2 0.0 
KST1 7.3 5.3 2.6 8.6 33.2 3.0 3.3 -6.8 -10.7 9.2 7.7 
USC 7.2 5.1 2.5 8.5 33.1 2.9 3.3 -6.9 -10.8 9.1 7.6 
EU 7.4 35.8 35.8 62.7 79.5 28.8 26.7 21.8 28.8 32.9 7.8 
EFTA 7.3 5.3 2.6 9.6 33.9 3.1 3.4 -6.6 -10.6 9.3 7.8 
Row 7.1 5.0 2.3 8.2 32.9 2.8 3.2 -7.0 -10.9 9.0 7.5 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 1 modified, CATO 
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How sensitive are the results to parameter changes? 
Import substitution parameters are among the key parameters in the model. 
Their choice varies among users of CGE models. It is thus important to examine 
whether model results are sensitive to a different choice of import substitution 
parameters. If these parameters are 50 per cent lower or 50 per cent higher what 
effects does this have on the results? The variations in the parameters are tried 
out for Experiment 2. 
The overall results show that compared to the results with central 
elasticities, lower elasticities lead to less dramatic results: the change in GDP, 
exports and imports are all lower for all countries. The lower gains are to be 
expected. Lower elasticities of substitution between imports from different 
sources mean that agents are not as responsive to relative price changes. They 
do not substitute to cheaper sources of products to the same extent as they do in 
when elasticities are higher. GDP changes although lower nevertheless are of 
the same order of magnitude as the GDP changes in the central elasticities 
scenario. Thus the "profile" of changes has been preserved; the countries which 
gained the most in the central elasticities scenario continue to do so in the lower 
elasticities scenario. Similarly, the countries which gained the least still do. 
When elasticities are increased by 50 per cent, the opposite happens as 
expected. GDP gains are higher, but of the same order of magnitude as in the 
central elasticities scenario. As with the results for lowered elasticities the 
changes in GDP maintain the "profile" of the gains across the countries. 
Thus the comparison of the differences in the expansion of GDP for 
different values of elasticities suggests that the model is quite robust. 
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Table 7.31 Sensitivity analysis results with low, central and high import substitution elasticities 
GDP Exports Imports 
Low Central High Low Central High Low Central High 
Dev Asia1 18626 21187 24400 10.34 19.23 29.51 9.48 17.15 25.54 
Japan 9545 11512 11300 2.97 5.67 8.72 5.17 9.39 13.90 
EAC1 3006 4170 4470 17.75 38.71 59.02 8.74 21.86 38.64 
IMT1 1130 1221 1373 6.17 12.08 19.21 6.39 12.24 19.13 
KST1 3293 3347 3464 6.10 11.16 17.02 5.57 10.54 16.29 
USC 16727 22490 28998 2.75 5.20 7.93 2.66 4.91 7.38 
EU 27084 28389 29696 3.32 6.51 10.23 4.92 9.25 13.85 
EFTA 7612 8292 8901 4.27 7.21 10.43 3.11 5.32 7.97 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC see the text. 
Source: Sensitivity analysis, CATO 
Table 7.32 Sensitivity analysis Exports to the EU by commodity under low elasticities (per cent change) 
agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 20.8 4.1 5.2 6.6 5.1 11.4 8.3 10.2 11.1 23.8 10.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 3.0 -3.1 0.9 3.4 2.8 -1.2 2.0 17.3 5.1 
EAC1 21.1 11.8 17.2 143.4 67.9 10.8 11.2 54.3 16.6 23.2 5.2 
IMT1 14.4 -1.4 0.7 6.4 5.5 4.1 3.8 1.0 7.7 20.4 5.3 
KST1 16.0 -0.4 1.8 -1.3 -0.1 3.9 4.2 1.3 6.2 18.7 5.2 
USC1 15.9 -0.1 -0.1 -5.3 -2.2 3.1 2.3 -1.2 2.0 16.7 4.8 
EFTA 17.1 0.7 3.2 -1.4 0.5 4.3 4.1 1.6 4.1 18.6 6.2 
Row 15.7 -0.4 -0.7 -6.6 -3.0 2.5 1.8 -2.4 1.0 15.9 4.5 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC, USC see the text. 
Source: Experiment 4, CATO 
Table 7.33 Sensitivity analysis, exports to the EU by commodity under high elasticities (per cent change) 
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agriculture natural prfood clothing textiles basmnf chemical machinery transport otherman services 
resource 
Dev Asia1 70.1 13.4 14.2 8.5 12.3 51.2 27.0 37.7 34.7 49.1 32.7 
Japan 0.0 0.0 10.2 -17.8 0.3 13.4 8.6 6.9 -2.2 27.5 16.5 
EAC1 51.6 19.4 36.1 629.9 300.5 26.0 23.4 37.5 208.6 30.8 1.8 
IMT1 43.0 -3.8 0.7 16.4 18.4 16.4 11.4 25.4 4.4 37.4 17.2 
KST1 52.6 -1.9 3.4 -13.8 -3.8 13.5 12.2 19.5 3.7 30.9 15.2 
USC1 15.3 19.2 19.1 24.1 67.5 19.6 13.8 0.0 -1.1 25.4 25.0 
EFTA 51.6 -0.9 5.9 -17.2 -3.9 13.1 10.3 9.7 1.7 28.1 16.6 
Row 48.7 -2.9 -5.5 -30.0 -13.9 6.6 3.2 0.4 -10.0 19.6 11.4 
Note: 1 For the definitions of Dev Asia, EAC, IMT, KST, USC, USC see the text. 
Source: Sensitivity analysis, CA TO 
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At the sectoral level, however, it cannot be denied that the model results 
are sensitive to the elasticity changes. Compared to results using central 
elasticities (see Table 7.9), the change in exports to the EU, are markedly lower 
when lower elasticities are used and markedly higher when high elasticities are 
used (Table 7.32 and Table 7.33). 
Nevertheless, the "profile" of the changes is similar to Experiment 2 and 
the qualitative conclusions remain the same. For example, exports of the Europe 
Agreement countries expand more rapidly than other countries' exports to the 
EU. The Europe Agreement countries' expansion of exports to the EU is larger in 
clothing than in textiles. Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand and developing Asia are 
better able to offset the trade diversion than Korea-Singapore-Taiwan in clothing 
and textiles. An examination of the results in other sectors show that generally 
where expansion to the EU was relatively large in the central elasticities scenario, 
it is relatively large in the lower and higher elasticities scenarios. For example, 
for Developing Asia"other manufactures" exports to the EU had a high rate of 
expansion, relative to the expansion of most other sectors, in the central 
elasticities scenario (36 per cent). This continues to be the case in the lower (23 
per cent) and higher (49 percent) elasticities scenarios. 
The sensitivity tests show that estimates of the costs and benefits of 
preferences are exceedingly difficult to make. Even the simplest calculations of 
trade diversion and trade creation require uncertain assumptions about supply, 
demand and substitution elasticities and can only be relied upon to indicate broad 
orders of magnitude. 
There are other reasons for caution in interpreting the model results. The 
approach rules out estimations of the welfare gains from reducing the variability 
of protection through the increase of tariff bindings (Francois and Martin 1994 ). 
The model has structural limitations that call for particular caution in 
interpreting the results. It is static and therefore does not model dynamic benefits 
such as economies of scale and the effect of increased competition that were 
discussed in chapter 3. Nor does it capture the effect of preferential agreements 
on international flows of investment also discussed in chapter 3. 
It assumes no adjustment costs between the two points of equilibrium, but 
real adjustment could be costly and long. 
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Preferential agreements and other regional trade agreements also have 
"systemic" effects which cannot be examined in the CATO framework. Regional 
trade agreements can boost multilateral liberalisation in several ways. Larger 
markets may assist some firms to be competitive and encourage them to compete 
worldwide which might reduce protectionist pressures and stimulate lobbying for 
access to extra-regional markets. Regional liberalisation can act as a model for 
multilateral liberalisation particularly in areas of non-tariff barriers and trade in 
services. But for some firms a large preferential market is to be guarded from 
outsiders; they are likely to resist the reduction of external barriers. The stronger 
the preferences provided in preferential markets, the more likely are such firms to 
oppose wider liberalisation. The negotiation of regional agreements can divert 
resources from multilateral efforts. The formation of regional trade areas poses a 
risk of trade wars (Snape 1996). Studies emphasise the importance of the external 
policy stance adopted by the bloc in the assessment of costs and benefits (de la 
Torre and Kelly 1992; Hallett and Braga 1994). 
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8 Conclusions 
Different approaches to trade policies 
Trade between the EA6 countries and the EU has not been as large as could be expected, 
given the size of the total trade of both groups. Trade intensities, for example, are lower 
between these two regions than between the EA6 and the United States. The greater 
geographical distance between EA6 and Europe is a reason for relatively weaker trade 
links. Differences in the strength of cultural and political ties have also been given as 
factors, although their influence is debatable and in any case has weakened over time. In 
contrast to the United States the EU market has been fragmented into relatively small 
member country markets, that is, until the 1990s. This has also contributed to the 
weakness of trade flows as it has reduced the opportunities for economies of scale in the 
transport of goods and the establishment of distribution networks. While acknowledging 
that these factors are important, this study focuses on the EU' s discriminatory trade 
policies as a major factor behind the weak trade flows between the EA6 and EU 
countries. 
The EA6 countries, except for Singapore, adopted import substitution in the 
1950s and grew slowly. Even Singapore had a flirtation with protection in the early 
1960s. When protectionist policies failed to deliver growth, Taiwan, in the late 1950s, 
and Korea, in the early 1960s, moved to outward oriented policies. Singapore followed 
suit in 1965. Although the entire policy frameworks adopted were important, the drive 
to export (starting with unskilled labour-intensive goods) was the key to these countries' 
rapid growth. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia turned outward in the 1980s. Industrial 
countries provided large, expanding markets for EA6 exports as the GATT rounds of 
multilateral negotiations opened up European and United States/Canadian markets and 
stimulated these countries' growth. The industrial countries lost their growth momentum 
in the 1970s as "stagflation" problems took hold. EA6 exports to industrial country 
markets nevertheless continued to grow rapidly. 
The EA6 countries continued to follow growth policies in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Unilateral liberalisation and commitment to GATT principles culminated in EA6 
support for the Uruguay Round. As the level of skills in the workforce expanded in 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exports diversified. The growth of manufactured exports 
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came to dominate export growth in all EA6 countries. The EA6 began to compete with 
industrial countries in electronic consumer and producer goods as part of an expanding 
range of exports. Korea and Taiwan continued to export clothing and textiles because 
they gained rents from the MFA. Thailand diversified its exports from the 1970s. The 
fall in petroleum prices in the early 1980s pushed Malaysia and Indonesia to diversify 
into exports of manufactures. Indonesia and Thailand increased their exports of 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour-intensive products, in particular, clothing, textiles, 
footwear and electronics assembly. The new EA6 exporters were initially able to take 
advantage of being outside the MFA. Malaysia began to catch up with Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore in diversifying and upgrading its export production. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of a formal regional trade arrangement, 
trade among the EA6 and with other Asian countries grew rapidly for the EA6 as 
incomes grew and trade barriers fell. Japan's emergence as an industrial country with 
increasing absorptive capacity for labour-intensive imports and China's "open door" 
also greatly stimulated intra-Asian trade. The contrast between restrictive, slow growing 
European markets and opening, fast growing Asian markets made for continuing low 
intensity of EA6 trade with Europe. The Uruguay Round commitments of the EA6 
countries led to a dramatic increase in tariff bindings and the removal of some NTBs. 
AFT A could lead to more preferential trade for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand and 
Singapore, but this remains to be seen. Proposals to give AFTA concessions to other 
countries on a most favoured nation basis have been made. 
While the United States led the GATT trade liberalisation movement, intra-
European trade expanded with the establishment of EFT A, with trade diversion as well 
as trade creation taking place. The formation of the EEC focussed on internal trade 
opportunities (although it took until the 1990s to approach a single market). United 
States transnational corporations were much more active than European transnational 
corporations in seeking low cost export platforms, notably in East Asia. 
The slowing down of economic growth in OECD countries in the 1970s was 
accompanied by a rise in a new type of protection involving non-tariff barriers in 
industrial countries. The European member states of the EEC continued to be more 
restrictive and discriminatory than the United States and Canada, increasingly using 
voluntary export restraints, unrealistic rules of origin, and anti-dumping actions against 
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imports in "sensitive" industries, particularly clothing and textiles. The trade preferences 
that the EU negotiated with various groups of countries built in biases against the EA6. 
The EU' s GSP scheme limited preferences to EA6 countries by relatively low quotas. 
Higher cost exporters were given more favourable treatment. Throughout the 1970s 
United States was less discriminatory so that its market continued to be more open to 
the EA6 than the EU market. 
The EU's use of NTBs towards the EA6 countries rose in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Anti-dumping, quantitative restrictions and voluntary export restraints spread first at the 
member state and then at the EU level. NTBs spread from clothing and textiles to 
electronic exports from Taiwan and Korea as exports of these products expanded. The 
SEM led to a reduction of overall barriers by removing them at the member state level, 
and by leading towards establishing EU-wide standards. 
Attempts to improve European economic performance continued to be focussed 
inward with the plan for a single European market by 1 January, 1993. The most 
optimistic expectations for rapid income gains have not, however, materialised. 
Inflexible labour markets contributed to high unemployment, increasing adjustment 
costs in the SEM, and made Europe less competitive in EA6 markets. Labour standards 
issues have re-emerged as a factor behind the trend towards protectionism. Although it 
is claimed that EMU will boost growth at the tum of the millennium the expected gains 
remain controversial. The adjustment costs of EMU, particularly for the peripheral EU 
states, could be another source of increased protectionism. 
While the EA6 have continued to reduced their trade barriers thereby increasing 
the EU' s access to their markets, the EU has continued to extend its preferential 
arrangements in the 1980s and 1990s. SEM type provisions were extended to EFTA 
countries in the European Economic Area. New, more comprehensive bilateral 
agreements were drawn up with Mediterranean countries. LOME IV was negotiated for 
ten years till 2000 for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. New plans for 
preferential arrangements in the medium term with the former Soviet Union and Central 
and East European countries were also drawn up. 
The Uruguay Round agreement should reduce the impact of these EU 
preferences on non-members trade in the latter part of the 1990s, but significant existing 
instruments of protection have not been eliminated in the Uruguay Round. The EU's 
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tariff reduction commitments leave high tariffs on "sensitive" products and the MF A 
phase out is likely to be "endloaded" so that trade in textiles and clothing for preferred 
sources is likely to be encouraged in the medium term. The Uruguay Round agreements 
may make rules of origin and technical standards more transparent, but they still retain 
dormant protectionist power. The anti-dumping code remains a weapon of 
discriminatory protection against competitive imports. New EU legislation has made 
anti-dumping measures easier to access. The first targets for contingent measures are 
likely to be the countries that answer to the charge of "dumping" or at least are the ones 
most able to supply competitively priced goods, namely the EA6. Furthermore, while 
the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement mechanism is considered to be more 
robust than the previous GATT one, this has yet to be shown in the international arena. 
In addition, it may not be able to prevent a shift to other forms of protection not covered 
by the Uruguay Round Agreements. 
Modelling trade policies 
The CATO model is a medium-run CGE model that was used to indicate the potential 
trade and GNP consequences of key aspects of the EU trade policies, particularly its 
Europe Agreements with Central and East European countries. It was also used to 
measure the trade and GDP effects of the EA6's unilateral liberalisations and the 
consequences of an EU move to non-discriminatory trade liberalisation. 
CATO gives special attention to manufactured trade between the EU and the 
EA6 in its commodity breakdowns. The regions modelled include the principal trading 
partners of the EA6 and the EU. The CATO model shows the ways in which different 
trade policies alter the allocation of resources in sectors and in the EU and EA6. The 
cost of trade barriers is quantified, giving a determinate result on whether a given trade 
policy benefits the EA6 and the EU. 
The results estimated by the model are only indicative. The model does not 
incorporate economies of scale or dynamic effects and to the extent that these exist, the 
model may underestimate the gains from trade liberalisation. The model, however, 
makes no allowance for adjustment costs and may therefore overestimate gains from 
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trade liberalisation. Investment effects of preferential trading areas, which in turn 
influence trade flows, are not investigated. The choice of elasticity parameters is 
necessarily somewhat arbitrary in CGE models. Sensitivity tests show that the model is 
sensitive to different values of these parameters. 
Experiment 1 shows that the preferential agreement between the EU and the 
Europe Agreement countries could weaken trade links between the EU and EA6 
countries further. The Europe Agreement countries would be likely to increase their 
textiles and clothing exports, which are their main exports, to the EU. The overall effect 
on EA6 countries' exports is estimated as small. This is partly because the EU is not a 
large enough market for some of them. In addition their strong ability to diversify to 
other products and markets is indicated. Also, Korea and Taiwan are, albeit, belatedly, 
moving out of textiles and clothing. The overall effect on income and sectoral 
production is small because the Central and East European countries are not a large 
enough presence in world trade. 
Experiment 2 suggests that despite the exclusion of the MF A phaseout during 
the first five years of the Uruguay Round implementation, the contraction of exports to 
the EU will be more than offset for Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand because their Uruguay 
Round cuts make them more competitive. Korea-Taiwan-Singapore are not significant 
clothing exporters but experience a contraction in clothing exports signalling their loss 
of competitiveness in this sector compared to the other three EA6 countries. The Europe 
Agreement countries do not lose in this scenario. Their export growth is maintained 
because their losses, arising from a reduction in EU preferences are offset by the 
increase in the EU' s total demand for imports, as the EU' s income increases much more 
than in Experiment 1. EU exports to the EA6 are projected to increase rapidly where 
tariffs prior to the Uruguay Round were high, particularly to Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand. 
In Experiment 3, unilateral tariff reductions by the EA6 increase EU exports to 
the EA6 market, but not their share of these markets since all countries will take 
advantage of these reductions. The EA6 share of the EU market, however, rises because 
the tariff reductions increase the competitiveness of the EA6. Thus the model results 
suggest that while the Europe Agreements are likely to lead to even weaker (relative) 
bilateral links between the EU and the EA6 and the Uruguay Round tariff cuts will not 
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be able to entirely offset trade diversion if the MFA is endloaded, unilateral 
liberalisations in the EA6 countries will go a long way to mitigating trade diversion. 
Experiment 4, suggests that a unilateral reduction of trade barriers in the EU is 
likely to lead to a gain in income for the EU, and an increase in its market shares in 
many products in the EA6 countries. The focus of multilateral trade negotiations on 
market access, is thus, in a sense, misleading. The model results suggest, as expected, 
that the reduction of a country's own trade barriers can lead to more striking market 
gains through increased efficiency than those obtained from relying upon the 
liberalisation of trade policies of trade partners. The EU' s approach of attempting to 
increase and maintain market shares in selected markets by preferential agreements is 
not as effective as non-discriminatory liberalisation. The hub and spoke approach is 
likely to reduce the EU share in other markets by failing to make gains in efficiency and 
it also leads to smaller gains in income for the EU. 
The model has only 11 industries therefore goods are represented in a highly 
aggregated form in it. In addition, the EA6 are grouped in two regions, thus differences 
in specialisation within members of a group are not analysed. Nevertheless broad 
indications are given with regard to the goods in which the EA6 and the EU can 
specialise in each others' markets. The model results are consistent with the more 
disaggregated analysis of trade data in chapter 4. In the most liberal trade scenario for 
the EU, the model shows that Korea, Taiwan and Singapore experienced a more 
broadbased expansion of products than Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. At a more 
disaggregated level, electrical machinery exports will be key for Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan. Standardised office equipment will also be an area in which they will see a 
large expansion. Korea's exports of transport products will also expand. Specialisation 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand is more narrow, with the main thrust of increased 
exports in Indonesia corning from the labour-intensive triad, textiles, clothing and 
footwear. Malaysia and Thailand although with more exports of electrical machinery 
and office equipment than Indonesia will also have a larger proportion of exports in 
clothing and textiles than the more developed EA6. Because it is a mature economy with 
a very wide range of industries, EU exports have the opportunity to expand in most 
industries, as shown by the relative evenness of their expansion in the model results. As 
with the other developed economies, chapter 4 suggests that the EU will be able to gain 
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a market in cutting edge technology goods and some highly differentiated luxury 
products, as demand for these increase with rising incomes in the EA6. 
Unilateral liberalisation in the EU is likely to lead to a substantial loss of income 
for the Europe Agreement countries, mainly because they cannot compete with 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand (and other low income developing Asia countries) in 
clothing and textiles. Hence, current EU policies which aim to promote the Europe 
Agreement countries' production of textiles and clothing appear to be distorting 
resource allocation to industries in which labour costs (wages and social security) are 
relatively high. Europe Agreement countries would be likely to do better in more skill-
intensive manufactures and in services in which they can exploit their proximity to high 
income West European countries. 
Implications for Policy 
This study in its qualitative analysis and CATO experiments supports the growing 
awareness that the EU has much to gain by increasing its trade links with the EA6. The 
EA6 now represent a substantial enough market for there to be large trade opportunities 
for the EU. Indeed the rate of population growth that is likely in the future will further 
expand EA6 markets. If the EA6 countries were to maintain high GDP growth rates by 
following the appropriate trade and other economic policies the growing opportunities 
for EU exporters would become very considerable. 
The study suggests that although the EU, although growing slowly increasing 
trade links with it is in the interests of the EA6 because it is the largest single market in 
the world. There are other aspects to the EA6' s interest in increasing its presence in the 
EU market. For the EA6 it represents an opportunity to diversify their export markets 
from Japan and the USA. With regard to the USA there are concerns that the US focus 
on NAFT A and associated accords may have adverse implications for the EA6. In 
addition, stronger trade links can stimulate foreign investment links for while the EU 
countries comprise the largest foreign investors in the world, EU investment in the EA6 
is very low. 
The study suggests unequivocally that a key barrier to trade opportunities 
between the two regions is the trade policies in the EU. The best trade policies in the EU 
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and EA6 for increasing their mutual economic links and economic growth is unilateral 
trade liberalisation. The CATO experiments show that the difference in GDP between 
the EU' s current preferential approach and a hypothesised unilateral trade barrier 
reduction is large. The preferential stance leads to considerably weaker trade links with 
the dynamic EA6 countries and a marekdly reduced competitiveness on the world 
market. The EA6 also gain considerably from EU unilateral cuts. Further unilateral cuts 
in the EA6 increase their GDP and market shares considerably and offset preferential 
policies in the EU. 
Future unilateral reductions in the EA6 are likely but the probability of the EU 
moving to that approach is still small. One way that policymakers can maintain trade 
liberalisation in coming years is through international negotiations. In the various 
negotiating fora in which they participate, there is scope for the EU and the EA6 to 
further non-discriminatory trade liberalisation: 
In the WTO the two regions can pursue trade liberalisation in variety of ways 
including the adoption of the following policy strategies: 
1) The EA6 and the EU need to review and pursue the full implementation of the 
Uruguay Round commitments in WTO follow-up meetings. In particular EA6, 
particularly Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia need to pursue the implementation of the 
MFA commitments where there is considerable discretion on the schedule of 
liberalisation of the developed countries. 
2) The EA6 and the EU need to encourage the Regional Trade Arrangment WTO 
Committee in its investigation of measures to limit the discriminatory effects of 
preferential trade arrangements. This is vital since the trend towards preferential 
arrangements has accelerated in the last decade. 
3) The EA6 and EU need to keep vital non-trade issues such as labour standards, child 
labour, human rights, corruption and the environment out of WTO negotiations. These 
issues are very important but need to be addressed by other more appropriate fora such 
as the International Labour Organisation and UNICEF. In general, this will prevent the 
abuse of these issues by protectionist forces, thus prevent the move towards free trade 
from becoming even more bogged down. 
4) The EA6 and the EU can seek a commitment to the launching of a new Round of 
WTO negotiations by the tum of the millenium. In the new Round, the two regions need 
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to pursue the extension of the Uruguay Round Codes on Anti-dumping, Rules of Origin, 
and Government Procurement. As discussed in chapter 5 they still have dormant 
protectionist powers. A target date for "free trade" may facilitate progress in the new 
Round. 
Because of the large number of participating countries in the WTO it may not 
suffice at times for achieving market opening accords. It is thus possible that smaller 
regional groupings pursuing "open regionalism" can have a strong role in trade 
liberalisation. In particular, in a rapidly changing economic environment, maintaining 
market access requires constant review of international rules not only because of the 
activation of dormant trade instruments but as non-trade policies become constraints to 
trade (such as competition policies). One possible forum for pursuing more in-depth 
trade liberalisation is the ASEAN-EU dialogue, involving among others, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, and the EU. 
1) ASEAN needs to expand its collaboration with the EU. This can be modelled on the 
progress made between ASEAN and its Pacific Basin partners. 
The EU and ASEAN could consider pursuing a more intense partnership along 
the lines of the Trade and Investment Cooperation Committee established between in 
the ASEAN-US dialogue. This committee aims at monitoring and reviewing trade and 
investment relations. It aims to identify opportunities for trade and investment 
expansion among other things. The committee meetings are attended by senior officials 
and convened at least once a year. Private sector participants can be invited. 
The ideas and attitudes in the ASEAN-US initiatives influenced the bilateral 
negotiations between the US and Singapore in the creation of a Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement. This approach could also be used in EU bilateral relations with 
ASEAN members. 
Within the expanded framework ASEAN and the EU can make greater efforts to 
to protect market access across a broad range of sectors and activities including the 
limited harmonisation of some domestic policies. 
ASEM' s international negotiations framework can be used to promote open 
regionalism in the way APEC has done. The agenda of ASEM is not clear yet. At this 
point it is difficult to see the direction ASEM will take. The policy tasks ahead for the 
EA6 and the EU in ASEM include: 
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1) The vital need to ensure that ASEM supports the "open regionalism" endorsed in the 
Chairman's Statement on ASEM. The EU needs to recognise that Asia's dynamism has 
been underpinned by its generally global outlook. Some diversion may take place within 
ASEAN and future Meetings can address these issues. 
2) The EA6 and EU need to promote the idea of a moratorium on ASEM membership as 
APEC instituted in 1993. With at least fifteen more countries wanting to join if ASEM 
expands it may be never be more than a talk forum and the possibility of deeper 
economic integration via ASEM will correspondingly fall. 
3) .Given the rapidly changing Asian environment, the further internal integration of the 
EU, its expansion, and its historically inward focus, the regularity of ASEM meetings 
and follow-up activities needs to be maintained to keep the EU-Asia relationship high 
on the agenda. In particular, forums and workshops for private entreprenuers can lead to 
greater trade between the two regions. The governments of the EA6 and the EU need to 
ensure that their policies reflect the results of the debates between private sector agents. 
4) The EA6 need to use ASEM to ensure that the EU does not become more closed. As 
suggested in chapter 3 the pressures of high employment and further preferential 
agreements in the EU may strengthen the hand of protectionists in the EU. 
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Table A. I: Developing Asia Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primary inp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
67982 975 4 
1272 4137 88 
123 193 1845 
6432 493 5 
12206 1064 651 
466 196 45 
59 96 15 
829 1506 783 
2589 2544 2178 
133 217 312 
19005 5536 2026 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
1704 
83 
73 
907 
5879 
205 
6 
591 
556 
152 
689 
Primary inputs 
106344 
29765 
54776 
35 
1332 
313 
68 
591 
110 
19 
1292 
550 
74 
216 
19048 
25094 
0 
0 
12 
1683 
0 
299 
29 
3 
628 
618 
23 
72 
3307 
2317 
0 
30438 
1225 
4 
7230 
805 
294 
48 
135 
2330 
420 
9745 
2317 
154 
15 
692 
440 
71 
4 
140 
474 
41 
355 
4633 
11639 
0 
3080 
3214 
21 
1114 
12546 
1347 
125 
564 
3904 
573 
10078 
94 
1375 
43 
110 
7313 
743 
15 
514 
945 
88 
376 
5254 
10243 
0 
13254 
370 
5 
83 
4103 
17327 
1163 
347 
1384 
373 
16718 
534 
41 
10 
8 
2570 
8822 
31 
254 
418 
92 
691 
12192 
10928 
0 
2515 
68 
3 
14 
794 
10194 
3148 
66 
536 
605 
6111 
115 
15 
8 
1 
635 
9869 
608 
80 
262 
489 
312 
8259 
6260 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
50 
523 
327 
59 
3121 
299 
163 
12352 
11754 
812 
10458 
7 
80 
686 
5 
1898 
242 
35 
15308 
4880 
234 
567 
11963 
14997 
0 
Basmnf 
1795 
13594 
132 
105 
3844 
1730 
251 
2244 
27751 
1497 
19710 
66 
11015 
304 
10 
2180 
1302 
50 
2236 
9578 
520 
746 
14868 
20409 
0 
Otherman 
199 
337 
198 
8 
861 
580 
54 
487 
3424 
3589 
4739 
34 
129 
137 
1 
745 
428 
10 
1051 
1312 
1151 
238 
3457 
5499 
0 
Services 
9071 
13923 
3711 
2784 
9628 
2767 
986 
9095 
64050 
2679 
114150 
1023 
4144 
4934 
767 
5916 
1454 
177 
12926 
14075 
1497 
9324 
173764 
144597 
0 
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Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
171456 3044 436 
15551 2864 57 
1055 8199 202 
54364 2 1422 
10876 467 449 
31559 1053 175 
16880 153 222 
12038 29703 401 
11988 2298 2029 
4896 1898 1407 
153515 137836 82476 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
0.00 1.21 0.39 
0.00 2.08 0.11 
0.00 35.74 1.82 
0.00 5.20 0.01 
0.00 14.29 0.99 
0.00 18.25 0.14 
0.00 19.28 0.05 
0.00 33.77 0.48 
0.00 21.38 1.35 
0.00 49.31 0.01 
0.00 9.83 2.18 
Ex orts 
8320 
16013 
12800 
5537 
23487 
16519 
643 
51302 
26067 
1884 
21572 
IMT 
9.65 
12.76 
0.40 
17.56 
2.66 
4.36 
9.52 
2.88 
6.27 
1.89 
1.97 
Households Investment Government Dut 
Final demand from imported sources 
6619 76 17 -343 
1526 218 28 -935 
854 10058 54 -889 
6406 7 100 -4173 
5572 303 204 -4874 
12209 43 107 -8320 
3028 3 47 -653 
14201 27903 220 -12310 
3725 1334 421 -5131 
431 113 43 -710 
6740 689 1951 -2922 
KST USA EU EFTA 
5.00 40.11 11.08 0.70 
2.85 5.14 15.47 0.36 
4.91 21.29 20.62 2.26 
9.83 17.88 23.63 0.86 
22.62 18.28 20.27 3.97 
57.37 5.33 9.16 0.68 
16.68 7.93 36.90 1.08 
19.08 14.77 21.95 4.90 
24.31 12.11 15.58 3.02 
25.05 10.78 9.06 1.93 
10.76 14.91 43.03 5.40 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
31.87 9312 
61.22 17635 
12.96 13540 
25.03 6063 
16.91 25322 
4.72 19412 
8.56 726 
2.17 55233 
15.98 29084 
1.97 2131 
11.91 21572 
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Table A.2: Japan Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primary inp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
68990 438 71 
878 6820 67 
1 846 3171 
21332 2201 170 
9917 5513 14288 
334 787 593 
224 194 131 
38 211 21761 
5568 2557 33179 
79 365 355 
26143 19034 45022 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
10489 
100 
0 
386 
235 
50 
27 
1 
121 
1 
704 
Primary inputs 
48095 
17398 
27661 
0 
188 
1 
0 
128 
22 
18 
9 
102 
20 
276 
21026 
19028 
0 
0 
5 
3058 
0 
302 
30 
19 
387 
521 
4 
841 
45995 
29857 
0 
30392 
19419 
1 
33867 
9515 
108 
288 
159 
19014 
324 
58938 
23077 
7807 
0 
4895 
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17 
32 
3 
285 
5 
4266 
43031 
33385 
0 
778 
2558 
4 
1736 
66665 
1862 
420 
664 
30761 
320 
88260 
1668 
27431 
0 
174 
9574 
15 
69 
22 
2901 
2 
1993 
51689 
59702 
0 
1175 
9 
0 
63 
9472 
14463 
140 
43 
3600 
215 
17442 
8104 
1 
0 
1 
417 
2353 
62 
0 
119 
11 
811 
19411 
7639 
0 
13 
4 
0 
35 
1226 
23219 
0 
33 
1770 
1740 
13900 
833 
0 
0 
0 
26 
2078 
90 
0 
58 
110 
163 
14358 
4314 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
303 
148 
918 
1028 
29374 
1151 
932 
99771 
113465 
1354 
163321 
3 
94 
1 
0 
404 
26 
107 
10931 
2503 
36 
4383 
163308 
122689 
0 
Basmnf 
424 
23298 
7 
1407 
37871 
1898 
869 
2710 
173538 
1193 
197947 
417 
25400 
1 
37 
2904 
94 
102 
342 
15806 
24 
6478 
164570 
119077 
0 
Otherman 
1144 
768 
1 
69 
7651 
1142 
161 
866 
10440 
581 
12709 
706 
507 
0 
0 
106 
117 
31 
31 
938 
522 
289 
12649 
7986 
0 
Services 
18746 
18899 
23828 
45098 
107555 
6820 
4915 
53839 
302146 
10042 
819848 
5139 
9285 
37 
2656 
5182 
578 
659 
2055 
7147 
575 
44311 
1391999 
929835 
0 
230 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
87121 8565 338 
7327 1135 67 
30153 30469 3917 
222919 347 608 
46015 1023 5968 
22967 1670 262 
54569 302 292 
44070 48773 14463 
41754 16918 6586 
14553 3969 1267 
1462537 364879 305166 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
9.98 0.00 0.70 
7.47 0.00 O.o? 
0.60 0.00 0.02 
10.57 0.00 0.41 
4.68 0.00 0.33 
29.34 0.00 0.14 
47.87 0.00 0.13 
5.72 0.00 0.06 
6.28 0.00 0.74 
19.53 0.00 0.13 
6.41 0.00 3.53 
Ex orts 
8320 
16013 
12800 
5537 
23487 
16519 
643 
51302 
26067 
1884 
21572 
IMT 
6.48 
18.00 
0.41 
8.94 
6.21 
5.33 
7.24 
9.43 
9.71 
8.02 
4.00 
Households Investment Government Du 
Final demand from imported sources 
7729 204 23 -27249 
2960 1 17 -1441 
1268 6519 527 -112 
5171 0 3 -1534 
1026 23 298 -601 
5042 103 18 -1049 
9546 llO 35 -l165 
2228 16352 703 -327 
2213 716 161 -983 
4794 564 62 -918 
14648 1728 742 -11429 
KST USA EU EFTA 
9.80 44.77 7.25 0.32 
2.81 ll.41 1.74 0.58 
3.08 49.66 41.40 2.55 
16.83 31.85 16.52 0.80 
9.17 32.14 32.03 8.07 
30.23 7.40 21.90 2.04 
22.91 5.28 14.14 0.29 
18.49 41.96 17.73 5.09 
16.39 27.10 7.85 2.53 
25.72 21.89 19.44 4.21 
13.96 27.69 14.12 4.57 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
20.71 21456 
57.93 72070 
2.27 11202 
14.09 ll800 
7.37 20050 
3.62 9534 
2.13 9710 
1.52 32716 
29.40 32752 
1.06 6559 
25.72 81632 
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Table A3: Europe Agreement countries Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresot1r_c ___ _'!'ranspor_t Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agricultnre 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primary inp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
20475 239 34 
4556 4068 131 
143 71 591 
2713 167 4 
2691 423 240 
175 49 43 
51 17 6 
716 434 376 
3427 1482 984 
220 80 50 
9112 3618 907 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
861 
63 
150 
535 
882 
50 
9 
347 
318 
9 
380 
Primary inputs 
12314 
4239 
7065 
14 
415 
50 
22 
145 
IO 
4 
493 
191 
9 
276 
5295 
5353 
0 
0 
17 
793 
0 
!02 
15 
2 
365 
175 
5 
112 
1786 
733 
0 
5196 
756 
15 
2994 
435 
32 
IO 
66 
1835 
39 
3542 
1256 
119 
6 
8!0 
211 
IO 
3 
79 
347 
7 
339 
4218 
4223 
0 
289 
!090 
24 
185 
4330 
159 
23 
143 
2055 
39 
3575 
72 
1337 
7 
48 
2370 
65 
7 
179 
364 
36 
356 
3692 
3411 
0 
!040 
47 
8 
14 
1154 
2851 
343 
56 
582 
78 
2066 
184 
14 
2 
1 
555 
1517 
117 
102 
110 
20 
194 
3434 
1988 
0 
92 
16 
1 
3 
217 
2133 
311 
18 
171 
90 
!017 
11 
2 
0 
0 
62 
760 
117 
19 
27 
34 
87 
1915 
824 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
60 
319 
67 
14 
473 
32 
12 
1669 
2366 
74 
2892 
1 
IOI 
58 
2 
250 
9 
5 
2322 
486 
26 
333 
5261 
2721 
0 
Basmnf 
284 
5866 
63 
71 
1577 
254 
51 
523 
12097 
173 
9514 
29 
3730 
66 
8 
781 
106 
16 
672 
3242 
49 
814 
11890 
8455 
0 
Otherman 
47 
111 
6 
7 
123 
56 
4 
39 
325 
87 
397 
IO 
53 
7 
0 
!02 
39 
3 
67 
78 
83 
38 
900 
500 
0 
Services 
2817 
3236 
976 
1405 
2671 
501 
193 
2341 
14019 
603 
33972 
111 
1251 
!047 
192 
1094 
157 
45 
3218 
2116 
248 
4011 
65043 
40487 
0 
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Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
24356 3687 597 
3189 751 1483 
908 15136 713 
16249 312 481 
2772 238 1930 
6808 219 357 
2627 104 427 
1718 24976 1545 
5935 8397 1967 
326 1353 477 
38454 184310 32579 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
5.15 0.02 0.00 
0.54 0.60 0.00 
0.41 5.86 0.00 
3.56 0.19 0.00 
0.69 0.70 0.00 
2.93 0.28 0.00 
12.27 0.06 0.00 
0.55 2.25 0.00 
0.41 0.69 0.00 
3.54 6.41 0.00 
4.19 4.55 0.00 
Ex orts 
3096 
7138 
5159 
3109 
6856 
4765 
1733 
14495 
7537 
1242 
10486 
IMT 
3.63 
0.24 
0.01 
1.17 
0.12 
0.49 
21.56 
0.21 
0.16 
0.44 
0.34 
Households Investment Government Du 
Final demand from imported sources 
1065 2 21 -279 
406 16 18 -143 
1728 1621 575 -516 
2337 0 65 -684 
823 7 553 -549 
2558 0 97 -524 
1566 0 137 -277 
2341 4833 1100 -1449 
969 104 238 -603 
371 258 240 -99 
2324 311 962 -839 
KST USA EU EFTA 
0.33 8.11 43.91 8.34 
0.28 1.92 11.04 4.74 
1.16 9.20 69.85 8.70 
0.18 2.52 53.61 10.83 
0.28 2.02 65.42 18.58 
1.70 1.29 79.43 5.69 
1.57 0.41 44.62 7.54 
2.71 4.24 67.64 17.57 
0.43 2.13 56.67 24.75 
4.74 4.62 59.04 16.16 
2.78 16.52 55.69 7.70 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
30.51 3096 
80.63 7138 
4.82 5159 
27.94 3109 
12.18 6856 
8.19 4765 
11.97 1733 
4.83 14495 
14.75 7537 
5.05 1242 
8.23 10486 
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Table A.4: Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primary inp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
18979 81 0 
330 2864 9 
39 369 3076 
2342 202 1 
1902 221 407 
36 26 59 
117 108 7 
90 264 113 
713 1863 1085 
11 23 38 
3906 4169 1548 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
396 
44 
9 
397 
1636 
46 
5 
174 
169 
13 
64 
Primary inputs 
15590 
5190 
17866 
12 
73 
25 
15 
177 
17 
1 
456 
461 
30 
249 
3946 
31581 
0 
0 
2 
2430 
0 
289 
26 
0 
956 
1209 
56 
47 
1871 
3737 
0 
5857 
1502 
29 
4286 
294 
20 
33 
65 
1117 
10 
3535 
3283 
77 
11 
939 
305 
27 
0 
159 
331 
11 
192 
1796 
6793 
0 
2401 
164 
37 
127 
2661 
101 
18 
55 
552 
21 
2647 
980 
295 
7 
16 
3943 
215 
0 
192 
136 
12 
129 
1471 
4474 
0 
563 
11 
43 
24 
855 
6348 
131 
25 
513 
16 
2494 
876 
2 
2 
1 
2092 
3004 
I 
102 
63 
4 
46 
1707 
5494 
0 
172 
0 
18 
1 
37 
5344 
37 
15 
86 
151 
1278 
60 
0 
0 
0 
181 
1550 
45 
1 
14 
2 
14 
1134 
2003 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
13 
40 
30 
17 
710 
74 
25 
968 
1232 
238 
4273 
2 
7 
58 
4 
928 
66 
0 
10086 
2334 
446 
180 
2014 
6287 
0 
Basmnf 
27 
11523 
137 
76 
620 
119 
25 
190 
6484 
23 
7317 
1 
3595 
17 
4 
965 
32 
0 
294 
5007 
22 
286 
4146 
13592 
0 
Otherman 
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9 
5 
4 
202 
91 
2 
79 
374 
250 
969 
14 
186 
6 
1 
240 
48 
0 
983 
471 
536 
37 
577 
2097 
0 
Services 
2966 
5540 
2294 
2894 
2655 
788 
439 
1040 
22608 
412 
40291 
362 
599 
998 
537 
1277 
124 
7 
6987 
8713 
467 
3922 
39376 
82434 
0 
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Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
29301 3959 101 
4496 909 2 
3181 23033 273 
16554 315 30 
4087 364 118 
3547 362 152 
5101 129 26 
854 44978 119 
3845 11918 829 
1045 1694 55 
65163 227546 23799 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
21.19 0.92 1.17 
6.75 2.95 0.04 
1.51 36.24 0.01 
18.55 5.37 0.07 
5.43 21.32 0.82 
13.75 14.40 0.11 
34.39 3.73 0.10 
2.99 34.84 0.20 
4.54 25.57 1.52 
7.55 42.32 0.03 
5.33 3.84 0.28 
Ex orts 
3951 
3642 
9110 
1957 
11091 
4332 
143 
37343 
17158 
2182 
19148 
IMT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Households Investment Government Du 
Final demand from imported sources 
2345 712 1 -4224 
1058 1 0 -529 
1986 7464 18 -2074 
1360 6 1 -528 
2034 72 104 -1978 
1716 40 21 -1737 
220 0 0 -68 
6699 20723 457 -8611 
1611 1454 351 -3159 
875 462 139 -489 
9797 18 4295 -4021 
KST USA EU EFTA 
4.67 20.33 6.10 0.71 
12.30 6.61 13.64 4.10 
8.21 27.98 21.75 2.98 
12.61 15.28 25.38 0.85 
27.17 12.51 19.45 3.99 
57.62 4.78 6.27 0.91 
40.52 6.61 12.88 0.53 
23.03 15.77 18.20 3.56 
32.41 6.45 10.05 2.42 
31.67 7.71 6.68 3.20 
3.01 15.65 60.10 6.80 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
44.91 4446 
53.61 4072 
1.32 9428 
21.89 2113 
9.32 11636 
2.15 4824 
1.25 158 
1.41 39139 
17.04 18583 
0.83 2328 
5.00 19148 
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Table A.5: Korea-Singapore-Taiwan Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Othennau 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primaryinp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
31910 105 0 
1455 3995 18 
115 291 2574 
7896 347 0 
4084 731 1080 
24 141 109 
3 24 11 
119 517 4062 
773 2278 5031 
11 50 7 
6898 3737 3835 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
1707 
9 
6 
567 
587 
4 
1 
57 
150 
4 
336 
Primary inputs 
18699 
4702 
18976 
5 
806 
144 
35 
112 
62 
5 
234 
326 
66 
484 
10123 
11356 
0 
2 
14 
3479 
0 
343 
20 
10 
1848 
1272 
20 
305 
4698 
3197 
0 
11115 
2070 
66 
5905 
1371 
28 
6 
108 
2895 
91 
5206 
10910 
685 
3 
2400 
429 
234 
4 
63 
541 
78 
471 
4398 
4234 
0 
114 
744 
67 
230 
27522 
2394 
87 
393 
5986 
54 
10499 
728 
2403 
6 
307 
13400 
635 
41 
428 
1137 
146 
1228 
10722 
12286 
0 
3049 
28 
25 
5 
9223 
14462 
79 
223 
1370 
29 
5123 
5005 
9 
8 
0 
1595 
3520 
24 
177 
155 
122 
448 
7814 
5673 
0 
50 
4 
12 
0 
468 
6532 
191 
49 
281 
48 
1552 
165 
1 
1 
0 
71 
3243 
115 
19 
19 
234 
158 
2888 
1029 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
4 
110 
158 
2 
5486 
150 
50 
29263 
18147 
45 
15176 
18 
242 
232 
1 
2511 
53 
71 
41292 
7270 
410 
1840 
21847 
15835 
0 
Basmnf 
49 
11955 
251 
100 
3987 
232 
44 
1564 
60313 
68 
21458 
38 
19767 
94 
15 
1897 
97 
38 
1805 
15978 
115 
2318 
19753 
28853 
0 
Otherman 
102 
98 
35 
2 
1920 
1450 
31 
465 
1795 
321 
1832 
44 
53 
19 
0 
348 
283 
13 
470 
546 
1836 
250 
2983 
1696 
0 
Services 
2493 
3867 
2806 
4530 
9889 
889 
454 
10695 
52920 
746 
91983 
1058 
3769 
3413 
1020 
2702 
562 
145 
8226 
8587 
954 
18384 
157459 
125789 
0 
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Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
35529 1019 2 
8323 422 0 
3490 11112 14 
40859 14 2 
8143 393 8 
3045 289 0 
7448 76 0 
7243 38327 21 
7367 6291 16 
875 667 1 
142010 133701 73386 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
12.88 1.73 0.24 
4.50 1.00 0.01 
0.72 27.74 0.06 
13.60 7.21 0.14 
4.14 32.76 0.30 
24.46 23.19 0.17 
34.86 8.57 0.09 
4.40 42.27 0.07 
7.33 26.68 0.92 
9.22 36.16 0.04 
9.00 25.48 1.20 
Ex orts 
9956 
24506 
13381 
6111 
20346 
7722 
1494 
69267 
29887 
5965 
34652 
IMT 
15.92 
18.70 
2.06 
23.55 
6.05 
20.83 
33.74 
10.47 
12.19 
21.39 
0.99 
Households Investment Government Dut 
Final demand from imported sources 
3620 908 0 -11611 
831 51 0 -802 
2642 6108 7 -831 
5610 16 0 -1409 
1282 149 1 -1282 
2577 114 0 -431 
1420 13 0 -81 
4231 27161 3 -4371 
1691 640 1 -1957 
3098 212 1 -573 
9679 1156 761 -3119 
KST USA EU EFTA 
0.00 39.41 5.04 0.53 
0.00 6.71 1.10 0.39 
0.00 42.26 19.43 2.43 
0.00 18.80 22.48 0.91 
0.00 27.27 21.08 2.52 
0.00 7.94 16.74 1.05 
0.00 1.85 17.65 0.42 
0.00 23.66 14.46 3.19 
0.00 16.52 10.66 2.61 
0.00 20.79 9.45 1.75 
0.00 30.90 20.30 3.07 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia'', EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
24.25 11165 
67.59 26732 
5.30 13850 
13.31 6707 
5.88 21359 
5.61 8622 
2.82 1626 
1.48 72856 
23.11 32613 
1.21 6371 
9.07 34652 
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Table A.6: United States Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primaryinp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
158610 105 3 
625 3995 227 
354 291 72661 
19242 347 13 
11666 731 18858 
265 141 5603 
3 24 26 
2283 517 33407 
10424 2278 51239 
35 50 157 
85627 3737 72080 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
4738 
40 
87 
358 
1711 
68 
1 
1187 
474 
17 
1704 
Primary inputs 
55043 
48430 
19204 
17 
1151 
165 
6 
558 
70 
11 
2047 
612 
11 
909 
42771 
72811 
0 
0 
75 
24786 
2 
2212 
549 
13 
11787 
5045 
25 
1972 
109880 
42410 
0 
36208 
2623 
23 
48151 
9342 
137 
10 
504 
34784 
17 
60488 
4450 
2160 
6 
4387 
1263 
21 
5 
164 
800 
9 
726 
52556 
80266 
0 
901 
8384 
51 
1692 
104653 
2854 
31 
2642 
22463 
272 
90075 
270 
5167 
11 
316 
17329 
239 
12 
735 
1782 
47 
1323 
93570 
102252 
0 
5093 
96 
9 
38 
17183 
30097 
240 
378 
2023 
200 
17161 
306 
4 
2 
4 
1559 
5030 
74 
477 
130 
107 
164 
27810 
15596 
0 
31 
377 
4 
1 
826 
22525 
5914 
140 
512 
362 
8683 
162 
5 
1 
0 
69 
3335 
2943 
59 
22 
163 
154 
21982 
11274 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
104 
419 
1381 
112 
22121 
1222 
69 
82505 
75026 
377 
111761 
7 
246 
158 
14 
2086 
125 
38 
38315 
7766 
108 
2333 
224091 
118576 
0 
Basmnf 
42 
102816 
673 
661 
37593 
4721 
70 
15262 
208977 
626 
204467 
33 
47218 
195 
66 
4745 
866 
37 
8542 
33543 
173 
2908 
245081 
140840 
0 
Otherman 
101 
40 
39 
12 
2689 
694 
17 
828 
5063 
757 
9804 
16 
106 
14 
2 
247 
209 
9 
318 
1068 
1174 
118 
11331 
12413 
0 
Services 
37835 
44781 
22273 
45602 
78756 
8375 
2029 
89946 
354628 
7446 
2145426 
3703 
12273 
5943 
3854 
11358 
2069 
979 
36812 
25891 
6218 
45250 
2933816 
1528541 
0 
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Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
109659 859 6713 
5346 846 1785 
145332 13992 80394 
212108 14 2938 
73918 587 14960 
32400 346 1544 
65492 93 1370 
43778 42068 65349 
157259 13667 38306 
19699 597 1214 
3218796 169720 915808 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
5.11 0.52 0.74 
4.90 0.75 0.02 
0.75 54.43 0.15 
7.28 1.86 0.92 
3.52 13.07 0.38 
30.61 3.35 0.76 
44.29 0.56 0.60 
4.40 32.59 0.16 
5.08 12.25 0.63 
16.65 29.28 0.16 
7.01 8.20 1.54 
Ex orts 
12868 
50691 
61102 
12826 
37290 
24882 
29862 
.155472 
48886 
27821 
85773 
IMT 
9.22 
3.19 
0.16 
10.69 
2.18 
7.13 
7.85 
5.57 
3.57 
7.87 
1.15 
Households Investment Government Dut 
Final demand from imported sources 
13308 221 395 -5825 
2387 328 53 -551 
34352 45749 7826 -6331 
11282 152 225 -687 
14796 999 3395 -1958 
19871 733 458 -2504 
34710 543 691 -6777 
40559 79280 18536 -16357 
15822 4530 2958 -2667 
23091 3013 745 -2425 
44948 1548 8320 -6862 
KST USA EU EFTA 
0.77 0.00 11.74 1.79 
0.72 0.00 8.85 4.84 
3.64 0.00 26.20 3.70 
2.61 0.00 41.72 2.81 
8.83 0.00 42.21 6.55 
22.71 0.00 19.19 1.41 
17.99 0.00 5.81 0.23 
18.37 0.00 22.72 3.89 
12.76 0.00 27.40 5.30 
19.52 0.00 15.73 2.35 
4.02 0.00 63.97 2.48 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
70.12 14563 
76.72 55136 
10.98 63314 
32.10 13747 
23.27 39158 
14.85 27823 
22.66 32271 
12.30 163568 
33.00 53345 
8.43 30308 
11.64 85773 
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Table A.7: European Union Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natres~_11._r5 __ !l'1111~}!0I't Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primaryinp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
231625 6386 53 
23461 212338 3305 
1120 2184 64736 
60532 6247 119 
33220 14557 25606 
599 340 1811 
459 232 1397 
6145 13914 29568 
14904 19836 58486 
93 131 166 
94141 107639 72146 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
5221 
2301 
97 
2388 
3442 
69 
88 
842 
988 
20 
8122 
Primary inputs 
192224 
81749 
25146 
529 
59684 
44 
194 
1540 
35 
53 
2104 
1175 
13 
7820 
84017 
155074 
0 
9 
362 
9060 
15 
2310 
304 
423 
7767 
3424 
24 
4361 
115531 
28771 
0 
67760 
20950 
148 
62188 
11068 
226 
157 
2532 
28647 
111 
89617 
18976 
3165 
17 
6753 
1201 
43 
30 
429 
1570 
21 
3586 
68178 
59888 
0 
2602 
36194 
639 
5467 
185282 
1541 
1294 
5755 
31340 
262 
124760 
1149 
4898 
280 
351 
31479 
215 
340 
1101 
3023 
42 
6699 
127318 
77164 
0 
6867 
1888 
24 
272 
15443 
28768 
18263 
1311 
3870 
143 
32975 
2402 
292 
1 
14 
1823 
6925 
5663 
207 
241 
43 
2012 
43062 
24928 
0 
1249 
1245 
18 
192 
9197 
17542 
15530 
971 
2060 
93 
21259 
2340 
220 
1 
3 
1221 
2803 
5066 
160 
90 
37 
1254 
27229 
15332 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
73 
4649 
2071 
210 
31005 
645 
371 
117245 
106875 
754 
147429 
15 
480 
322 
34 
2556 
87 
73 
39729 
7310 
282 
10808 
241694 
89243 
0 
Basmnf 
2328 
45856 
812 
942 
42072 
2901 
1675 
19253 
346168 
650 
235193 
1710 
7322 
153 
93 
3475 
589 
430 
4292 
52749 
87 
11890 
279872 
133475 
0 
Otherman 
127 
600 
184 
17 
3827 
316 
257 
1284 
9210 
1173 
9424 
44 
103 
22 
0 
429 
63 
78 
313 
1207 
1224 
533 
13372 
7568 
0 
Services 
47751 
256677 
74946 
57321 
99293 
10377 
7409 
105955 
270644 
7894 
1831568 
3422 
17398 
8510 
2356 
7039 
1068 
1364 
23356 
16916 
2563 
79338 
2660839 
2160644 
0 
240 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
293735 100 1481 
174381 14 1019 
119150 317 6209 
281644 25 9 
97066 143 486 
106075 10 319 
67323 10 71 
60885 365 23873 
134334 361 10191 
23002 52 371 
2726994 1340037 122744 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
5.01 0.19 6.44 
l.71 0.25 l.37 
0.68 33.50 3.32 
5.79 0.61 4.55 
3.14 8.16 4.62 
25.21 3.38 7.31 
32.06 0.62 11.76 
2.87 22.32 2.10 
2.17 2.46 8.81 
14.12 28.31 1.52 
8.84 5.51 3.78 
Ex orts 
31367 
94975 
47046 
21646 
55161 
26924 
29660 
155154 
92366 
21974 
170349 
IMT 
6.14 
0.84 
0.85 
8.58 
1.63 
7.76 
7.91 
3.08 
2.57 
4.33 
3.33 
Households Investment Government Dut 
Final demand from imported sources 
15940 2 410 -18770 
7458 l 66 0 
18745 45 13843 -2922 
13973 l 0 -3262 
8327 17 93 -2891 
19932 2 107 -2083 
22241 6 197 -3838 
24468 70 71524 -9769 
11987 131 3240 -5088 
18386 0 2219 -1423 
29830 5 4091 -10221 
KST USA EU EFTA 
0.63 16.32 0.00 4.24 
0.26 6.17 0.00 17.67 
4.55 30.42 0.00 19.28 
l.35 22.18 0.00 ll.33 
3.78 27.49 0.00 34.30 
10.39 7.48 0.00 17.06 
6.20 l.95 0.00 5.14 
11.24 29.88 0.00 23.64 
3.08 14.37 0.00 43.98 
16.13 15.58 0.00 15.83 
3.15 34.34 0.00 22.40 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
61.03 35415 
71.74 103205 
7.40 48695 
45.62 23302 
16.88 57811 
21.41 29761 
34.34 31985 
4.88 162818 
22.56 101760 
4.18 23724 
18.64 170349 
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Table A.8: European Free Trade Area Input-Output Table 1992. 
Industries Agriculture Natresourc Transport Prfood Chemicals Textiles Clothing Machinery Basmnf Otherman Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Primaryinp 
Labour 
Capital 
Land 
Intermediate inputs from domestic sources 
23855 99 17 
514 I046 13 
87 218 1833 
5277 378 23 
1883 780 1194 
42 86 121 
13 30 IO 
626 894 1421 
2606 1765 4365 
8 12 IO 
8780 8255 4974 
Intermediate inputs from imported sources 
1355 
96 
17 
458 
975 
36 
33 
100 
307 
3 
266 
Primary inputs 
I0979 
9795 
5648 
14 
252 
30 
12 
417 
52 
90 
527 
435 
52 
535 
9769 
26669 
0 
4676 
374 
3 
2771 
485 
27 
18 
28 
496 
15 
1107 
I0029 
4370 
0 
7936 
1697 
53 
7985 
953 
39 
12 
172 
3488 
12 
8731 
308 
14596 
165 
83 
4200 
336 
128 
1166 
16500 
I06 
4893 
9133 
7917 
0 
214 
5024 
42 
289 
69IO 
272 
21 
444 
4801 
18 
13020 
411 
1244 
26 
133 
9909 
95 
47 
167 
1967 
18 
2095 
13623 
8569 
0 
216 
8 
16 
8 
721 
1631 
88 
92 
651 
14 
2365 
702 
IO 
3 
3 
711 
2063 
141 
62 
111 
23 
389 
4524 
1589 
0 
9 
3 
2 
3 
88 
731 
56 
12 
138 
17 
834 
16 
1 
0 
0 
79 
955 
149 
7 
24 
78 
69 
1734 
542 
0 
Notes: Natresourc is natural resources, Prfood is processed food, Basmnf is basic manufactures, otherman is other manufactures. 
75 
74 
293 
97 
2973 
IOO 
53 
6901 
13002 
47 
18723 
19 
46 
296 
3 
1227 
84 
145 
14066 
3566 
139 
3862 
32561 
16321 
0 
1377 
16902 
206 
330 
4800 
482 
72 
1828 
43701 
46 
38221 
1 
4 
3546 
1 
549 
I07 
13 
2066 
1252 
17 
1855 
50386 
25165 
0 
80 
47 
14 
7 
556 
55 
7 
99 
I077 
59 
1379 
29 
58 
8 
0 
2IO 
63 
18 
72 
479 
263 
123 
2749 
1323 
0 
5854 
7039 
4757 
8082 
I0530 
928 
297 
8315 
63725 
668 
227021 
865 
1523 
2496 
I080 
6998 
787 
756 
6498 
11291 
1677 
34660 
341880 
214039 
0 
242 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Commodities 
Agriculture 
Natresourc 
Transport 
Prfood 
Chemicals 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Machinery 
Basmnf 
Otherman 
Services 
Households Investment Government 
Final demands from domestic sources 
25971 5027 1952 
1194 1654 127 
7662 15847 2725 
40073 54 1117 
6409 751 2847 
5122 745 313 
2549 98 66 
3705 26842 2972 
25519 17757 7570 
1113 1399 197 
312917 259615 156510 
Share of imports by source (per cent) 
Dev Asia Japan EAC 
1.06 0.07 5.27 
0.86 0.34 5.02 
0.41 18.13 1.43 
2.31 0.38 3.63 
0.45 2.18 1.94 
7.76 0.97 2.62 
17.81 0.29 3.87 
0.88 5.68 1.13 
0.47 1.45 4.76 
4.53 10.07 2.76 
3.61 3.67 1.29 
Ex orts 
6733 
12407 
22757 
6169 
25498 
8711 
9116 
48833 
32657 
6999 
51224 
IMT 
1.32 
0.67 
0.03 
2.52 
0.23 
1.47 
2.69 
0.62 
0.34 
1.40 
1.13 
Households Investment Government Dut 
Final demand from imported sources 
5380 92 293 -4043 
602 30 15 0 
8863 9542 2392 -1416 
7599 0 241 -930 
3817 126 2571 -1337 
6738 132 311 -671 
9600 55 280 -1183 
7417 26627 3381 -3074 
6651 1990 1948 -1789 
4951 928 487 -447 
6850 1623 2777 -3073 
KST USA EU EFTA 
0.11 6.78 58.78 0.00 
0.18 6.84 39.63 0.00 
1.88 9.46 66.35 0.00 
0.38 4.72 76.58 0.00 
0.84 5.00 84.61 0.00 
3.82 1.80 76.35 0.00 
1.98 0.98 67.67 0.00 
4.49 10.07 76.14 0.00 
1.16 3.21 83.03 0.00 
6.21 10.50 60.46 0.00 
1.51 7.25 75.56 0.00 
Notes: Dev Asia is "developing Asia", EAC is Europe Agreement countries, IMT is Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand, KST is Korea-Singapore-Taiwan. 
ROW Total Imports 
26.60 7629 
46.46 13714 
2.31 23600 
9.48 6645 
4.76 26738 
5.21 9589 
4.71 9861 
1.00 51241 
5.58 35778 
4.07 7449 
5.98 51224 
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Table A9 Variables of the CATO model 
Variable Subscript range Number Description 
(n)(l) n= l, ... ,c c(c+l)gh Demand for good i from source s for 
i = l, ... ,g current production in industry j and X(is)j country n 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
j = 1, ... ,h 
(n) n = l, ... ,c ch Activity level in industry j and country n 
ZJ 
j = l, ... ,h 
(n) n= l, ... ,c c(c+l)g Price of good i from source s in country 
i = l, ... ,g n (denoted in country n's currency) for 
pis all end uses in country n 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
(n)p n= l, ... ,c 3ch Demand for primary factor v in industry 
v = 1,2,3 j and country n Xvj 
j = l, ... ,h 
(n)p n= l, ... ,c 2ch Price of primary factor v (v=2 capital), (v=3 land) in industry j and country n 
pvj v=2,3 j = l, ... ,h 
(n)p n = l, ... ,c c Price of aggregate labour in country n 
p1 
(n)o n= 1, ... ,c ch Demand for other costs in industry j in 
j = l, ... ,h country n 
Xj 
(n) n= 1, ... ,c cg Output of commodity i in industry i and 
i = l, ... ,g country n 
X(in) 
(n)( 2) n = l, ... ,c c(c+l)gh Demand for good i from source s for 
capital creation in industry j and country 
X(is)j i = l, ... ,g n 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
j = l, ... ,h 
(n) n= 1, ... ,c ch Investment in industry j in country n 
yj j = l, ... ,h 
(n)< 3) n= l, ... ,c c(c+l)g Demand for good i from source s for household consumption in country n 
Xis 
i = l, ... ,g 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
(n)(3) n = 1, ... ,c cg Demand for good i undifferentiated by source for household consumption in 
Xi 
i = l, ... ,g 
country n 
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Variable Subscript range Number Description 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c c Number of households in country n 
q 
(n)( 3 J n= l, ... ,c cg Price of good k undifferentiated by 
pk k= l, ... ,g source to consumers in country n 
(n)( 4 J s = 1, ... ,c cg Commodity demands by source in the 
rest of the world 
Xis i = 1, ... ,g 
(n)( s) n= 1, ... ,c c(c+l)g Other demands for good i from source s 
i = l, ... ,g for use in country n Xis 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate real household consumption 
in country n 
CR 
(n)( s) n = l, ... ,c c(c+l)g Country shift factors for other demands 
fis i = l, ... ,g 
by source 
s = 1, ... ,c+l 
(n)(3) n= 1, ... ,c c Index of consumer prices in country n 
£ 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c c Aggregate nominal household 
c 
expenditure in country n 
(n)o n= 1, ... ,c ch Country prices of other costs 
pj j = 1, ... ,h 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c ch Cost of capital creation in industry j in j = l, ... ,h country n 
1Cj 
(n)* n = l, ... ,c c2g Cif import price to country n of 
i = l, ... ,g commodity I from foreign source s 
pis (expressed in source s's currency) 
s = l, ... ,c+l 
s=n 
n = 1, ... ,c c Exchange rate for country n (the 
</Jn 
domestic price of the rest of the world's 
currency) 
n = l, ... ,c c2g One plus the ad valorem rate of 
fi(n, s) s = l, ... ,c+l 
protection on commodity i imported by 
country n from foreign source s 
s=n 
n= l, ... ,g c(c-l)g Ad valorem transport margins required 
hi(m,n) m,n= l, ... ,c 
to move goods from country m to 
country n 
m=n 
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Variable Subscript range Number Description 
Ad valorem transport margins required 
hi(n, w) 
to move goods from country n to rest of 
the world 
(n) i = 1, .. .,g cg One plus the ad valorem export (to rest 
of the world) subsidy on good i in 
Si 
n = l, ... ,c 
country n 
(n)e n = l, ... ,c cg One plus the ad valorem export subsidy 
Sin i = l, ... ,g 
on good I in country n 
(n)e n= l, ... ,c cg Export price of good i from country n 
Pin i = 1, ... ,g 
(n) n= l, ... ,c ch Rate of return to capital in industry j and 
j = l, ... ,h country n Tj 
(n) n = l, ... ,c ch Current capital stock in industry j and 
kj j = 1, ... ,h country n 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate nominal investment in 
. 
country n 
l 
(n) n= l, ... ,c ch Employment of land in industryy j in 
j = l, ... ,h country n 
ni 
i = l, ... ,g g Commodity demands, undifferentiated 
x/4) by source, in the rest of the world 
(s)( 4) s = l, ... ,c+l (c+l)g Price of good i from source s in the rest 
of the world 
pis 
i = l, ... ,g 
(n) i = 1, ... ,g cg Country n's commodity import volume (from other countries and the rest of the 
XiF n = l, ... ,c world) 
(n) i = l, ... ,g cg Import volume of good i country n to 
other countries 
XiE n = l, ... ,c 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c2g Country n's imports of good i from 
s = l, ... ,c+l foreign source s Xis 
i = l, ... ,g 
n=s 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate foreign currency (rest of the 
world currency units) value of imports 
m by country n 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate foreign currency (rest of the 
world currency units) value of exports 
e by country n 
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Variable Subscript range Number Description 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c c Balance of trade in country n 
M3 
(n) n= l, ... ,c c Aggregate import volume by country n 
mvol 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate export volume by country n 
' 
.i evol 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c c Real aggregate investment in country n 
. 
lR 
(n)( 2) n= 1, ... ,c c Investment goods price index in country 
n 
e 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate employment in country n 
1 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Aggregate capital stock in country n 
1C 
(n)o n = l, ... ,c ch Shift factor for the price of other costs in 
fi j = l, ... ,h industry j in country n 
(n) n= l, ... ,c c Shift factor for the price of labour in 
f 1 general in country n 
(n) n = 1, ... ,c c Real GDP in country n 
gdp 
(n) n = l, ... ,c c Real other demands in country n 
XG 
(n) n=ltoc c Economy-wide rate of return in country 
n 
r 
(n)R n=ltoc ch Rate of return shift terms in country n 
fi j=ltoh 
(n) n=ltoc c Nominal GDP 
gdpN 
(n) n=ltoc cg Shift term for production of good i in 
fi i = 1 tog country n 
(n)c n=ltoc c Consumption function shift term for 
f country n 
(n) n=ltoc c GDP excluding terms of trade effects 
gdpT 
2 2 Total number of vanables = 2c gh+2cgh+8c g+ 13cg+ 15ch+2g+23c 
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Table AlO Parameters of the CATO model 
Eauation Parameter Description Source and example* 
(1) (n)(l) CBS substitution parameter for alternative Econometric 
Ciij sources of good i for use as input into 
current production in industry j in country n 
(n)(I) Share of good i from sources in industry j's IO. 
S (is)j purchases of i for inputs to current (n)11 J 
production in country n S (is) j is the ijth element of 
A11 divided by sum ofijth 
elements of Au + Az1 + Ae1 + 
Ac+1,1 
(2) and (3) (n)p CBS substitution parameter for primary Econometric 
<J'j factor v in industry j in country n 
(n) Cost share of primary factor v (v = 1 labour, (1) 
Svj v = 2 capital, v = 3 land) in total primary IO. S2j is jth element of 
factor cost in industry j in country n H1 divided by jth column 
total of G1 + H1 + I1 
(c) 
SI j is jth element of Ge 
divided by jth column 
total of Ge + He + le 
(4) and (5) No parameters 
(6) (n)!2J CBS substitution parameter for alternative Econometric 
O"ij sources of good i for use as an input into 
investment in industry j in country n 
(n)(2J Share of good i from source s in industry j's ( 1 )(2) 
Sus)j total purchases for i for inputs to capital IO S (il)j is the ith 
creation in country n element of Bu divided by 
the sum of the ith 
elements of Bu + B21 + Be+1,1 
(7) (n)(3) CBS substitution parameter for good i from Econometric 
<Ji source s when used in household 
consumption in country n 
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Equation Parameter Description Source and examnle* 
(n)(3J Share of the value of good i from source s in (1)(3) 
Sis the total purchases of good i by households IO. Sil is the ith element 
in country n of C11 divided by the 
sum of the ith element of 
Cu+ C21 + Cc1 + Cc+1,1 
(1)(3) 
Si,c + i is the ith element 
of Cc+l,I divided by the sum 
of the ith elements of Cu+ 
C21 + Cc1 + Cc+l,l 
(8) (n) Household expenditure elasticity of good i Econometric 
£i in country n 
(n) Household cross price elasticities of demand Econometric 
1Jik for good i in general with respect to changes in the general price of good k in country n 
(9) (n)(3! Defined in (7) IO 
Sks 
(10) (4) CBS substitution in parameter in the rest of Econometric 
<Ji the world for good i from source s 
(s)(4) Share of the total purchases of good i in the (1)(4) 
Sis rest of the world represented by purchases IO. Sil is the first 
of good i from source s 
element of the ith column of 
P divided by total of all 
elements in ith column of P 
(11) (n )(5) Indexing parameter to set relationship Specified by user 
his between aggregate real consumption and 
other demands for good i from source s in 
country n 
(12) (n)(l) Cost share of good i from source s in total ( 1)(1) 
H (is)j current production costs of industry j in H (is) j is the ijth country n IO. 
element of A11 divided by 
total costs of industry j in 
country 1. These are 
computed as the jth column 
sum of An+ Ac1 + Ac+1,1 + G1 
+ H1+11+11 
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Equation Parameter Description Source and examnle* 
(n)(P) Cost share of labour in the total costs of (l)(P) 
H1 industry j in country n IO. H1 is the jth element 
of G1 divided by the total 
costs of industry j in country 
1 
(s)p Cost share of primary factor v in the total (l)p 
Hvj costs of industry j in country n IO. H2j is the jth element 
of H1 divided by the total 
costs of industry j in country 
1 
(n)o Cost share of other costs in the total costs of (l)o 
Hj industry j IO. Hj is the jth element 
of J1 divided by total costs of 
industry j in country 1 
(n )(2) 
H (is)j 
(13) Share of good i from source s in the total (1)(2) 
costs of capital creation in industry j in IO. H Ul)j is ith element 
country n 
of Bu divided by the sum of 
the column elements of Bu + 
Bz1 + Bel + Bc+1,1 
(14) to (17) No parameters 
(18) (m)(l) Share of total sales of good i produced in (1)(1) 
B(in)j country n absorbed by sales to industry j in IO. B(il)j is the ijth 
country m for current production 
element of Au divided by the 
total sales of country 1 's 
good i, ie the sum over the ith 
row of Au +Bu +Cu+ Du 
+ Ei,c+t + A12 + B12 + C12 + 
D12 +Ale+ Blc +Cle+ D!c 
(m)(2) Share of total sales of good i produced in (1)(2) 
Bun>j country n absorbed by sales to industry j in IO. B(il)j is the ith 
country m for capital creation 
element of B11 divided by the 
total sales of country 1' s 
goodi 
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Equation Parameter Description Source and example* 
(m)(3J Share of total sales of good i produced in (1)(3) 
Bin country n absorbed by sales to households IO. Bil is the ith element 
in country m of C11 divided by the total 
sales of country 1' s good i 
(1)(4) Share of total sales of good i produced in (1)(4) 
Bin country n absorbed by sales to exports (rest IO. Bil is the ith element 
of the world) of E1,c+l divided by the total 
sales of country 1' s good i 
(m)(5) Share of total sales of good i produced in (1)(5) 
Bin country n absorbed by sales to other IO. Bil is the ith element of 
demands in country n D11 divided by the total sales 
of country 1' s good i 
(19) (n) Share of country n's total employment (1) 
Bti which is accounted for by industry j IO. Btj is the jth element 
of G1 divided by row total of 
G1 
(20) to (22) No parameters 
(23) (n) Share of country n's total cif imports of (1) 
F (is) good i represented by imports of i from IO. F (i2) is ith row sum sources 
of Az1 + B21 + C21 + D21 + F21 
+ Ac1 + B cl + C cl + D cl + F 
cl + Ac+l,1 + Bc+l,1 + Cc+l,l + 
Dc+l,I + Fc+1.1 
(24) (n) Share of total exports of commodity i from (1) 
SE(im) country n going to country m IO. SE(i2) is ith element 
of (A12 + B12 + C12 + D12 + 
Fn) divided by (A12 + B12 + 
C12 + D12 + F12 + ... +Ale + 
B1c + C1c + D1c + F1c) 
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Equation Parameter Description Source and example* 
(25) (n )<l) Share of the total imports of good i by (1)(1) 
F (is)j country n from source s which is absorbed IO. F(i2)j is ijth 
by industry j in country n for current 
elementof A21 divided by production total imports of good i to 
country 1 from country 2, ie, 
ith row sum of Az1 + B21 + 
C21 + D21 
(n)(ZJ Share of the total imports of good i by (1)(2) 
F us>i country n from source s which is absorbed IO. F (i2)j is ith element 
by industry j in country n for capital 
of B21 divided by total 
creation imports of good i to country 1 
from country 2 
(n)(3J Share of the total imports of good i by (1)(3) 
Fis country n from source s which is absorbed IO. Fi2 is ith element of by households in country n C21 divided by total imports 
of i to country 1 from country 
2 
(n)(5) Share of the total imports of good i by (1)(5) 
Fis country n from source s which is absorbed IO. Fi2 is the ith element by other demands in country n 
of D21 divided by total 
imports of i to country 1 from 
country 2 
(26) (n) Share of total foreign currency cost of IO. First compute row sums 
Mim imports to country n from country m of Az1 + B21 + C21 + D21 + 
represented by imports of good i from (1) 
country m F21· Mi2 is ith element of 
vector sum divided by all 
elements in vector sum 
(n) Share of total foreign currency cost of (1) 
Mm imports to country n represented by imports 
IO. M2 is (A21 + B21 + from country m 
C21 + D21 + F21)/(A21 + B21 + 
C21 + D21 + F21 + Ac1 + B cl + 
C cl + D cl + F cl + A.:+1,1 + 
Bc+1,1 + Cc+1,1 + Dc+1,1 + 
Fc+1,1) 
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Equation 
(27) 
(27) cont'd 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
Parameter 
(n) 
Miw 
(n) 
Mw 
(m) 
Ein 
(m) 
En 
(w) 
Ein 
(w) 
En 
(n) 
E 
(n) 
M 
Description 
Share of total foreign currency cost of 
imports to country n from rest of the world 
represented by imports of good i from rest 
of the world 
Share of total foreign currency cost of 
imports to country n represented by imports 
from the rest of the world 
Share of the foreign currency exports of 
country n to country m accounted for by 
commodity i to country m 
Share of the total foreign currency exports 
of country n represented by exports to 
countrym 
Share of the foreign currency exports of 
country n to the rest of the world accounted 
for by commodity i to the rest of the world 
Share of the total for currency exports of 
country n represented by exports to the rest 
of the world 
Total foreign currency export earnings of 
country n 
Total foreign currency import costs of 
country n 
See equation (26) 
See equation (27) 
Source and examole* 
IO. First compute row sums 
of Ac+t,1 + Bc+1,1 + Cc+u + 
(n) 
Dc+l,l + Fc+l,l· Miw is ith 
element of vector sum 
divided by all elements in 
vector sum 
(1) 
IO. Mw is (Ac+l,l + Bc+l,1 
+ Cc+U + Dc+t,1 + Fc+1,1)/(A21 
+ B21 + C21 + D21 + Fz1 + Act 
+ B cl + C cl + D cl + F cl + 
Ac+t,1 + Bc+l,l + Cc+l,l + 
Dc+1,1) 
IO. First sum Au+ B12 + C12 
(2) 
+ D12 + F12- Eil is ith 
element of vector sum 
divided by all elements in 
vector sum 
(2) 
IO. El is (A12 + B12 + C12 
+ D12 + F12)/(A12 + B12 + C12 
+ D12 + F12 + Atc + Btc + Ctc 
+ D1c + Fie + E1c+1) 
(w) 
IO. Eil is ith element of 
E1,c+1 divided by total of all 
elements ofE1,c+I 
IO. is E1,c+1 /(A12 + B12 + 
C12 + D12 + F12+ A1c + B1c + 
C1c + D1c) 
(1) 
IO. E is A12 + B12 + C12 + 
D12 + F12+ A12 + B12 + C12 + 
D12 + F12 + E1,c+1 
(1) 
IO. M is Az1 + B21 + C21 + 
D21 + Fz1 + Ac1 + Bel + Cc! + 
Dc1 + Fc1 + Ac+t,1 + Bc+1,1 + 
Cc+l,l + Dc+l,1 + Fc+l,1 
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Eauation Parameter Description Source and example* 
(31) (n)(3) Weight of good i from source s in the (1)(3) 
Wis consumer price index in country n IO. Wit is the ith element 
of Cu divided by sum of all 
elements in Cu + C21 + Cc1 + 
Cc+1,1 
(32) (n) Wage indexation parameter Set by model user 
hi 
(33) (n)o Other costs indexing parameter Set by model user 
hj 
(34) (n) Respectively the shares of gross domestic Calculated by model user. 
Sc product accounted for by aggregate . Sum of all shares is unity. 
consumption demand, investment demand, 
other demand, export demand and import 
demand in country n 
(n) 
Si 
(n) 
Sg 
(n) 
Se 
(n) 
Sm 
(35) (n)(5) Share of total other demands in country n ( 1)(5) 
Sis accounted for by other demands of good i IO. Sn is the ith from source s 
element of Du + D12 = Dc1 + 
Dc+t,1 
(36) No parameters 
(37) (n) For country n share of total investment National accounts 
Ti accounted for by industry j information 
(38) (n) Defined in (37) 
1J 
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Equation Parameter Description Source and example* 
(39) No parameters 
(40) (n) Ratio of gross (before depreciation) to net National accounts 
Q; (after depreciation) rate ofreturn in industry information 
j in country n 
(41) (n) Share of country n's aggregate capital stock National accounts 
lf/2j accounted for by the capital stock in information 
industry j 
(42) No parameters 
(43) (n) Share of industry j in total value added in ( 1) 
SV; country n IO. SV1 is the first 
element of (G1 + H1 + I1) 
divided by the sum of all 
elements of G1 +H1 +11 
(44) No parameters 
(45) See equation (34) 
* Parameter source is either econometric or from the input-output (IO) set of accounts 
constructed for the base period, or from some other nominated source. The IO based parameters 
are defined in terms of the elements in figure 2 and figure 3. 
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Table All: Equations of the CATO model 
Identifier Equation Range Number Description 
1 (nXo (n) (•Xt (n) f (n)O! (n)) i = 1 tog c(c+l)gh Country demands for intermediate 
X(is)j = lj- O'ij pis- S(is)j pis s = 1 to c+l inputs by source for current j=ltoh production 
s=l n=ltoc 
2 (n)p (•) (n)p( (n)p ± (n) (n)p (n)(n)p) v=2,3 2ch Country demands for capital (v = 
Xvj = 'Zj- <Jj pvj- Svj pvj- Slj pl j=ltoh 2) and land (v = 3) 
v=2 n= 1 toe 
3 (n)p (n) (n)p((n)p ± (n)(n)p (n) (n)p) n=ltoc ch Country demands for labour (v = 
Xlj = lj- <J'j p1- Svj pvj- Slj p1 j=ltoh 1) 
v=2 
4 (n)o (n) j=ltoh ch Country demands for other costs 
Xj = ZJ n=ltoh 
5 (n) (n) (n) n=ltoc cg Country supplies of commodities 
Xin = Zi+ fi i = 1 tog 
6 (n)'.". _ (n) (nk.'.'( (n) f (nk'! (n)) i = 1 tog c(c+l)gh Country demands for intermediate 
X(1s)1 - Y1- <:Ju pis- S(is)j pis s=ltoc+l inputs by source for capital 
s=l 
j=ltoh creation 
n=ltoc 
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Identifier Equation Range Number Description 
7 (nk" (n)m (nk"( (n) f (nk" (n) J i = 1 tog c(c+l)g Country household demands for 
Xis = Xi - <J'i pis- Sis pis s = 1 to c+l commodities classified by source 
n= 1 toe 
s=l 
8 rn;,, rn1 rnrn> <n>) f <n> <n>''' i=ltog cg Household demand for 
Xi - q = Ci C - q + 'J1ik pk n=ltoc commodities undistinguished by 
k=l 
source 
9 (n)l3J "I (n)(3) (n) k=ltog cg Country general price of each 
pk = Sks pks 
n=ltoc commodity to households 
s=l 
10 (<k<J "' "'((>!«> I, ('k•>(<)«>J i = 1 tog cg 'Rest of world' demands by source 
Xn = Xi- Oi pis - Sis pis n= 1 toe 
n=l 
11 (n)(5) (n) (n)(5) (n)(5) i = 1 tog c(c+l)g Country other demands by source 
Xis = CR his + fis s=ltoc+l 
n=ltoc 
12 (n) g I. (n) (n)(l) (n)(P) (n)(P) j=ltoh ch Zero pure profits in production in 
pjn= 'L pisH(is)j+ pl H1j n=ltoc each country 
i=l s=l ± (n)p (s)p (n)o(n)o 
+ pvj Hvj+ Pi Hj 
v=2 
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Identifier 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Equation 
g 
(n) - ~ 
1Cj - LJ 
i=l 
(n) (n )* 
c+l ~ (n'. (n)(2) 
LJ pis H (is) j 
s=l 
pis = pis+ </Jn+ [i(n, s) 
(n)* (m)e 
pim = pim+ hi(m,n) 
(n)e (n) (n )e 
pin= pin- </Jn- Sin 
(n)(4) (n) (n) 
pin = pin- </Jn- Si+ hi(n, w) 
(n) h c (m)(l) (m)(IJ h 
Xin = L L X(in)j B(in)j+ L 
j=l m=I j=I 
~ (m)(3) (m)(3) (n)(4) (n)(4) 
,£.. Xin Bin+ Xin Bin 
m=l 
~ (m)(5) (m)(5) 
+ ,.t..J Xin Bin 
m=l 
~ (m~(2). (m~(2) 
£..J X(m)J Bcm)j 
m=I 
Range Number Description 
j = 1 to h ch Zero pure profits in capital 
n = 1 to c creation in each country 
i = 1 tog I c2g Zero pure profits in importing 
s = 1 to c+l 
n = 1 to c 
s=n 
i = 1 tog I c(c-l)g I Border pri~e of good i from 
n=ltoc country mm n 
m =I to c 
m=n 
i = 1 tog cg Export price of good i from 
n=ltoc country n 
i = 1 tog cg Zero pure profits in exporting to 
n = 1 to c rest of world 
i = 1 tog cg Demand equals supply for 
n=ltoc domestic commodities in each 
country 
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Identifier 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Equation 
(n) ~ (n)p (n) 
1 = ."-' Xlj Bli 
j=l 
(n) (n) 
yj = kj 
(n) (n)p 
/q = X2j 
(n) (n)p 
nj = X3j 
(n) c+l (n) (n) 
XiF = L X(is) F(is) 
s=l 
#l 
(n) c (m) (n) (n)4 (n) 
XiE = L X(in) SE (im) + Xin SEi, row 
m=l 
m#n 
Range 
n= 1 toe 
n=l 
j = 1 toh 
n=ltoc 
j = 1 to h 
n= 1 toe 
j = 1 toh 
i = 1 tog 
n= 1 toe 
i = 1 tog 
n= 1 toe 
Number I Description 
c I Demand equals supply for labour 
in each country 
ch I Investment growth equals capital 
stock growth in each country 
ch I Demand equals supply for capital 
in each country 
ch I Demand equals supply for land in 
each country 
cg I Import volume by country n from 
other countries 
cg I Export volume by country n to 
other countries 
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Identifier Equation 
25 (n) h (n)Cl) (n)(I) h (n)(2) (n)(2) 
Xis= L X(is)j F (is)j+ L X(is)j F (is)j 
j=l j=l 
(n)C3) (n)C3) (n)CS) (n)CS) 
+ Xis Fis + Xis Fis 
26 (n) ~ ['f ( (n) (n)*) (n) ] (n) 
m = L..J L..J Xim+ pim Mim Mm 
m=l i=l 
moFn ['f ( (n) (n)•) (n) ] (n) + L..J Xiw+ piw Miw M w 
i=l 
27 (n) ~ ['f ((m) (n)e) (m)] (m) 
e = L..J .L.J Xin+ pin Ein En 
m=l i=l 
moFn 
'f ((n)(4) (n)C4)) (w) (w) 
+,Li pin + Xin Ein En 
i=l 
28 (n) (n)(n) (n)(n) 
lOO~B = Ee- Mm 
Range 
i = 1 tog 
n=ltoc 
s = 1 to c+l 
s=n 
n=ltoc 
n=ltoc 
n = 1 to c 
Number I Description 
c2g I Imports by country n from source s 
c 
c 
c 
Foreign currency value of imports 
by country n 
Foreign currency value of exports 
by country n 
Balance of trade for country n 
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Identifier 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Equation 
c (n) ~ 
mvol = L..J 
m=I 
m*n 
[~ (n) (n) ] (n) ,L..J Xim Mim Mm 
i=I 
[~ (n) (n) ] (n) + L..JXiw Miw Mw 
i=I 
(n) c [ g (m) (m)] (m) 
evol = ~ tt Xin Ein En 
m*n 
~ (n)(4) (w) (w) 
+ L..J Xin Ein En 
i=I 
(n)(3) ~ ~ (n)(3J (n) 
e = ,£..J ,£..J Wis Pis 
i=l s=l 
(n)p (n) (n)(3) (n) 
p1 =hi ~ + f 1 
(n)o (n)o (n)(3) (n)o 
Pi+ hi ~ + fi 
(n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) (n) 
gdp =Sc CR+ Si iR+ SgXG+ See 
(n) (n) 
-Smm 
Range 
n=ltoc 
n= 1 toe 
n=ltoc 
n= 1 toe 
n=ltoc 
j = 1 toh 
n=ltoc 
Number I Description 
c 
c 
c 
c 
ch 
c 
Volume of imports by country n 
Volume of exports by country n 
Consumer price index in country n 
Allows exogenous setting of 
country wages 
Allows exogenous setting of price 
of other costs in each country 
Real GDP in each country 
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35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
c+l (n) - ~ 
XG- £. 
~ (n)'.5) (n)(S) 
£. Xis Sis 
i=l 
(n) 
CR= 
s=l 
(n) n(3) 
c- ~ 
(1~) f ((n) (n)) (n) 
z = .L..J nj + yj Tj 
j=l 
(n)(2) ~ (n) (n) 
e =£.TJ1q 
j=l 
(n) 
. 
lR = 
(n) 
Tj = 
(n) (n)(2) 
i - £ 
(n)( (n)p (n)) 
QJ p21- ltj 
(n) ~ (n) (n) 
K = £.J Ki l/f2J 
j=I 
n = 1 to c 
n = 1 to c 
n = 1 to c 
n = 1 to c 
n=ltoc 
j = 1 to h 
c=lton 
n=ltoc 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
ch 
c 
Real other demands in each 
country 
Real consumption in each country 
Nominal investment in each 
country 
Investment goods price index in 
each country 
Real investment in each country 
Country industry rates of return 
Aggregate capital stock in each 
country 
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Identifier 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Equation 
(n) (n) (n)R 
n=r+fi 
(n)N (n) h (n) 
gdp = gdp+ I sv j pin 
j=I 
(n) (n)N (n)c 
c = gdp+ f 
(n)T (n)(n) (n)(n) (n)(n) (n) (n) 
gdp = Sc CR+ Si iR + Sg Xg+ Se evoz-
(n) (n) 
Smrnwz 
Total number of equations= 2c2gh+2cgh5c2g+10cg+12ch+18c 
Range 
n=ltoc 
j = 1 toh 
n=ltoc 
n=ltoc 
n=ltoc 
Number I Description 
ch I Defines relative rates of return 
c I Nominal GDP in each country 
c I Consumption function in each 
country 
c I Real GDP for region n excluding 
terms of trade effect 
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